

For Reference

NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM

Ex LIBRIS
UNIVERSITATIS
ALBERTAENSIS



THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

EDUCATION FOR SOCIALISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES AND THEIR POLITICAL -
ECONOMIC CONTEXTS IN CHINA AND TANZANIA

by



WILLIAM STEPHEN CARTHEW

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND
RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF EDUCATION

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING, 1978

DEDICATION

This Thesis is dedicated to the memory of
Bob Mansfield, and all we shared in life.

ABSTRACT

Education is usually regarded as a vital element in the development of nations. But educational strategies alone do not bring about wide-scale improvements in the material conditions in which people live. They must accompany political-economic strategies that build sound and secure lives for people by providing economic and social security that is equally accessible to the masses of people.

In the last thirty years, since the end of World War II, the newly independent countries of the 'Third World' have expanded their educational systems. But at the same time their political-economic development has been circumscribed. Their incorporation into the Periphery of the international capitalist system has exacerbated their dependency on the advanced capitalist world. They are undergoing what Andre Gunder Frank has called 'dynamic underdevelopment'.

Until the dependent nation severs itself from the dependency relationship, its attempts at 'modernisation' will inevitably be counter-developmental. The attempts will benefit only the fortunate few whose economic function is to serve global corporations and their local subsidiaries. Included in this are the attempts at 'educational modernisation' - the pursuit of educational strategies which in themselves are incapable of creating equality of opportunity for the masses.

The thesis examines the political-economic strategies of two countries which have attempted to dissociate themselves from dependency

relationships: the People's Republic of China, and Tanzania. It analyses and compares the policies and programmes these two countries have pursued to affect the transition to socialism. It also analyses their educational policies and programmes. These are set into context with the political-economic strategies in an endeavour to explore and explain the relationship between the two. The overall intention is to show how 'socialist' political-economic and educational strategies interact with one another in the transition to socialism.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would never have been written without the support, help and encouragement of the members of my supervisory committee: Dr. Brian Evans of the Department of History has generously shared with me his knowledge of and experiences in the People's Republic of China. Dr. Harry Garfinkle of the Department of Educational Foundations made some extremely useful suggestions on the theoretical framework of the thesis. His helpful suggestions for the design of the format are also valued. Dr. Raj. Pannu of the Department of Educational Foundations took over as my supervisor at short notice. His willing help will always be deeply appreciated, as will be his enlightening comments on the earlier draft of the thesis. Dr. Kazim Bacchus of the Department of Educational Foundations provided me with the initial guidance for the project. His encouragement gave me the courage to proceed.

In addition, I would like expecially to express my deepest gratitude to some of my fellow graduate students in the Department who helped me through some difficult times.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART		PAGE
I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
	Preamble.....	2
	Background to the Problem.....	2
	Statement of the Problem.....	4
	Sources.....	5
	CHAPTER I.....	7
	Education and Modernisation.....	18
	CHAPTER II.....	27
	Dependency and Educational Underdevelopment.....	34
	A Note on 'Socialism'.....	43
II.	Preamble.....	52
	CHAPTER III.....	56
	The Case of China.....	56
	Revolutionary Strategy: The Early Years.....	61
	The Yen'an Period.....	62
	The Case of Tanzania.....	68
	The Colonial Legacy: (i) Infrastructure.....	70
	(ii) Strategy.....	71
	Co-Operative and Self-Help Schemes	71
	The Development Strategy of the Post-Independence Period.....	73
	The First Five-Year Plan 1964-1969.....	76
	Comparing the Political-Economic Contexts.....	79

PART		PAGE
	CHAPTER IV.....	89
	Educational Developments in China Before 1949.....	90
	The Educational Strategy of the CCP - The Early Years to 1949.....	95
	The Cheng-feng Campaign.....	103
	Educational Developments in Tanzania Prior to the Arusha Declaration 1967.....	107
	The German Period.....	107
	The British Colonial Period.....	108
	The Post-Independency Period to 1967.....	112
	Postscript to Part II.....	115
III.	Preamble.....	127
	CHAPTER V.....	133
	China's Development Strategy: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.....	147
	Self-Reliance and the Development Strategy.....	151
	Conclusion.....	154
	CHAPTER VI.....	161
	Industry and Agriculture.....	162
	The Urban-Rural Dichotomy.....	164
	Self-Reliance.....	168
	Foreign Assistance.....	169
	Socialism.....	171
	Postscript to Part III.....	183
	The State.....	188
	Self-Reliance.....	191
IV.	Preamble.....	197
	CHAPTER VII.....	201

PART	PAGE
Part-Work, Part-Study Schools.....	206
The Regular School System.....	212
Events and Effects During the GPCR Itself.....	222
Students.....	224
Educational Institutions.....	226
Official Pronouncements.....	227
Educational Changes and the Cultural Revolution.....	230
Learning and Productive Labour.....	230
Localisation.....	231
Organising Education.....	233
Expansion.....	234
Teaching Methods, Materials, Curricula.....	235
Other Innovations and Changes.....	236
The May 7 Cadre Schools.....	238
CHAPTER VIII.....	250
Working out the Educational Strategy: Some Applications.....	254
Education for Self-Reliance in the Countryside.....	255
Adult Education.....	262
Illiteracy and Literacy Campaigns.....	264
The Education of Cadres: Kivukoni College.....	269
Postscript to Part VI.....	274
Localisation.....	274
Education and Labour.....	277
Ideology and Educational Practice.....	281
Forms.....	283
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	291

PART I

INTRODUCTION

"Paradigms of Development and Underdevelopment: 'Modernisation Theory' versus Dependency. And Explanations of the Role of Education."

Chapter I. 'Modernisation Theory' and the Role of Education in 'Modernisation'.

Chapter II. Imperialism and Dependency and Educational Underdevelopment.

Preamble to Part I

Background to the Problem.

Since 1945 the old European global empires have been gradually dismantled giving political independency to former colonies. The new nations of the 'Third World' often found themselves in dire economic straits, necessitating continuing dependence for economic survival on the former metropolises. There were some whose economies were sufficiently well-developed and integrated to eschew continuing patronage by the former metropolises. But in most cases, the new nations relied still on external support for capital - whether it came from Europe, North America, or Japan. All of these wealthy capitalist Centres were willing to provide investment capital, financial aid, and various other forms of assistance.

Nevertheless, the global corporations, for the most part, were only interested in investing where rates of return to capital were most profitable. The international 'aid' agencies distributed their funds and supportive services most readily where the corporations were operating best, where 'development' was promising.

By the mid-nineteen sixties new patterns of dependency and neo-imperialism were emerging. Many of the new nations discovered that they had merely replaced one coloniser with another. The gap between the wealthy centres and the exploited peripheral economies was growing. The rates of expropriation of capital in the forms of both financial profits and materials were considerable.

During this period when the new nations were designing strategies for economic, political and social reconstruction after colonialism, unprecedented emphasis was placed on the role of education in national development. It was assumed that the education systems of the wealthy capitalist Centres should be emulated. It was thought that education produced social, political, and economic progress. As the years passed the newly-expanded education systems produced trained people in greater numbers. But, despite this many countries found themselves little further advanced economically and socially. Instead of trained, skilled people working on developmental projects, the cities were exploding with young, educated, and unemployed people.

What had gone wrong was that the economic development strategies pursued operated more for the profit of global corporations than for the improvement of the masses' lives. Projects undertaken with the backing of Multinational capital often contributed little to actual infrastructural development. Many of the new countries found themselves with 'milk-bar' economies: producing consumer goods for export to the advanced capitalist countries. Their economies were neither expanding nor independent. They were once again locked into economic strongholds with little hope of breaking out.

In this context education for overcoming underdevelopment was useful only to the limited extent to which the job market could absorb school graduates. Furthermore, the education systems were a burdensome weight on national budgets, designed as they were for more affluent socio-economic conditions. Finally, the relationship between education and political-economic development was not clear-cut. Education, it was discovered, could do little to improve people's lives

materially if the economic context in which it was supposed to operate was not working for similar wide-scale socio-economic development. In short, education strategies for development were invariably designed and adapted with uncritical attention to the political and economic realities of neo-imperialism and dependency.

Statement of the Problem

In the thesis I argue that dependency resulting from involvement in the global capitalist system is counter-productive to development. It is further argued that political-economic and social development is only possible where development strategies can be planned and executed in relative isolation from international capitalism. That is, in order for development to succeed, the peripheral economy has to dissociate itself from the dependency relationship with the capitalist Centres, and plan strategies independently. This includes educational strategies, which must be developed in a manner complementary to the political-economic strategies. These arguments form the substantial bases to Parts One and Two following.

In Parts Three and Four I proceed to the central problem of the Thesis. I investigate the relationship between the political-economic, and educational strategies in two countries which have moved to dissociate themselves from the international capitalist system. These two countries, China and Tanzania, have embarked on strategies which are designed to affect the transition to socialism. Analysing policy statements and reports of policy applications I hope to show how political-economic strategies and educational strategies

interract in 'socialist' societies. In doing this I make comparisons and draw conclusions to support the earlier argument - that strategies can only be successful when planned and undertaken in societies that have dissociated from international capitalism.

Sources

In the absence of comprehensive data on the strategies as they are applied, it has been necessary to concentrate on policy documents and published reports. The latter are frequently government reports from various information agencies. Both of these kinds of data are useful as they take account of the 'nationwide' scope of the discussion in both cases. Few other sources can provide this scope.

Nevertheless, analysing national economic and educational strategies frequently leaves the investigator with the problems of inadequate breadth in the data, on the one hand; and statements and reports which are far too general, on the other.

In the cases of both China and Tanzania, primary research data describing nationwide applications of strategies and their results are not readily available. Though Five-Year Plans and comments on them by other analysts are sometimes usable. For the most part, however, I have relied on policy documents published by the governments concerned, and on extrapolations and from these by informed analysts. In many cases I have used speeches and writings of political leaders, and party pronouncements and reports. These too are analysed with reference to other reporters and analysts. Hence, the work in the thesis has been, substantially, policy analysis.

China, for the researcher or analyst who does not read the Chinese language, is a special case in the matter of sources.

Reliance upon translated documents poses two difficulties: first, the translations themselves may be of questionable accuracy. Second, one is totally dependent solely on material that another individual or institution has translated. As for the former, one can only be careful not to place too much emphasis on a point that mistranslation or misinterpretation could affect. As for the second difficulty, it is doubtful whether knowledge of the Chinese language could have placed much more material relevant to the thesis within reach. Most important education policy announcements are readily available in translation from a number of sources.

CHAPTER I

"MODERNISATION THEORY" AND THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN "MODERNISATION"

It has long been held that education in some form has an integral role to play in the development of what are called the 'underdeveloped nations'. Most contemporary sociologists, political scientists, economists, and psychologists writing about development and underdevelopment in the "Third World" assign a prominent role to education in bringing development about. The development of an educational strategy as part of, or even prerequisite to, a political-economic development strategy is widely regarded as essential. There is, nevertheless, growing dissatisfaction with the manner in which the relationship between education and political-economic development is viewed. The sources of this dissatisfaction are various, but they may be generally grouped under two headings: dissatisfaction emanating from skepticism about the actual political-economic strategies within which educational strategies are supposed to operate; and dissatisfaction with the forms and methods of education itself. These questions are discussed in the following pages with a view to placing the political-economic and educational strategies of China and Tanzania in a particular context.

The term "underdevelopment" is usually understood to refer to a set of conditions which operate against the realisation of the full

potential of societies in human or material terms. Relative to the countries of the "developed" world, those of the underdeveloped world are materially poorly off. But it is not sufficient to leave our understanding of "underdevelopment" at that - in the form of a general comparative statement - this can blind us to some of the assumptions that are inherent in such a simple comparison.

A society may be underdeveloped also, according to its potential for 'development' - but this statement must also be treated circum-spectly since it is frequently argued, either explicitly or implicitly, that the development of the full potential of societies means the development of industrially-based, mass consumption society in which surplus is derived from the sale of consumer goods in a "free" market.

Concentrating for a moment on the former aspect of the 'relativity' of underdevelopment and development: it is clear that the 'developed' countries of North America, Western Europe, Oceania and Japan abound with wealth that is in contrast to the 'underdeveloped' countries. Their inhabitants enjoy individual and social security and the conditions for upward mobility in a way that is unknown in the Third World. In fact, the characteristic abundance of the developed world finds its direct antithesis in the underdeveloped countries.

However, it is incorrect to regard the relative conditions of the developed and the underdeveloped world as manifestations of their different positions on a historical time line. This assumption of 'unilinearity' underlies many of the interpretations of the processes of political-economic development. Most of these interpretations lie within a particular paradigm of development that for the purposes of this study, can be referred to as 'modernisation theory'. The core

assumption of 'modernisation theory' is that societies progress toward what is assumed to be the end result of any historical development - the kind of society that is characteristic of contemporary "First World" capitalism.

For example, the sociologist Elsenstadt includes this assumption in his definition of 'modernisation':

Historically, modernisation is the process of change towards those types of social, economic, and political systems that have developed in western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth and have then spread to other European countries and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the South American, Asian and African continents.¹

In making this assumption, modernisation theorists tacitly subscribe to the view that there is a single direction of historical development, and that the now-underdeveloped world is somehow locked into an earlier epoch out of which the metropolises of the capitalist world have already broken by various means. In Eisenstadt's case, the recent political, economic and social histories of Asia, Latin America and Africa are reduced to the 'spread' of 'western' political, social, and economic forms and processes. There is scant mention of capitalist economic domination in these areas, nor of the manner in which the 'political' and 'social' systems of for instance the United States, are instruments in the perpetuation of this domination.

The challenge confronting the Third World, it is argued (and it is frequently expressed in these dramatic, rhetorical terms) is similarly to break out of the incarcerating binds of history. This leads to a variety of explanations for underdevelopment that concentrate on perceived deficiencies in underdeveloped societies in

economic, political, cultural, sociological, or psychological terms. That is, modernisation theorists attempt to show that since developed capitalist countries and their inhabitants manifest certain characteristics that are considered to promote development, the Third World is not developed because it lacks these characteristics. These characteristics are diverse and often ill-defined, they include 'traditionalism' 'conservatism' or 'feudalism' as applied to both institutions and attitudes; or they may be specifically associated with certain sociological or psychological conditions that are believed prevalent. For example, Inkeles and Smith in their study of the preconditions for 'modernisation' in several societies concluded that: "modern" man must demonstrate such characteristics as "cosmopolitanism", "innovative spirit", "present time orientation", "punctuality orderliness" habits, and faith in science and technology.²

McClelland's³ well-known argument that entrepreneurial activity (a prerequisite for economic development) is a product of 'need for achievement motivation', or N-ach, is another deficiency model. The countries of the Third World, McClelland asserts, are developing only slowly because of the absence of N-ach. Hagen⁴ also contends that certain necessary psychological characteristics associated with achievement motivation are lacking in underdeveloped societies. As Andre Gunder Frank correctly points out achievement motivation, or any other precept of individual psychology for that matter, is hardly a sufficient prerequisite for development on its own, without, that is, making extensive alterations in or revolutionizing the social, political and economic conditions within which people operate, or achieve.⁵

Since the early 1960's there has been increased emphasis among 'modernisation theorists' on political modernisation as a focal point for overcoming underdevelopment. The functional analysis of, for instance, Pye, Coleman, Almond et.al.⁶ gave rise to a lexicon of political science jargon with which attempts were made to describe the political systems in 'developing' countries in terms of their alleged functions: 'political socialisation', 'political recruitment', 'interest articulation', 'interest aggregation' and so on - all which, cast little light on the actual conflicts and contradictions in Third World political economy, and give the analyses a spurious 'scientific' appearance. Pye locates 'cultural diffusion' (presumably in pre-colonial times) as a significant factor inhibiting the development of political integration: '...there are, 'he writes, 'almost communal groupings in each society, each oriented around ideas and practices that can be placed at different points on a continuum from traditional to modern life'.⁷ In this context, as in others, the inadequacy of the 'traditional'/'modern' dichotomy is clearly perceptible since it ignores the relationships between these 'communal groupings' which are likely to explain the differences in behavior - especially the economic and political relationships between 'groupings' (which are probably more adequately defined, the absence of a specific context notwithstanding, as classes). Moreover, the "traditional" is simply defined negatively in relation to the "modern", so even while omitting the contentious question of what is modern, differences between empirical societies allocated to the residual category of the traditional are ignored'.⁸

Unilinearity is a key component of W.W. Rostow's 'Stages of Economic Growth'.⁹ This description of the progression of societies from 'traditionalism', 'modernism', i.e., to high mass consumption, has been extremely influential especially in the formulation of United States policy in the Third World. The Rostowian thesis has always been the object of attack by economists bourgeois and Marxist alike¹⁰ - the most penetrating critique coming from Paul Baran and E.J. Hobsbawm", and from A.G. Frank.¹² It is instructive, at this point, to detail the main thrust of the attacks on Rostow, as they contain elements of a general critique of modernisation theory.

Briefly, Rostow's thesis (which he subtitled 'a non-communist manifesto') contends that societies progress through five distinct "stages" in their progression toward economic maturation: traditionalism, the stage of precondition for take off, 'take-off', the drive to maturity, and the stage of sustained high mass consumption. The critical stage is the "take-off" in which 'the rate of investment increases in such a way that real output percapita rises and this initial increase carries with it radical changes in production techniques and the disposition of income flows which perpetuate the new scale of investment and perpetuate, thereby, the rising trend in percapita output. Initial changes in method require that some group in the society have the will and the authority to install and diffuse new production techniques; and a perpetuation of the growth process requires that such a leading group expand in authority and that the society as a whole respond to the impulses set up by initial changes, including the potentialities for external economies. Initial changes in the scale and direction of finance flows are likely to imply a command over income flows by new groups or institutions; and a

perpetuation of growth requires that a high proportion of the increment to income during the take-off period be returned to productive investment.¹³ Rostow's model of a society undergoing 'take-off' is conceptualised in terms which betray his singularity of outlook: what he is in fact proposing is a class structure that is a mirror image of that in the rich countries of the contemporary world, and an institutional structure which complements it.

Baran and Hobsbawm criticize Rostow on the following grounds, some of which suggest the basis for a more generalised critique of modernisation theory from the perspective I have been developing above: The theory is area specific, though it is presented with an air of spurious generality which does not take account of the fact that 'however universal the problems of technical growth may be, different types of economic organisation can, or must solve them in very different ways'.¹⁴ Rostow fails to admit the profit motive into his analysis - this is a crucial omission that leaves whole areas of behavior and consequence in both developed and underdeveloped societies unexplored. Finally, Rostow fails to take account of the fact that one century of capitalism has failed to bridge the gap between rich and poor in underdeveloped countries. This last point linked with the former, indicates a more general shortcoming of the Rostowian thesis: that it simply fails to take account of the manner in which the rich metropolises exploited (and continue to exploit) the underdeveloped peripheral economies.

The question of unilinearity must be dealt with specifically as it is crucial to our understanding of the phenomenon of underdevelopment and to our analysis of any proposals for action to overcome it.

Once more, turning to Baran, Frank, and others, the real causes of underdevelopment must be explained with specific reference to history:

...the history of the now underdeveloped countries has been most intimately related to the history of the now developed ones for at least several centuries. Indeed, the economic and political expansion of Europe since the fifteenth century has come to incorporate the now underdeveloped countries into a single stream of world history, which has given rise simultaneously to the present development of some countries and the present underdevelopment of others. However, in their attempt to construct theory and policy for the underdeveloped countries, Rostow and others have examined the developed countries as if they had developed in isolation from this stream of world history.¹⁵

The pivotal point, of course, of Frank's analysis, which will be discussed in following sections, is the contention that underdevelopment in the now-underdeveloped world may only be understood with reference to the 'contradictions of appropriation and expropriation of surplus'.¹⁶

Similarly, Baran, after a lengthy discussion on the precise nature of the conflict that characterised the early association of European and Asia, Africa, and Latin America, details the manner in which the preconditions for the transformation from feudalism to capitalism that may have been taking shape in many parts of the world were distorted by the arrival of European mercantile capitalism which had developed the means of subordinating the economic processes that were taking place.¹⁷ The discussion leads Baran to the conclusion that 'the forces [sic] that have molded the fate of the backward world still exercise a powerful impact on the conditions prevailing at the present time. Their forms have changed, their intensities are different today; their origin and direction have remained unaltered.'¹⁸

Baran's criticisms confront squarely the assumption in Modernisation Theory that underdevelopment is an 'original state' for

those countries of the world which are now underdeveloped. This assumption is erroneous not simply because it indicates that the historical relationship between metropolises and satellites has not been taken into account. It frequently reflects ignorance of social, economic and political organisation before European colonisation.

Andre Gunder Frank points this out in Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. Noting that Spanish colonisation of the Inca Empire produced demographic shifts and relocation of peoples on an inestimable scale, Frank rejects the supposition that the peasants in contemporary Peru and Bolivia lead an existence whose history can be traced 'lineally' and uninterrupted from the pre-Columbian era to today.¹⁹

The persistence of the 'original state' assumption leaves Modernisation Theory conceptualising the problems of underdevelopment in terms of psychological, 'cultural' and 'societal' deficiencies.

Modernisation Theory has been attacked elsewhere for 'ethnocentrism' and 'reductionism'. The former is implicit in the assumption of historical unilinearity that there is 'but one destination', 'even admitting that there are different routes'. It is especially pronounced when 'modernisation' is rendered synonymous with 'westernisation'. 'Reductionism' refers to the habit of 'universalising certain traits at the level of personality mechanisms',²⁰ for which McClelland is notorious.

Among Modernisation Theorists there is a preoccupation with the societal forms and experiences of the capitalist world. This is an inevitable product of the tools and practices of functionalist sociology itself in which Modernisation Theory is rooted. Because it suffers from serious theoretical limitations such as those

sketched above, Modernisation Theory is limited in its usefulness for explaining the dynamics of underdevelopment.

Briefly, to recapitulate, the critique of the 'Modernisation paradigm' presented here has concentrated on three flawed assumptions in 'Modernisation Theory': First, the assumption that the developed and the underdeveloped world are at different stages of a single historical continuum. The second is the assumption that the development of the 'developed' world is an appropriate model (indeed, the only model) of development for the underdeveloped world. Finally, there is the assumption that present underdevelopment of the underdeveloped world is causally explicable with reference to some imbalance or deficiency that inheres in the internal structures of the societies themselves.

Before going on to discuss the critique further, a couple of additional points need to be stated to clarify the last statement, but they do bear on the other two statements. First, the existence of privileged elites in many of the societies of the Third World is frequently acknowledged by scholars and analysts of Third World affairs. Further, it is often alleged that a narrowing of the gap that separates these elites and the masses is a necessary first step in overcoming underdevelopment. That is so is obvious. Yet it is too rarely understood that the position of these elites is sustained through the relationship between the modern industrialised centres of the satellite economies and the capitalist metropolises. The privileges of the elites do not accrue through some sort of deference on the part of the masses to their 'betters'. They are, in fact, more frequently than is admitted by 'modernisation theorists',

sustained through military force controlled by these elites using police and other armed forces, or 'anti-subversive' gangs, which are often trained and equipped by the governments of the 'developed' world. This applies more and more in the capitalist peripheries where disaffection and revolt by 'deviant elements' are suppressed by force.

The second point that must be made to fill out the critique refers to the manner in which the centres of the satellite economies are regarded as the leading sectors to be developed for the eventual development of the whole societies. It is frequently held that these centres or 'modern sectors' are leading the way for the other 'traditional' sectors to follow. This ignores two important factors: first, the 'dualistic' economy is an economy that is proceeding in two directions simultaneously: the 'modern' sector is usually 'progressing' toward 'modernity' in a manner reminiscent of the now-developed metropolises at earlier stages of capitalist development, but with some vital differences. The 'traditional' sector, on the other hand, is frequently either stagnating or undergoing the process that A.G. Frank calls 'dynamic underdevelopment'. This means the relationship between the two 'sectors' is not one in which the 'modern' sector is leading the way; it is an exploitative relationship in which the surplus from the modern sector, where it is not appropriated to the metropole, is reinvested in the modern sector to the advantage of those already in that sector, or, it may be expended in conspicuous consumption. The surplus, if there is any, from the 'traditional' sector is similarly reinvested to the advantage of the centre of the Peripheral society.

The 'modern' sector (or 'centre') is in no position itself to be 'leading the way' as its relationship with the metropole (the 'Centre') is the relationship of exploiter to exploited, as explained by A.G. Frank:

The metropolis expropriates economic surplus from its satellites and appropriates it for its own economic development. The satellites remain underdeveloped for lack of access to their own surplus and as a consequence of the same polarization and exploitative contradictions which the metropolis introduces and maintains in the satellite's domestic economic structure.²¹

That is, and this will be dealt with in more detail below, it is a relationship of dependency.

EDUCATION AND MODERNISATION

Most of the literature on education and 'modernisation' or 'development' (the two are usually regarded as synonymous) assumes a direct relationship between education and economic growth. This assumption would be less dubious if more attention were paid to the actual dynamics of capitalist underdevelopment in the Third World. Since Denison's and Schultz's²² 'discoveries' of the contribution that 'investment in "human capital"' makes to economic growth, numerous studies have been undertaken with a view to assessing human investment needs. However, much of the material demonstrates an unhealthy willingness to accept the inevitability, if not the overwhelming efficacy of capitalist development. For instance, even the celebrated attack on Denison and Schultz by Balogh and Streeton takes place as if the context to which it is purported to refer were an approximation of an earlier stage of development of the now-developed capitalist countries. Despite Balogh and Streeton's disclaimer the 'Growth rates derived from the experience of the

United States cannot be used to calculate the returns on education in the entirely different setting of the underdeveloped countries', the point is quite missed when they attempt to substantiate this objection by referring in isolation to the alleged negative effects of education in underdeveloped societies (i.e., education produces a 'class' of educated who 'refuse to work on the farms'; education 'sets up ideals that stand in the way of development',²⁴ instead of confronting the real questions of the nature and modus operandi of the development strategies pursued within which the educational strategies must take place. That is instead of asking such questions as: are the masses of the people being considered above and before profit and efficiency?; is surplus being reinvested at all? or, if so, how appropriate to overall development is the investment in education?, etc.

The 'investment in human capital' approach to education for modernisation that Denison and Schultz's work gave rise to has remained the dominant paradigm in the literature and has been used as the basis of some extravagant studies on education and underdevelopment. Among the best known of these is that undertaken by Harbison and Myers²⁵ where they develop a 'Composite Index of Human Resources' which, when correlated with Per Capita GNP will give an indication of the expansion required for 'development' in a particular country, or so the authors claim. Despite the cautionary warnings with which the authors themselves proclaim their findings, there are certain underlying assumptions throughout the study that are questionable: for example, a) the acceptance of the universal applicability of the Denison-Schultz propositions about education and economic growth; b) failure to acknowledge that the development strategy itself may

be problematic - the advice Harbison offers viz. 'that the educational strategy should be based on the character and traditions of the people' is meaningless unless the political-economic strategy itself is similarly based, which, it invariably is not. Finally, c) the very idea of ranking the 75 countries in the study according to their relative 'levels of Human Resource Development' carries with it the assumption of a direct linear relationship between "investment in human resource development" and economic growth and affluence.

Fitting squarely into this paradigm is Adam Curle's influential book, published in the early 1960's, Educational Strategy for Developing Countries.²⁶ It is worthwhile to examine this work closely for a moment, because in more recent times Curle has been extremely reflective about his earlier work.

Curle defined underdevelopment as the 'failure to make adequate use of human resources',²⁷ and discussed development problems in terms of 'intellectual capital' and its utilisation in various 'stages of development' (i.e., Rostow's stages of development). He came up with the singularly unstartling idea that 'the underdeveloped nations can only change through the development of their people.'²⁸ Curle argued that 'a country must have a very considerable proportion of trained and educated citizens, not only to act as doctors, engineers, teachers, agriculturalists, scientists and the like, but to create a new class sufficiently large, and hence sufficiently strong, to establish its own values of justice, selection on merit, flexibility, empiricism and efficiency (sic).'²⁹

The 'strategy' Curle proposed was clearly in the camp with McClelland, Parsons, et.al: he recommended propagating 'the idea

that development is not only desirable, but also possible';³⁰ concentrating on the development of the agricultural infrastructure.' and 'improving the levels of citizenship', individual training, etc. This was so much question begging to the extent that the kinds of political-economic strategies into which the educational strategies were to fit were inadequately discussed - in other words, the direction, impetus, and end result of 'development' were, essentially, regarded as 'given'.

For a devastating critique of Curle, however, we turn to the author himself. In 1974 Curle published a book 'Education for Liberation',³¹ in which he unceremoniously rejected practically everything he had earlier proposed, in his writing on education and 'development'. He rejected the assumption that 'a desirable condition could be achieved through economic growth' because 'the model' (presumably the capitalist model which Curle, to his disadvantage, regarded as the only model) had 'lost its attraction':

'The 'developed' countries are destroying the biosphere with their wastes, their callous rapacity is using up the worlds resources at awful speed, they are inextricably enmeshed in interminable conflicts, they are plagued interbally by crime and violence ...they abound with every sort of unpeacefulness.'³²

Unfortunately Curle's about face seemed more the result of moral disaffection than of a thorough understanding of the internal contradictions of capitalism that produce these conditions - this prevented him from undertaking a thorough going analysis of the events and conditions he deplored.

The second assumption that he rejected was that 'economic growth would be attained through 'appropriately adapting the practices of the rich nations', because 'the rich nations as a whole exploit the

poor countries and in fact are impeding rather than promoting their economic advance'. Finally, the coup de grace is his rejection of the assumption upon which so much of his earlier thinking had been based: that 'education or 'human resource development' was a powerful tool in the achievement of economic development' because it was 'attuned to the competitive and materialistic ideologies of the west',³³ a point with which I concur, but I doubt that Curle understands why this must inevitably be the case with education in capitalist underdevelopment - given the role of education vis-a-vis the capitalist production system.³⁴ That is he fails to understand that education is the principal ideological apparatus of the state, preferring to continue to regard it as though changes in it will lead to changes in the direction of nations - he does this without referring to the political-economic substructure upon which the educational superstructure rests. In short, it is not Curle's humanitarian concern for the peoples of the underdeveloped world that I would disagree with at all, but rather, his inability to see that these concerns are incompatible with any strategy for action that does not recognise as its foremost premise that the capitalist mode of production itself is the fundamental source of the uneven development which he deplores.

This leads us to the summary point of this short critique of education for 'modernisation'. Among most writers who have attempted, over the last ten to twenty years, to fit education into the process of 'modernisation' there has been a disturbing tendency to treat education as though changes in the educational apparatus alone could produce significant changes in the socio-economic structure of nations. That this is clearly not the case has been borne out frequently in

the experience of most capitalist underdeveloped countries. Rather than more even distribution of economic rewards through education we find increased disparities between those who were wealthy in the first place and who benefit from extended periods of education and those who continue to be poor despite (or even because of) education.³⁴ Rather than education providing an army of employable and employed manpower, the capital-intensive nature of capitalist investment has determined that the ranks of unemployed, especially educated unemployed, have swollen. Rather than transforming the outlook of people, schooling at best makes them simply adaptable to changing socio-economic conditions over which they have no control.

Footnotes to Chapter I

¹S.N. Eisenstadt, Modernisation: Protest and Change, (Englewood Cliffs N.J., Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 1.

²Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, eds., Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1974).

³David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton, D. Van Nostrand Company, 1961).

⁴Everett E. Hagen, On The Theory of Social Change (Homewood, Ill., The Dorsey Press, 1962).

⁵Andre Gunder Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969), pp. 73-5.

⁶G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton University Press, 1964).

⁷Lucien W. Pye, "The Politics of South East Asia" in *ibid.*, pp. 65-149.

⁸Henry Bernstein, "Modernisation Theory and the Sociological Study of Development", Journal of Development Studies, 7, (2), (1971): 141-166.

⁹Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1962).

¹⁰For a summary critique by such bourgeois economists as Kuznets, Cairncross, et.al. see Gerald Meier, Leading Issues in Development Economics (New York, Oxford University Press, 1964).

¹¹Paul A. Baron and E.J. Hobsbawm, "The Stages of Economic Growth", Kyklos 14, 1961.

¹²Andre Gunder Frank, "Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology", in Latin America, pp. 21-94.

¹³Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, pp. 207-209.

¹⁴Baran and Hobsbawm, "Stages of Economic Growth", p. 55.

¹⁵Frank, "Sociology of Development", pp. 40-41.

¹⁶Frank, Latin America, pp. 6-8.

¹⁷Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1962), pp. 134-162.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 163.

¹⁹Berstein, "Modernisation Theory", p. 147.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 148-149.

²¹Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 8.

²²See T.W. Schultz, "Capital Formation By Education", Journal of Political Economy 6 (1960), pp. 571-583; idem, "Investment in Human Capital", in Mark Blaug, ed., Economics of Education, 2 vols. (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968), vol. 1: pp. 13-33; and idem, "Reflections on Investment in Man", Journal of Political Economy 5 (October 1962), pp. 1-8.

²³See Blaug, *ibid.*, for this discussion.

²⁴Ibid., p. 142.

²⁵Fred H. Harbison and C.A. Myers, Education, Manpower, and Economic Growth (New York, McGraw Hill, 1964).

²⁶Adam Curle, Educational Strategy for Developing Countries (London, Travistock, 1963).

²⁷Ibid., p. 69.

²⁸Ibid., p. 142

²⁹Ibid., p. 157.

³⁰Ibid., p. 158.

³¹Adam Curle, Education for Liberation (New York, Halstead Press, 1974).

³²Ibid., p. 114.

³³Ibid., pp. 114-115.

³⁴For a fuller discussion of this point see Herb Gintis and Samuel Bowles, Schooling in Capitalist America (New York, Basic Books, 1976); and, Martin Carnoy, Education as Cultural Imperialism (New York, Cavid McKay, 1974), especially chapters 1,2, 7 and 8.

³⁵Carnoy, Cultural Imperialism, p. 9.

³⁶Ibid., p. 18, see also Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York, The Seabury Press, 1970), expecially chapter 2.

CHAPTER II

IMPERIALISM AND DEPENDENCY AND EDUCATIONAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Whereas modernisation theory either fails to take any cognisance of the relationship between the underdeveloped satellites and the 'developed' metropolises, or fails to explain it adequately, Dependency Theory posits this relationship in the centre of the discussion. Referring back to Frank for a moment, it will be recalled that the history of the satellites is inextricably interwoven with that of the metropolises - this is the outcome of the expansion of capitalism 'from the hills and valleys of the English midlands to a global economic order'. Lenin explained that imperialism was the outcome of the internal dynamic expansion of an economic system which needed export markets for the ever-increasing volume of goods it produced, and raw materials to sustain and increase levels of production. As this dynamic gathered impetus, and through the evolution of giant international corporations and financial institutions capital became 'internationalised'.¹ Ultimately the global system is sustained through gaining control over as much of the earth's raw materials as possible, through the continuing conquest of foreign markets, through foreign investment and through the maintenance of a plethora of political and social institutions whose function it is to ensure political compliance and economic 'stability' in the satellites through law and order.² These are the classical features of

imperialism and colonialism; the modern features of imperialism that is ordered by the oligopolistic power of the huge global corporations include the continuing struggle to maintain political and economic hegemony over the former colonies of the old 'nation state imperialism; the pre-eminence of the United States as the dominant capitalist power and organiser of the imperialist system; and the rise of a technology that is 'international in character'.³

As the phase of monopoly capitalism consolidates, the relationship between metropolis and satellites becomes more complex, and the domination of the metropolis is sustained through the co-operation of the 'national bourgeoisie' in the nations of the international capitalist system. In this we focus on the Periphery:

Dependency is the obverse of imperialism: imperialist nations - the metropole or center nations... - dominate and exploit the periphery areas of the world, but the Periphery nations are exploited and dependent.⁴

Whereas analysis which concentrates on the nature of imperialism as it benefits the Centre is concerned to reveal such phenomena as net capital outflow from the Periphery to the Centre, and the manner in which trade relationships (especially in commodities) favour the Centre, dependency theory is more concerned to demonstrate how the tightening of the grip of monopoly capitalism on the periphery strangles its development. The central point is that investment by the center in the periphery is based on a development model that is capitalist, contradictory, and which produces what Andre Gunder Frank calls "lumpendevelopment".⁵ Before elaborating on this it is necessary to clarify what is meant by 'dependency'. Though there is some disagreement among theorists about the mechanisms of dependency,

they share an understanding of capitalism as a global economic system which has both a central functioning core and an outer peripheral edge. The Centre comprises the wealthy capitalist countries of Europe, North America, Japan and Oceania. The economies of these centres are, in the words of Samir Amin, 'self-centred', which, briefly, means that the central determining relationship in the economy is that between the production of goods for mass consumption and the production of capital goods. The production of the former involves the simultaneous production of surplus value which is then invested in capital goods which sustain the production and reproduction of the entire process.⁶

On the Periphery of this global system (i.e., in the 'under-developed' countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America) the economic structure bears no resemblance to that in the Centre. That is, the economies are not self-oriented, this is largely a result of the fact that they came into being when, on an impulse from the Centre an export sector was created and this came to play a determining role in the creation and shaping of the market. In the words of Andreas Papandrea, the dependent periphery 'becomes extroverted through a process of disarticulation, this extroversion and disarticulation of the dependent periphery reflects the mode of its integration into the global capitalist process - a mode that blocks the extension of the capitalist mode of production so that it does not become, or tend to become, the exclusive mode of production'⁷. This produces uneven development in the Periphery, or what Frank calls 'lumpendevlopment'. In his historical studies of Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America, Frank demonstrates how this occurred in Chile and

Brazil, the key causal mechanism in lumpendevlopment being the expropriation of economic surplus from the satellite to the metropole which had the effect of generating underdevelopment in the peripheral satellites while generating economic development in the metropolitan centres.⁸

Hence, imperialism incorporates the metropolises of the 'developed' world and the satellites of the underdeveloped world into a single economic complex which functions to the advantage of the metropole. In this international economic order the relations between the "Centre" and the "Periphery" elements are structured in terms of dependence. In the words of Johan Galtung there is a:

relation between a Centre and a Periphery nation so that a) there is harmony of interest between the centre in the Centre nation and the centre in the Periphery nation, b) there is more disharmony of interest within the Periphery nation than within the Centre nations, c) there is disharmony of interest between the periphery in the Centre nation and the periphery in the Periphery nation.⁹

Thus the interest of the Centre nation in the Periphery is not, as the modernisation theorists would have it, the material welfare of the latter but the continuing expropriation and accumulation for the Centre. This is contrived with the complicity of the bourgeoisie in the periphery nation acting as the 'junior partner of foreign capital',¹⁰ whose interests are served by conspicuous of luxury goods and by token participation in the distribution of appropriated surplus.

To fill out this necessarily rather schematic overview of dependency we turn for a moment to the actual activity of the metropolises in the peripheral economies in order to show how the kind of investment by global corporations itself produces unwanted effects in the Periphery.

a) The inflow of investment in the Periphery is stimulated by demand for goods in the Centre, rather than in the Periphery itself. In the case of consumer goods - motor cars, household appliances, prepared food, etc., - they are commodities that may only be either exported, or consumed by the small, wealthy local bourgeoisie whose tastes and consumption patterns are emulated from the Centre. Where the surplus can be sold abroad the markets are limited to either other centres of Peripheral nations or to the Centre itself. In the former case the commodities may confront tariff walls since the production processes in these centres are determined from the same source.

b) Goods which are exported from the Periphery to the Centre often face unfair competition on the open market, or, if they are foodstuffs especially, the price is not determined by the seller at all - rather it is fixed by the Centre.

c) The actual technology used in industrial enterprise is developed in the Centre in the interests of efficiency and mass production, any alterations to the design of plant, machinery, etc. are minimal, adoptive changes. Coupled with this, the actual research carried out in the Periphery to determine the needs of the Periphery is minimal. One negative effect of this is capital intensive investment failing to provide employment to the growing numbers of men and women displaced from the countryside and living in the urban fringes.

d) The investment undertaken is usually in what is referred to as 'screwdriver industry' - the importation of processes that involve assembly of products that have been partially completed in another country or which are to be only partially completed in the

Periphery so they can be imported to the Centre as 'unfinished' goods. This frequently happens with component parts (for example for television sets or motor cars) which require considerable cheap labor to manufacture or assemble.

e) Many countries on the Periphery have placed hopes in import substitution as a means of building up an industrial infrastructure. The metropolis undertakes the development of light and consumer goods industries in the Periphery, and the Periphery becomes dependent on the Centre for imported capital goods. This blocks development in the Periphery at a more sophisticated level since the domestic market that grows in the Periphery caters not for mass consumption but, rather abets the riot of conspicuous consumption of luxury goods by the bourgeoisie.

f) Finally, as Magdoff and Jalee¹¹ and others have shown, there is a net profit outflow from the Periphery to the Centre. Thus, through the investment of capital by the metropole and the expropriation of the surplus generated in the Periphery, accompanied by the numerous other factors sketched above, the dependency relationship between Centre and Periphery is strengthened and secured. The eccentric interests of the Centre and the bourgeoisie in the Periphery further emphasize disarticulation in the Periphery by the destruction of traditional modes of production, the swelling of the ranks of the unemployed and the growing marginalisation of the masses.

In the historic situation in which dependency takes place, the structure of the world economy, to which the dependent countries belong, is favourable to the developed countries and unfavourable to the dependent countries. The social and economic structure of the dependent countries is geared up to fitting into this unfavourable world economy, and this in and of itself contributes to slowing development ...If democratiza-

tion of political institutions occurs, or is maintained, the dissatisfied majority could become increasingly powerful, and, if allowed, would eventually take power and ultimately have to create institutions that break with the metropole centers and with the international capitalist system in order to develop without 'conditions'.¹²

As Carnoy and others have indicated, in order that a society may begin to develop independently, it is necessary for it to sever relations of dependence. Severence involves moves to dissociate from the Centre and transition to 'real, autonomous, self-centred development'.¹³ Severence of dependency and association with 'socialist' development strategies has taken place in various nations formerly on the Periphery, has been associated with varying kinds of stimuli, and has proceeded with varying degrees of success.

China, Vietnam, Korea, Cambodia, Laos, and Cuba, for example, were all involved in periods of protracted struggle with imperialist powers and their local allies before the victories of their various revolutions enabled them to sever relations of dependence and embark on their own development strategies. Severence in the case of Tanzania, on the other hand, has been stimulated by the influence of a strong party leadership and a carefully spelled out set of aims for an alternate direction of the country.

"Varying degrees of success" refers to the extent to which the degree of isolation self-imposed or imposed from outside has helped or inhibited the direction of the development of the country. Contrast the isolation of Cuba, for example, or Cambodia (which is more 'self-imposed') with the relative continuing integration of say again, Tanzania, or Algeria.

Nevertheless, it is argued that dissociation from the dependency relationship is necessary if a self-reliant, autonomous strategy is to evolve - a strategy that takes as its rationale the needs of the masses and not simply those of the bourgeoisie. An important component of such a strategy will be the educational strategy which must also be attuned to the needs of the masses and must comply in its aims and goals with the direction of the political-economic strategy. It is the principal hypothesis of this study that the educational strategies of China and Tanzania are interwoven with the political-economic strategies in such a way as to assist in the successful achievement of the goals of the latter. The two societies have dissociated from the dependency relationship to differing extents, but both have embarked on development strategies that are designed to transcend capitalism and imperialism and build 'socialism'. Their differences will be discussed and taken into account as the study proceeds. After a short discussion on the subject of education and dependency, something will be said about their apparent commonality of aims with particular reference to 'socialism'.

DEPENDENCY AND EDUCATIONAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT

In 1960 and 1961 a series of conferences sponsored by UNESCO and held in Karachi, Addis Ababa and Santiago de Chile discussed the problems of education and underdevelopment. These conferences produced what was regarded by most of the participant countries as a series of practical suggestions and guidelines to overcome their educational problems. For the most part the educational strategies that emerged from these guidelines were unsatisfactory since they were far too uncritical of the educational models upon which they

were based, and they were primarily linked with the rhetoric of 'modernisation'. They assumed a direct relationship between education and 'modernisation' and proceeded to advocate universal elementary schooling, universal literacy etc. as if these moves could become principal determinants in overcoming the political-economic ills of underdevelopment.

The debate on education and underdevelopment surrounded such questions as how school systems could be upgraded to produce 'much needed' manpower for 'development'. Balogh and Streeton argued for the vocationalising of curriculum so that schools would produce people who could 'modernize' agriculture, Phillip Foster countered with the 'vocational school fallacy'¹⁴ rebuttal, pointing out that 'academic' education was vocational education in the acutest sense as the demand for it was based on student's understanding of the reward structure that favoured those who possessed the same educational qualifications that were traditionally demanded in colonial bureaucracies. But these arguments left untouched the question of the political-economic context within which underdevelopment was being perpetuated - or, at least the metropole-satellite relationship as a casual factor in underdevelopment.

It was not until the 1970's that a body of literature grew up which addressed itself to the role of education in imperialism and dependency, and analysed the relationship between education and the political-economic base. In surveying this literature it is necessary to explain the mechanisms of educational underdevelopment and educational dependency. Though these two concepts are manifestations of the same complex of phenomena brought about by imperialism and political-

economic dependency it is useful, at this point, at least to keep them separate. For the purposes of this section "educational underdevelopment" refers to the actual deficiencies and disparities in education (e.g., access to education, educational forms available to different classes and so on) that are characteristic of education systems in underdeveloped countries. These include shortages of all kinds: shortages of funds, of qualified personnel, of materials, of research facilities etc. (Coombs) "Educational Dependency" refers more to the causal mechanisms - such as the perpetuation of school systems designed to serve the needs of the centre that bring educational underdevelopment about. But it also refers to the implications and consequences of such phenomena as educational "aid", the "brain drain", the concentration of educational resources in urban centres and generally to education as an aspect of cultural hegemony that accompanies political-economic domination of the Periphery by the Centre.

It has already been pointed out that underdevelopment cannot be properly explained, nor understood if separated from the historic context in which it was brought about. Similarly with educational underdevelopment and educational dependency- neither is explicable unless reference is made to transplanting of educational infrastructures and ideologies on the satellites by the metropolises and the simultaneous destruction of indigenous educational traditions and forms.

There are not too many sources that provide models for studying educational dependency and underdevelopment. Carnoy's Education as Cultural Imperialism is the best; his principal thesis will be outlined below since it is being followed fairly closely throughout

this whole thesis. Walter Rodney in How Europe Underdeveloped Africa¹⁵ has a lot to say about educational underdevelopment, but his position is a little ambiguous for at the same time as he deplores education as cultural colonialism he berates the colonialists for not having provided enough educational resources to Africans. A recent study that is an excellent study of the relationship between education and capitalist development is Gintis' and Bowles' Schooling in Capitalist America:¹⁶ the approach used in this book has useful applications for studying education and underdevelopment in the countries of the Periphery, but Gintis and Bowles are using research data that are rarely available in underdeveloped countries.

Although few scholars and commentators of underdevelopment who theoretically draw on the dependency paradigm in their analyses of underdevelopment address themselves directly to educational underdevelopment, they do nevertheless, refer to it implicitly in their analyses of cultural imperialism (viz: Memmi, Fanon, et.al.)¹⁷ Paulo Freire is among the few who undertake analysis of the practice of education at a very fundamental level to provide us with a perceptive model of what he calls 'banking education' which he then juxtaposes to 'libertairan education' for cultural freedom - itself a useful model for education in the Periphery.¹⁸ Others have, in papers, described various particular aspects of educational dependency and underdevelopment. For example, Mazrui¹⁹ describes the 'African university as a multinational corporation' and shows how African culture is neglected in universities - the latter preferring to emulate the colleges in the Centre upon which they have been modelled. Altbach²⁰ demonstrates that what he calls 'literary colonialism'

occurs when local publishing houses produce material that is designed for consumption in the Centre and ignore topics of local intellectual interest. The same process is perpetuated by book 'gifts' from U.S. government departments to libraries and universities - usually of textbooks which carry a strong ideological bias. In an earlier article Altbach²¹ gives a detailed description of the mechanisms of educational underdevelopment and dependency, we will return to this article after a summary of Carnoy's thesis which is the fullest discussion of the problem.

Carnoy argues that:

...educators, social scientists and historians have misinterpreted the role of Western schooling in the Third World and in the industrialised countries themselves.... far from acting as a liberator, Western formal education came to most countries as part of imperialist domination. It was consistent with the goals of imperialism: the economic and political control of the people of one country by the dominant class in another. The imperial powers attempted through schooling, to train the colonised for roles that suited the coloniser. Even within the dominant countries themselves, schooling did not offset social inequities. The education system was no more just and equal than the economy and society itself - specifically ...because schooling was organised to develop and maintain, in the imperial countries, and inherently inequitable and unjust organisation of production and political power.²²

Through a series of studies of education and traditional colonialism in India and West Africa, and education and 'Free Trade' colonialism in Latin America, Carnoy arrives at the conclusion that:

The historical evidence shows that schooling expanded in the context of imperial and colonial relations between and within what are now nation states. In the mercantile period of imperialism, schooling was largely limited to consumption by children of the relatively well-to-do merchants and some nobility. Universities provided the few professionals, philosophers and religious thinkers required by precapitalist societies. Since the European precapitalist

social structure was organized mostly on the basis of family position and landownership, and almost everyone lived in cohesive villages, institutions like the church were adequate for social control. Training was received by apprenticeships. But even in the mercantile period, schooling was used by the church and state to provide moral guidance to the unruly poor in the metropole urban centres, and to try to convert natives in the colonies to Western values and norms.... schooling was used to pacify natives either directly, ...or indirectly by providing special education for native elites which would make them intermediaries between the colonisers and the indigenous masses. In both cases, the purpose of this pacification was to allow the colonisers to exploit the colonised by conducting trade on grounds favourable to the coloniser by extracting direct taxes from the indigenous population, or by getting cheap (often slave) labor to work mines and plantations.²³

Given this relationship between education and the economic infrastructure and the resultant class structure, the intention of the original statement, that educational underdevelopment cannot be properly understood without reference to the historical conditions which brought it about, becomes clearer. The educational underdevelopment experienced by Tanzania and China at the end of their 'bourgeois democratic' periods was the outcome of their relationship with imperialist powers, since imperialism supported a particular class structure in which the availability of education was restricted to people who occupied privileged positions in the centre of the satellite economies.

Thus, education in Tanzania and China, as we shall see, was a channelling agent for skilled people to work in the centre, and agent of domination, since it was almost exclusively available to one class, and it was an agent in maintaining the class structure, since passage through the education system was a necessary prerequisite for admission to the relatively affluent centre.

Nor did political independence in most parts of the underdeveloped world bring educational neo-colonialism and dependency to an end. In his chapter called "Education and the Ideology of Efficiency", Carnoy shows how "schooling was seen as a means of influencing national elites to lead a U.S. - inspired and financially supported economic development process" and soon, also, U.S. Foundations and aid donors decided to assist schooling as an investment in skilled labor. The effect of this expanded educational assistance was to strengthen the role of schooling as the principal ideological apparatus in underdevelopment. We are careful to stress here that this does not say anything about the intrinsic value of schooling itself. The point is that occupying the position it does, vis-a-vis the political-economic infrastructure, schooling as it is practiced in most parts of the Periphery which demonstrate all or some of the classic features of capitalist underdevelopment, strengthens the process of dynamic underdevelopment despite any potential intrinsic worth.

What remains now is to illustrate how educational dependency and educational underdevelopment are perpetuated and to list some of their characteristics. Educational underdevelopment is perpetuated by the chronic problems that shortages of economic resources impose on peripheral societies. Recent moves to promote alternative educational forms (particularly Non-Formal Education) are in part a response to these continuing shortages.²⁴ Non-formal education is regarded, probably rightly enough, as relatively inexpensive, and 'portable' (i.e., it can be taken to the clients). Yet, so long as it is offered in context of a political-economic underdevelopment brought

about by the structural relationship of dependency, it will be minimally effective in producing significant economic changes in the countryside. Other alternative forms designed to combat educational underdevelopment, notably Freire's education for 'conscientisation', are potentially useful. But the vital point Freire makes is that education should be designed to produce revolutionary consciousness in people so that they will themselves take hold of their own destinies and become active agents in social change. So far Freire has been used circumspectly in parts of the Periphery - with a close eye being kept on the agencies advocating the method lest it become effective.²⁵ In other parts, the method has been 'adapted' - that is, stripped completely bare of its political content.

Educational dependency is perpetuated as long as political-economic dependency remains. Its more visible mechanisms are:

- a) sending 'advisers from the metropole to the satellite.

These advisers are often selected as much for their political outlook as anything. Also, political considerations play apart in the selection of projects.

- b) transplanting educational institutions (land grant colleges in Brazil and India): the 'new' universities, sponsored by OAS in Latin America often provide a counterbalance to radical left-wing thought and action in the 'older' universities. They also provide such training as is necessary for capitalist industry, in management and administration. Fitting out university laboratories and workshops with hardware and reference material from the metropole also increases educational dependency at this level as maintenance and replacement of installations and user reference material can often only continue with the cooperation of the Centre.

c) research often reflects the interests of the Centre rather than the Periphery. Research that explores seriously the relationship between education underdevelopment is rare, and many of the educational projects that have been assisted by the metropole at great cost have been inadequately evaluated, if at all, so there is little indication of their actual success or failure.

d) the real needs of the Periphery are often not analysed and considered in much of the education that goes on. For example, sophisticated training for doctors and other technical personnel (engineers) is often directly copied from the Centre without any consideration for the specific delivery systems (medical delivery systems, transport and housing delivery systems) that for which these training programs have been designed in the Centre.²⁶

There are probably countless illustrations of the manner in which education operates in dependent societies to perpetuate political-economic underdevelopment. These are easily identifiable once the relationship between education and the political-economic infrastructure is understood, and once it is realised that education cannot itself be a major agent in political-economic change unless it accompanies other challenges to hegemony of the class base of imperialism and dependency. Hence, in order for educational strategies to succeed they must be implemented in a context in which dissociation from the metropole-satellite nexus is taking place and in which self-centred, autonomous development is taking place. That is, for educational strategies to work they must be part of the process of severance from the dependency relationships. The present work is an attempt to find how and if this is actually happening with the educational strategies in China and Tanzania.

A NOTE ON "SOCIALISM"

"Socialism" is surely one of the most abused words in the vocabulary of politics. This is neither the place to lament nor account for this, but since the two societies under study are committed to building "socialism" some attempt must be made to pare away some of the parasitic growth around the concept if not actually to define it. It would be discreet perhaps, to proceed with a word of caution: first it is very difficult to say anything that is absolute about 'socialism' - that is the stuff of political speeches and party polemics. Second, I would argue that there is no such thing as "true" socialism in the sense of a model that societies must follow to the letter. Soviet socialism is heavily influenced by the historical conditions in which the October Revolution came about, by the exigencies of World War II, and by the rise of the United States as the dominant neo-imperialist power. Similarly, Chinese socialism has developed over a long period of time that has endured the ravages of Japanese imperialism and bloody civil war. Thus, Chinese "socialism" will inevitably show marked distinctions from the Soviet type - although, of course, there will be some common commitments like public (state) ownership of the productive apparatus, and control of the market.

For all that, however, there are, I believe, some discernible characteristics of "socialism" and "socialist" development that are generalizable to the extent that they may be suggested as analytic guidelines, at least, in the discussion of "socialist" development strategies - especially as those strategies contrast with capitalist underdevelopment. "Socialist" education is, of course, much more

difficult to define, let alone summarize - it is, in fact, part of the purpose of the present study to attempt to throw some light on this definition.

A characteristic of the Periphery is dependency on extraneous resources - resources like capital (industrial capital) and technology that come from the centre. In contrast to this, socialist development concentrates on the maximum utilisation of available resources. This requires a realistic appraisal of the human and material resources in addition to a commitment to a series of programs that makes fullest use of these resources. Nyerere's commitment to the maximisation of available resources was outlined clearly in the Arusha Declaration itself where he stresses the necessity to concentrate on land and labour as the material foundations for a development strategy. The Chinese, particularly in the post-GPCR period, have concentrated on the cultivation of indigenous resources, technology and modes of social and political organisation.

An important aspect of this maximum utilisation of available resources is the utilisation of labour. Many underdeveloped countries are faced with massive labour surpluses, the result of rapid population increase and of capitalintensive investment from the Centre that is a feature of capitalist underdevelopment. It is largely beyond the control of the Periphery to do very much about this since they have little real control over patterns of investment from the Centre. On the other hand, countries following patterns of socialist development are able to take account of their labour resources in a far more constructive fashion and design production patterns accordingly. Hence, China is developing processes in

agriculture and industry that are labor intensive rather than capital intensive.

Similarly, Tanzania is seeking alternative production forms and has received assistance from China in the form of the well-known Friendship Textile Mill which employs large amounts of labour relative to the capital investment outlay, thus putting people in jobs that would not otherwise have been available where the investment was relatively capital intensive.

A second notable feature of socialist development is the active commitment by socialist political leaders and planners to the greater equalisation of economic rewards. This conviction is predicated on a further conviction characteristic of socialist thinkers, especially in the two societies under study, that is, that every individual has the potential to produce and to participate in the construction of society in which people can more and more create the conditions for their own self-realisation and development in collective material terms. It is this commitment that is behind 'the mass line' in China. It means, in effect, that everyone can make a worthwhile contribution to the construction of socialist society. In capitalist underdevelopment the nature of the production system requires a division of labour based on narrow specialisation, and on the actual exclusion of much of the productive potential of the masses. Thirdly, in socialist societies, whilst it is recognised that certain skills must be cultivated for certain tasks and that people must apply themselves constructively to the development process, there is sought a series of solutions to economic problems that takes account of the capacity of people as workers. This may mean, in some cases, that the

political consciousness of some individual workers is valued more highly than their technological expertise. This was the basis of the 'red versus expert' debate in China in the 1960's where there was a growing awareness that people who were especially trained to perform certain tasks were often potential threats to the success of the development strategy because of the possibility that they might form a separate new class of technocrats motivated by class interest rather than the interests of the society as a whole. There is a growing awareness in Tanzania, also, that what Issa Shivji refers to as the "bureaucratic capitalist" class constitutes a threat to socialist development via its connections with the international bourgeoisie.²⁷ So long as the selection procedure for workers in government corporations and bureaucracies generally is based on criteria that are essentially 'capitalist' in nature (i.e., formal educational qualifications, etc) the commitment to the productive potential of all humans in the society remains hollow and its realisation threatened.

The fourth characteristic feature of socialist development is the articulation of a strong motivating ideology buttressed by practice. In capitalist underdevelopment where there is often articulated an 'ideology', this is merely the rhetoric of bourgeois nationalism (witness "African Socialism" in Kenya). In socialist countries, or countries which have committed themselves to the pursuit of 'socialist' development (i.e., by extricating themselves from the dependency relationship) the ideology is usually more carefully thought out and it is based on the objective conditions of the society. The official ideology in socialist society is a real motivating factor in development. It serves to give the masses of

people a clear understanding of the direction in which the country is heading - that is it has an educative function. It also serves to unite the people, to help them understand the common goals of development. This latter function is only worthwhile if the masses are able to reap the benefits of their own productive efforts - and this is what is meant by 'buttressing the ideology with practice'. The Maoist ideology, for instance, is based very strongly on popular decision making - but these decisions must actually be seen to affect the well-being of the participants. They are not merely 'political' decisions in the sense that they are only local level decisions that have to be taken to higher levels for approval. Visitors have noted that in China, for example, the success of the Lianching canal was critically dependent on the sense of "participation" the people derived from its construction. In Tanzania, efforts to consciously buttress the ideology have been limited in some respects - the freeze on civil servant wages in 1970 can be seen, in part, as an attempt to realize the spirit of the Arusha Declaration documents as they relate to the more equitable distribution of economic rewards. The ten cell system of political organisation is also an attempt to involve the people in decision-making - yet there is still considerable centralisation of decision-making in some important areas.

From 'classical' socialism and from Lenin come other characteristics features of 'socialism' that may serve as useful guidelines for description of socialist systems in the contemporary world. Among these is the role of the socialist state - it is not the task of the present investigation to debate at length the role and nature of the state in socialist society. However, it seems axiomatic that the

transition to socialism must witness the destruction of all vestiges of the bourgeois state (particularly 'parliamentarism' and its replacement by a dictatorship of the ascendant classes' (the proletariat and the peasantry). Nonetheless, this statement should not be taken dogmatically since Lenin was careful to acknowledge that 'the transition from capitalism to communism certainly cannot but yield a tremendous abundance and variety of political forms'. Yet the 'proletarian' state does become the focal point for social, political and economic organisation, since it owns and controls the means of production.²⁸

This gives rise to a further characteristic feature of socialist development - the role of planning. Here again, it is not our task to delve into the myriad questions that this brings up - it is necessary simply to acknowledge that the area is problematic. It is important to understand, however, the state planning will play an important role in mobilising the means of production and in the distribution and allocation of resources.

Finally, the modern socialist state will invariably have a strong mass-based party with dynamic political leadership. The party is usually the principal arbiter of policy, the principal mode of political organisation, and, an effective counterbalance to bureaucracy.

Footnotes to Chapter II

¹Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 34.

²Ibid., pp. 34-40.

³Ibid., p. 40.

⁴Carnoy, Cultural Imperialism, p. 51.

⁵Andre Gunder Frank, Lumpenbourgeoisie and Lumpendevelopment (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1972).

⁶Samir Amin, "Accumulation and Development: a theoretical model," Review of African Political Economy 1 (August-November 1974), p. 10.

⁷Ibid., p. 13.

⁸Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 3.

⁹Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", Journal of Peace Research 8: 2 (1971): 83, quoted in Carnoy, Cultural Imperialism, pp. 46-47.

¹⁰Frank, Lumpenbourgeoisie, p. 15.

¹¹Pierre Jalee, The Pillage of the Third World (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1968).

¹²Carnoy, Cultural Imperialism, p. 56.

¹³Amin, "Accumulation and Development", p. 16.

¹⁴Phillip Foster, "The Vocational School Fallacy in Development Planning", in Blaug, Economics of Education, vol. 1.

¹⁵Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, (London, Bogle-L'Overture Publications, 1972), pp. 261-287.

¹⁶Herb Gintis and Samuel Bowles, Schooling in Capitalist America (New York, Basic Books, 1976).

¹⁷Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, (New York, Grove Press Inc., 1968); Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (Boston, Beacon Press, 1967).

¹⁸Freire, Pedagogy, especially Chapter 2.

¹⁹Ali Mazrui, "The African University as a Multinational Corporation: Problems of Penetration and Dependency", Harvard Educational Review 45:2 (May, 1975).

²⁰Philip G. Altbach, "Literary Colonialism: Books in the Third World", Harvard Educational Review 45:2 (May, 1975).

²¹Idem, "Education and Neocolonialism", Teachers College Record 72:4 (May, 1971)

²²Carnoy, Cultural Imperialism, p. 3.

²³Ibid., p. 348.

²⁴See Philip H. Coombs and Manzoor Ahmed, Attaching Rural Poverty: How Nonformal Education Can Help (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).

²⁵An American director of a USAID - sponsored literacy programme in Ecuador (which was purportedly based on Freire's method) told me in 1974 that the government permitted the project because it appeased the concerns about peasant education that were from time to time expressed by funding agencies and U.S. aid-giving departments.

²⁶Altbach, "Education and Neocolonialism".

²⁷Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (London, Heinemann, 1976), passim.

²⁸V.I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1973), passim.

PART II

PRE-1949 CHINA AND PRE-ARUSHA TANZANIA: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC AND EDUCATION CONTEXTS

Chapter 3: The Political-Economic Contexts
of the Chinese and Tanzanian
Development Strategies.

Chapter 4: Educational Underdevelopment
and the Beginnings of Educational
Strategies in China Before 1949
and in Tanzania before 1967.

Preamble to Part II

In the following two chapters brief background sketches to the political-economic and educational conditions in China and Tanzania are traced. The purpose in outlining these backgrounds is to provide a context within which to analyse the political-economic and educational strategies as they developed and are still developing. In this there is an attempt to discover a sense of continuity as well as a sense of change. This apparent contradiction is explained below treating the political-economic sections and the educational sections separately. However, to reiterate Frank's point once more, it is necessary to provide a background picture to show how the present condition of uneven development is a direct outcome of the relationship between satellite and metropole. In political-economic terms, this is seen in the manner in which the export enclave developed while the development of the hinterland was distorted, and how the political and social institutions in the satellite were effectively superseded by those institutions which served colonialism best. This latter point applies equally strongly to educational institutions and practices.

Imperialism does not operate in vacuum - indeed, the success or failure of the imperialist venture is often determined by the degree of resistance offered by the colonised people. European capitalism invaded various parts of the globe with varying degrees of success depending on factors like distance, popular resistance, even

physical conditions. For example, the German and British colonisation of East Africa was much more easily accomplished than say, the French occupation of Annam due to a variety of factors - an important one being the failure of the tactic penetrating the hinterland from the Mekong Delta area - the North Vietnamese ferociously resisted French encroachment.

The existing mode of social and political organisation must also be regarded as factors in the success of imperialist ventures. In the cases of China and Tanzania, on the one hand the British, though they were able to defeat the Chinese militarily, encountered stiff opposition in imposing overall political order - not because of the recalcitrance of the people but because of the fairly strong cohesion and political domination of the mandarin class. In Tanzania, on the other hand, confronted with a 'communal' polity, the Germans and the British were able to impose their economic and political wills with greater ease.

Imperialism imposes a set of political and economic conditions upon a satellite economy at the same time as it operates within the traditional political, social, and economic framework. Prominent among the direct results of imperialism is the existence of a part of the economy that is organised along capitalist lines - for the extraction of raw materials for export, and production for profit. This usually means the imposition of 'modern' processes (factories, mines, processing plants, docking facilities), the employment of wage labour, and the introduction of a mode of organisation of the means of production that is usually hitherto unknown (at least on a similar scale) in the satellite. The smooth operation of this

economic order requires an auxilliary apparatus to facilitate the continuing supply of skilled manpower by education and training, to protect the imperialists' interests by the establishment of a militia or construction of a garrison, and a variety of other necessary functions. Either way, the enclave becomes established so that its purpose - the expropriation of goods for profit - is not frustrated.

But the traditions and institutions within which the new order imposes itself do not immediately disappear - although, for the most part they either cease to be effective means of social and political organisation, or they continue to be effective by being utilised by the imperialists. An example of the latter is the manner in which both the British and the Germans coopted local headmen into the colonial administrative apparatus in Tanzania.

Resistance to domination by imperialism often comes from those elements in the colonised society that were part of the ruling order prior to colonisation - this is not surprising since these elements usually have a monopoly on education, access to positions of power, etc. The mandarin class in China is typical of a class which, when threatened by a new power structure, gave rise to resistant elements - although the mandarin class did not successfully defend itself as a class, it was not sufficiently cohesive. In Tanzania, opposition to British rule came indirectly from the ruling class in the traditional society through these young men who had secured jobs in the administration - the early Tankanyika African Association drew its membership from this group. That is, whilst imperialism imposes a new and absolute order on the satellite, it also imports a set of conditions in which conflict between coloniser and colonised arises. The

following section it is shown that this happened in China and Tanzania, and that education was an element in the conflict that arose.

CHAPTER III

THE CASE OF CHINA

Since the Opium Wars in the middle of the nineteenth century China has sought a development policy suitable to Chinese conditions. The post 1840 period saw the beginning of an imperialist onslaught on China which threatened Chinese feudalism, and which did not let up until the middle of the present century. As long as European trading activity was confined to Canton and controlled by the Chinese bureaucracy, the continued pre-eminence of traditional Chinese life was assured. But the military defeat of the 1840's brought about increased foreign activity in and influence on China whilst, at the same time, stimulating forces opposed to change in the sense of modernisation.¹

The questions the Chinese confronted were designed to test their durability, and their capacity to change. As China sought wealth and power in order to ensure its existence as a political entity, what changes were necessary to create a viable culture capable of combining the best of the old with the new, the indigenous and the foreign, and thus overcome the threat of Western bourgeois culture? How could China integrate the modern economic, scientific, and technological methods of the Western capitalist world into Chinese society.²

Attempts to solve these dilemmas were varied. The discussion was the focal point of the so-called 'Self-Strengthening Movement'

of the period after 1850 which sought to build up military power, but defend the traditional way of life.³ The basis of 'Self-Strengthening' was to be the adoption of western science and technology. Its advocates included Feng Kuei-fen who urged that China develop the capacity to manufacture armaments through learning from the barbarians: 'We should use the instruments of the barbarians, but not adopt the way of the barbarians. We should use them so that we can repel them'.⁴ Feng also urged the adoption of western learning through translating western works on 'mathematics, mechanics, optics, light and chemistry': 'If we let Chinese ethics and confucian teachings serve as the foundation, and let them be supplemented by the methods used by the various nations for the attainment of prosperity and power, would it not be the best of all situations?'⁵

But the outstanding exponents of 'Self-Strengthening' during the latter half of the nineteenth century were Taeng Kuo-Fan and Li Hung-chang.⁶ They argued that the best way of self-strengthening lay in sending young men abroad to study 'military administration, shipping administration, infantry tactics, mathematics, manufacturing and other subjects',⁷ and after ten years they could return home 'so that other Chinese might learn thoroughly the superior techniques of the westerners':

Thus we could gradually plan for self-strengthening.

The Self-Strengthening Movement was strongly reformist with the function of reform designed to maintain Chinese 'ethics and foundation' (and thus the pre-eminence of the official class) through adapting the knowledge and techniques of the West. An associate of Tseng and Li, Hsueh Pu-ch'eng, in an essay submitted to Li in 1879

argued that 'we should change the present so as to restore the past but we should change the past system to meet the present needs'.⁹ Change was conceptualised in terms of its remedial function. It is this fact that comes closest to explaining the failure of the Self-Strengthening movement, since the scholar class fell far short in its estimate of the impact of western imperialism.

The movement did, however, contribute to the rise of a small bourgeois intellectual and commercial class, students who had returned from abroad and the compradors of the coastal cities emerged to reinforce the impact of bourgeois culture.¹⁰ Furthermore, these classes joined the landlord class in 'promoting economic growth, the central goal of the Self-Strengthening movement'.¹¹

With the humiliation suffered by the Chinese at the hands of the Japanese after the Sino-Japanese war (1895) and the intensity of imperialist expansion of economic spheres in the closing years of the nineteenth century, many Chinese despondently feared that their country and their civilization was on the verge of extinction.¹² It was in this climate of widespread national despair that the revisionist debate on the future of China vis-a-vis its position as a semi-colonial state raged. The principal protagonists in this debate were K'ang Yu-wei and Chang Chih-tung. The debate itself had its roots in the Self-Strengthening movement. K'ang, the bourgeois radical who espoused western values and ideas, sought to try to legitimize his radical cause within the Confucian tradition.¹³ He advocated the adoption of the 'purpose of Peter the Great, and to take the Meiji reform of Japan as the model of reform';¹⁴ that is, he emphasized a basic change from absolute monarchy to constitutional rule.¹⁵ His

development strategy encompassed such far-reaching reforms as 'socialized education',¹⁶ the setting up of bureaus to promote commerce, industry, modern banking, mining, and agricultural development.¹⁷

K'ang's leading opponent was Chang Chih-tung whose Exhortation To Learn was widely acclaimed. His famous slogan 'Chinese learning for the base and Western learning for application',¹⁸ sums up his position with regard to the necessary steps China must take to survive.

But the force that the reformers seriously underestimated was western imperialism itself, so that by 1905 the Confucian Ching-Shih ('practical statesmanship')¹⁹ philosophy had reached its demise as a guiding framework for coping with western bourgeois culture.²⁰

The debate among Chinese intellectuals in the latter half of the nineteenth century on the courses open to China in the face of imperialist aggression was, in essence a search for a development strategy. The protagonists all, to one degree or another, foresaw the need for China to somehow integrate western knowledge and technology if China were to survive politically and culturally. Beginning with the Self-Strengthening Movement, the outlook of the protagonists was defensive, adaptive, and reformist. They sought to defend the Chinese political culture (expressed as 'ethics and foundation') and, with this, their own class positions. But they were also apparently quite serious in their conviction that China must adapt economically, politically, and socially to a changing world. Finally, their unshakeable faith in the Confucianist traditions and institutions limited their vision to a reformist position. It was this failure to understand the anachronistic and authoritiarian basis of the old

order that doomed their moves to reform. This is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in their failure to regard the wishes of the masses manifest in the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer uprising. In other words, the debate on a development strategy went on in vacuo, and continued to do so until the advent of the mass political movements of the twentieth century, which were, incidently, led by members of the same intellectual class.

With the final collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911 and the subsequent division of China into warring warlord states, the question of a development strategy began to shift from a discussion dominated by returned students and scholar-officials on how to integrate China into the modern world to a situation in which the discussion was overtaken by events themselves. As the pressure from Japanese imperialism increased in intensity, it becomes more and more realistic to view the various treaty ports as centres of what had become a peripheral economy. The crippling effects of indemnity demanded by the imperialist powers had increased China's dependence on foreign financial support. The notorious 'Twenty-One Demands' imposed by Japan in 1915 heavily exacerbated the burden on the struggling economy.

The threat of the destruction of China's economic viability posed by the Twenty-One Demands was severely aggravated by the grossly unfair 'settlement' embodied in the Versailles treaty. These two threats, and the success of the October Revolution in Russia acted as catalysts to the storm that broke out on May 4th, 1919 which is widely regarded as the turning point in China's search for some solutions to the urgent questions hanging over the country's future. Perhaps the most interesting characteristic of the period was the seriousness with

which Chinese intellectuals began to absorb western philosophies, notably Marxism. One of China's earliest Marxist thinkers, Li Ta-chao described China as a 'proletarian nation': China had gradually been transformed into a proletarian society thus becoming part of the 'world proletariat'.²² Li's thinking had an enormous influence on a young associate for whom he had found a job at Peking University - Mao Tse-tung.²³

Throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century the search for a solution to China's economic, social and political problems as national problems became closely interwoven with the debate on revolutionary strategy generally.²⁴ The development of Chinese communism itself cannot be regarded in isolation from the national question. In fact, Chinese communism as it evolved in the 1920's came to view the national and the social questions as organically related: it would be impossible to achieve national integration and liberation without a social revolution, or vice versa.²⁵ This is not to suggest that the Chinese revolution must be regarded only as a 'nationalist' revolution (the 'nationalist or communist?' debate among political scientists has done little to broaden our understanding of the events in twentieth century China) but rather that the revolutionary strategy took the course it did because of the emphasis of the revolutionaries on the need to develop a national strategy. It is within this framework that the development of Chinese communist revolutionary strategy must be analysed.

REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY: THE EARLY YEARS

Mao Tse-tung realised early that the key to the success of the revolution in China was the masses of peasants. He urged the

adoption of a 'new line' in the peasant movement in 1926,²⁶ and in the spring of 1927 wrote the famous essay Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan, a classic analysis of class and class interest in rural China.²⁷ In the "Report" Mao outlines what was to become the very basis of his revolutionary strategy - the exploitation of class struggle through organised peasant leagues.²⁸

From around this date, and particularly after the events in Shanghai and Nanking 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek slaughtered every communist he could lay hands on,²⁹ communist activity became more and more concentrated in the countryside, and the first 'Soviet' was set up in the Hunan-Kiangsi border region.³⁰

The social, political, and economic organisation of the southern soviets was, of course, integral to the military activities of the Red Army. Nevertheless, Maoist development strategy has its roots in this area. Land redistribution was quickly affected as Mal's understanding of the importance of the peasants to the revolutionary movement developed:

We must lead the peasants' struggle for land and distribute the land to them, heighten their labor enthusiasm and increase agricultural production, safeguard the interests of the workers establish co-operatives, develop trade with outside areas, and solve the problems facing the masses - food, shelter and clothing, fuel, rice, cooking oil and salt, sickness and hygiene and marriage. In short, all the practical problems in the masses' everyday life should claim our attention. If we attend to these problems, solve them and satisfy the needs of the masses, we shall really become organizers of the well-being of the masses, and they will truly rally round us and give us their warm support. Comrades, will we arouse them to take part in the revolutionary war? Yes, indeed we will.³¹

Throughout this speech (Be Concerned With the Well-Being of the Masses) Mao stresses his conviction that it is up to the revolutionary

leaders to exhort the masses to work for their advancement. Likewise, he strongly emphasizes his impatience and outright contempt for 'bureaucratic methods of work', and his preference for 'practical, concrete ones'.³² The result, according to Edgar Snow, was a warm, enthusiastic response from the peasants.³³

In this early period in the development of revolutionary strategy, Mao was acutely aware of the need to cultivate the class consciousness of the peasants through intensive propaganda in the villages in order to increase the productivity of their land.³⁴

The period of the Kiangsi soviets may be regarded as the formative period in the application of the Chinese revolutionary development strategy. Despite the constant military maneuvering which preoccupied the communists, it was a period in which many features of contemporary Chinese development strategy had their beginnings. The principal elements of the strategy were land redistribution, political mobilisation to rally the peasants' support and morale, and social and political reorganisation of the countryside through emphasis on class struggle.

The Yen-an Period

In the face of continuing harassment of CCP positions in Kiangsi, which posed a serious threat to the continued existence of the soviets, and to the CCP itself due to the technological and numerical superiority of Chiang's forces,³⁵ the communists were obliged to withdraw from the liberated areas of south China and move northward. The Long March to, and subsequent settlement in and expansion from Shensi saw the development and maturation of the thought of Mao Tse-tung, along with the consolidation of the

communist revolutionary strategy. It is from Yen-an both geographically and historically that the Chinese revolution developed to the victory of 1949 beyond.

Since the aftermath of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution there has been renewed interest among scholars in the Yen-an period. In the opinion of one, "The Cultural Revolution reflects the Yen-an experience in both its causes and its cures."³⁶ Before going on to discuss the experience in this light it ought to be mentioned that it is a mistake to regard the period as one of isolated experiment with revolutionary strategy, since it coincides with the national policy of 'united front' against the Japanese. Hence, it is a period in which revolutionary strategy became interwoven with national strategy to a fairly significant degree. It is instructive, therefore, to regard the Yen-an period as a reflection of an incipient, broader national policy.

The Ten Great Policies of the CCP for the Anti-Japanese Resistance and National Salvation urged the total mobilisation of the whole nation on the basis of the principles of self-determination and self-government.³⁷ And, since the economy of China was on a war footing it became necessary to stress self-sufficiency in rural organisation and 'agricultural products'.³⁸ These exhortations to self-reliance are, of course, in the context of driving the Japanese imperialists out of China,³⁹ in addition to being a traditional exhortation in China: viz. 'drive out the foreign devils'.

In other words, self-reliance was really the only viable economic strategy the communists were left with, since the country was cut off from international help by the Japanese occupation, and isolated from other parts of China by Chiang Kai-shek's forces. In

addition, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region was one in which there was 'no machine industry of any importance'.⁴⁰ It was the need to come to terms with these objective conditions at a very fundamental level that ensured the comprehensiveness, the complexity, and eventually the success of the 'Yenan Way'.

Mark Selden, whose book The Yen-an Way in Revolutionary China is a major study of the essential features of the Yen-an Period and their subsequent effect on post-Cultural Revolution China summarizes the characteristic features of the 'Yenan Way':

...a heavy reliance on the creativity of the Chinese people, particularly the peasantry, and a faith in the ultimate triumph of man over nature, poverty, and exploitation. Unequivocally rejecting domination by an administrative or technical elite operating through a centralized bureaucracy, it emphasized popular participation, decentralization and community power. Underlying this approach was a conception of human nature which held that men, all men, could transcend the limitations of class, experience, and ideology to act creatively in building a new China.⁴¹

What this meant in everyday terms, in addition to the implementation of communist reforms such as land redistribution, the abolition of usury, and 'the elimination of privileged groups',⁴² was the radical restructuring of Chinese rural life to construct from the land and the people a strong economic base. The following were some of the campaigns carried out to this end:

- concentration on the utilization of waste land,⁴³
- simplification of bureaucratic structures and procedures by vesting more power in local committees,
- the 'to the village campaign' in which intellectual and urban workers were sent to the countryside to work alongside the peasants,⁴⁴
- the restructuring of village social and political life,⁴⁵

- the village co-operatives movement,
- labor diversification campaigns designed to break down traditional disdain for manual labor,
- a popular education campaign spreading literacy in an area where the literacy rate was perhaps the lowest in China, and introducing new ideas into remote villages.⁴⁶

All these moves were designed to alleviate rural poverty and oppression. But through all this activity the communists vigilantly combatted the rise of rigid bureaucratic structures in which an 'elite' class of experts might develop.

In this way, according to Mao, they were 'learning to apply the theory of Marxism-Leninism to the specific circumstances of China':⁴⁷

For the Chinese Communists who are part of the great Chinese nation, flesh of its flesh and blood of its blood, any talk about Marxism in isolation from China's characteristics is merely Marxism in the abstract, Marxism in a vacuum. Hence to apply Marxism concretely in China so that its every manifestation has an indubitably Chinese character, i.e., to apply Marxism in the light of China's specific characteristics, becomes a problem which is urgent for the whole Party to understand and solve. Foreign stereo-types must be abolished...⁴⁸

Mao's thinking this time reflects the conditions which brought about the cheng-feng (rectification) movement, designed to revitalize the party machinery in the face of bureaucratization, revisionism, and 'incorrect party tendencies'.⁴⁹ Its purpose was to prepare cadres 'to act independently and forcefully on the basis of shared values and a vision of China's revolutionary future'.⁵⁰ The campaign was not a purge. It did, however, prefigure some of the later rectification campaigns in the 'fifties and sixties, especially the Hundred Flowers and Anti-Rightists campaigns, and, to a greater extent, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution itself.

To this extent the campaign indicated a very important element of Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary strategy: the conviction that all people could become revolutionaries and make revolution, even the limitations of class could be transcended in the cause of the revolution.⁵¹ This is, then, the genesis of the 'mass line' which has been the cornerstone of China's development ever since, with its strong emphasis on class struggle, on anti-dogmatism and anti-bureaucratism, and mass mobilisation through 'ideological imperatives'.

In terms of economic development the Yen'an period revealed a strategy which is based on a labor-intensive agricultural foundation. In the virtual absence of capital⁵² all the available labor was mobilised at the village level into cooperative and 'mutual aid ventures'.⁵³ The ultimate success of the strategy depended upon dedication, excellent relations between party cadres and the people, and an intense ideology campaign among the peasants. It involved, also, a 'production war' aimed at increasing productivity at all levels. 'Mao's commitment was to a type of development that would promote co-operative relations, bring the masses into decision making about their daily lives, and thus unleash the creativity and resourcefulness at the local level so necessary to build a new China.'⁵⁴

This kind of development was, almost by definition different from, at times antithetical to, a development strategy which emphasized rapid industrialization accompanied by urbanisation, the application of scientific techniques in order to develop sophisticated technology; centralised planning and mechanisation of agriculture. Yet this type of development strategy was foremost in the minds of many party cadres - especially those who had returned from studying in the Soviet Union

where this kind of development was pursued. The post-Yenan period in the Chinese revolution is a period in which both these development strategies were pursued, and in which the development of socialism was largely confounded by the incompatibility of the two.

THE CASE OF TANZANIA

Early contact between that part of east Africa which has become Tanzania and western imperialism was inauspicious - Arab slave traders plied the coastal trade buying slaves from dealers who had often penetrated far inland. The slave traders themselves occupied small, scattered settlements along the coast.

The territory that is now Tanzania acquired a fragmentary administrative infrastructure through German occupation in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The Germans emphasized economic organisation (along private lines) largely because of the expense involved in maintaining a colonial bureaucracy.⁵⁵ By the early part of the present century the cash crop economy had made a significant impact on the area - principal crops were sisal, coffee and rubber which were largely grown on settler holdings. By 1913 there were over five-thousand German settlers in Tanganyika who very nearly brought the country under settler rule.⁵⁶

After World War I the League of Nations entrusted the rule of Tanganyika to Britain. From a very early date the colonists, apprehensive about their experiences with 'nationalist' sentiment in India, pursued a policies of 'divide and rule'.⁵⁷ This was implemented, in part, by exploiting the differences between the Africans and the thousand- or so Indians in the country through the education system.

But in essence, British policy was 'indirect rule' under which African leaders in each area were granted executive, judicial, and financial powers within their tribal boundaries, backed by the authority of the British colonial government and its officers.⁵⁸

In addition, the British began training young men for posts in the civil service - the characteristic man of this period was the educated clerk, teacher, or pastor.⁵⁹ These young men became the nucleus of the Tanganyika African Association, the forerunner TANU, which was formed in the 1930's.

The Tanganyika African National Union itself was formed in 1954 under the leadership of Julius Nyerere. Its principal objective was to secure independence from British colonial rule, and the slogan which brought the party to prominence was 'Freedom and Unity'. The rapid growth of an organised and united demand for self-government was, in Nyerere's words 'favoured by historical circumstances'. There was already in existence a grass roots political infrastructure in the form of a multitude of very small welfare and tribal organisations; there were no strong local or vested interests supporting the maintenance of colonialism and privilege; Kiswahili was understood by the majority of the people; and no single tribal group dominated in size, wealth, or education.⁶⁰ Capitalising on these perceived factors, TANU led the struggle for political independence which was won in 1961. This analysis of the political conditions in Tanzania is, perhaps, the closest parallel there is on the subject of analysing objective conditions for change between the work of Mao Tse-tung and Nyerere. Mao's Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan is, as we mentioned earlier, a classic class analysis - Nyerere's analysis

looks for the integrating agents in Tanzanian political life rather than the conflicts. This contrast underlines a crucial difference between the two.

THE COLONIAL LEGACY: (i) Infrastructure:

At the time of independence the economic infrastructure outside the peasant economy was almost entirely designed to facilitate the export of raw materials and the import of manufactured goods. Roads, railways, and power distribution were all built to service the export enclave. Production was heavily dominated by cash crops: coffee, cotton, and pyrethrum - about half the farmers in Tanzania were engaged in these three alone. The infrastructure did not include a well-developed industrial sector and there was heavy reliance on manufactured goods imported from outside. The industries that had been constructed were largely owned by foreign firms, mainly British, as were the agencies that distributed the country's commercial produce on the world markets.

This meant, of course, that as long as significant proportions of the cash-earning sector of the economy were dominated by foreign concerns the investible surplus was invariably lost to Tanzania. It also meant that any decisions that affected the economy as a whole were largely made by the imperialists in their own interests. Furthermore, the mode of production itself was decided upon according to the single criterion of profitability, with the appropriate concessions to geographical and other physical constraints, but not to labor intensity nor overall development of the economy. As a consequence, the number of trained workers was small - and these were employed under relatively favourable conditions befitting a 'labour aristocracy'. It

is this group that Nyerere was addressing in 'Ujamaa - the basis of African Socialism' - singling it out for making excessive demands on the economy.⁶¹ In this, Nyerere comes closer to pinpointing sources of conflict in the country. It is the persistence of these conditions that made Tanzania a 'neo-colony' in the post-Independence period.

(ii) Strategy:

The TANU government inherited a three-Year Development Plan from the outgoing colonial regime which covered the period 1961-64. The plan which was, in Nyerere's words 'little more than a series of public expenditure projects',⁶² was based on the premise that, although industrialisation was desirable, it could not take place until agricultural expansion had created a sufficiently sophisticated domestic market.⁶³ It was, in other words, an extension of the British colonial policy of gradual development through the implementation of certain infrastructural improvements - construction of roads, schools, irrigation etc. It did not contemplate the re-ordering or redirection of the structure, organisation or objectives of economic life.⁶⁴

The government soon implemented a 'peoples plan' which was designed to stimulate the co-operation and self-help programs that had been steadily developing since pre-independence days.

Co-Operative and Self-Help Schemes

The co-operative movement began in Tanganyika in the early 1940's with coffee farmers in the north forming cooperatives for farming and marketing their produce. The movement grew in the period following independence - the cooperative organisations themselves 'bridging the

gap between commercial cash farming and traditional communal life'.⁶⁵

In addition to marketing, the cooperatives provide assistance to farmers introducing them to improvements and new techniques. From early times the cooperatives had voiced their feelings on political issues⁶⁶ and the links between them and TANU has a history going back to the formation of the former and the growth of the TAA across the country. By the mid-1960's the cooperative movement had become a significant pressure group in Tanzanian politics.⁶⁷

Self-help schemes were initially a reflection of the TANU's attempts to translate Nyere's Ujamaa philosophy into action.⁶⁸ That is, they were a response to a political call to people to build village schools, roads, dispensaries, etc.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, the call was premature inasmuch as the appropriate administrative apparatus so necessary for the coordination of this kind of mobilisation simply did not exist. But the schemes, taken as a whole and as a manifestation of political mobilisation, are important, as they represent a response by the masses of people to ideas that were later embodied in the self-reliance theme which underlies much of Nyerere's thinking. Furthermore, they did stimulate the TANU leadership's confidence in the efficacy of mass mobilisation as a potential means of economic construction.

The existence of both the cooperative movement and the self-help schemes in Tanzania doubtless facilitated the initial conceptualising of the scope and economic direction of the strategy that is implicit in the Arush Declaration documents. Moreover, they represent an indication of the means of implementation to which the Declaration gave impetus.

THE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY OF THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD

Having attained political independence from Britain for Tanzania, Nyerere and the leaders of TANU were pressed by the need to formulate a development strategy which would embody the aspirations of the people and the party and which would, somehow, lead to development in the country that was in the spirit of Uhuru. TANU was in office because it had played a leading role in the independence movement - to this end it had been extremely successful in uniting the people and laying the groundwork for national unity. But the party had not worked out for itself a cohesive set of formulations about the future upon which to base a development strategy. The grave danger facing the party was that it might take another 'false start in Africa' of the kind Rene Dumont had warned in 1962.⁷⁰ Africa, Dumont argued, was marking time and the responsibility for this now rested with Africans who had taken over from European colonialists. Unfortunately, too many of the new leaders were pursuing the same policies as their former oppressors - policies based on inaccurate and ultimately destructive misconceptions about the process of development itself. There were 'too many tractors and coffee plants, not enough oil palms and food crops; too little attention paid to helping the peasants who were the economic backbone of Africa'. The new elites were, according to Dumont, 'a modern version of Louis XVI's court'.⁷¹

These elites had also been singled out by Frantz Fanon in his book The Wretched of the Earth published around the same time:

The national bourgeoisie steps into the shoes of the former European settlement: doctors, traders, barristers, commercial travellers, general agents and transport agents. It considers that the dignity of the country

and its own welfare require that it should occupy all these posts. From now on it will insist that all the big foreign companies should pass through its hands.... The national middle class discovers its historic mission: that of intermediary. Seen through its eyes, its mission has nothing to do with transforming the nation; it consists, prosiacally, of being the transmission line between the nation and a capitalism rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the mask of neo-colonialism.... The national bourgeoisie turns its back more and more on the interior and on the real facts of its undeveloped country, and tends to look toward the former mother country and the foreign capitalists who count on its obliging compliance.⁷²

Nyerere also had these people in mind - they could, paradoxically, provide the effective leadership in the crucial process of decolonisation and development in Africa, yet it was precisely their training and their lifestyles that made them the most intractable obstacles to the African revolution.⁷³

But the urgency was not to make sure that the future of Africa was simply overseen by Africans - it was to ensure that any development strategy would take into account the real, objective conditions confronting Africa (including the existence of a recalcitrant national bourgeoisie) - and these included the historical reality of Africa's former colonial status. The institutions of colonialism were just that - the new transitional institutions must not simply be replicas of old.

Nyerere himself thought deeply about these problems, and in 1962 read a paper in which he articulated his thoughts on the direction which he thought Tanganyika should take - it was the direction that had already been similarly articulated by other African leaders, Amilcar Cabral and Kwame Nkrumah, in their writings on African socialism. Nyerere's paper explored the traditional note on of 'Ujamaa' or 'familyhood', and claimed that this should form the basis

of African socialism. In the paper Nyerere argued that since in traditional African society the distribution of wealth insured that everybody was taken care of, and everyone was certain of the security offered by the village community. It was capitalism, brought by European colonialism, that brought exploitation of one man's labor by another to Africa. To combat this, Tanganyikans needed to reeducate themselves 'to regain their former attitude of mind', but more than that: 'we must reject also the capitalist methods that go with the capitalist attitude of mind'.⁷⁴ Nyerere castigated those who demanded a greater share of the national wealth because of the premium which market value placed on their products. In doing this he addressed himself to both trade unionists and to professional people or individuals who had skills that were in demand.

In claiming that African socialism is an attitude of mind that is rooted in Africa's past, Nyerere sets himself apart from the mainstream of socialist thinkers and particularly socialist revolutionaries who regard the revolution as the transcendence of capitalism and imperialism and the transition to socialism as the inevitable unfolding of the processes of history. Nyerere demands the transcendence of capitalism to take its impetus from a force in society that is, in fact, pre-capitalist. And the transition to 'socialism' is, in part, a reconstitution of that form.

In extolling the virtues of 'Ujamaa', which, he said 'describes our socialism',⁷⁵ he was concerned to develop a 'national ethic'.⁷⁶ Research undertaken around this time indicated a tendency to conceive of Ujamaa without policy or imperical foundations in every walk of life, except for its association with self-help schemes. Seldom was

there any agreement with the idea that Ujamaa involved the extension of the feelings of brotherhood, obligation and consensus from the community to the state level. On the other hand, students at Kivukoni college (the TANU political school) associated Ujamaa with exploiting the expropriators and putting an end to the uneven distribution of wealth.⁷⁷

It was not until 1967 that Nyerere's Ujamaa was translated into a coherent set of principles which spelled out Tanzania's development strategy. In the meantime the new nation (which formally became Tanzania in 1964 with the unification with Zanzibar) had embarked on a development strategy that was dominated by the legacies of colonial rule.

THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 1964-1969

In addition to the immediate objectives of the First Five-Year Plan published in 1964, namely, raising life-expectancy at birth, raising per-capita incomes, and developing self-sufficiency in manpower, the Plan proposed structural changes in the economy. These changes were to be brought about by accelerated infrastructural reform, including improvements in housing, township development and roads. There was considerable emphasis on industrialisation with the implicit aim of increasing import substitution. The agricultural sector was treated with less emphasis than later plans - but there was to be added stimulus to the export sector which was regarded as vital for foreign exchange earnings. The government was, at this stage, prepared to seek considerable finance abroad, especially for investment in secondary industry, much of this finance was to be used in the construction of primary product processing plants.

By and large, the shape and general orientation of the Plan reflected the fact that at this stage, the Tanzanian economy was a classic example of an export-dominated economy.⁷⁸ Yet the outlook of the plan for the development of Tanzania was 'modest' - especially in regard to the acquisition of foreign funds - reflecting, perhaps, the TANU leadership's growing apprehension about the neo-imperialist intentions of the lending countries. This apprehension is clearly behind Nyerere's remarks on the occasion of the presentation of the Arusha Declaration to parliament.

Independence cannot be real if a nation depends on another for gifts and loans from another for its development... it would be improper for us to accept such assistance without asking ourselves how this would affect our independence and our very survival as a nation.... And even if we were able to convince foreign investors and foreign firms to undertake all the projects and programmes of economic development that we need, is that what we really want to happen?... could we do so without questioning ourselves?⁷⁹

Despite the general optimism of the Plan there was still some ambiguity in the relationship between the philosophy of 'Ujamaa and its increasing significance as a theoretical framework for the development of socialism in Tanzania, and the economic direction of the country. Nyerere explained some time later.

During 1966 there was a gradual realisation that although some economic progress was being made, and although we were still talking in terms of socialist objectives, the nation was, in fact, drifting without any sense of direction. A lack of co-ordination between our different objectives and policies was resulting in confusion some of our people were getting disheartened, and there was a widespread tendency to look to others for our salvation instead of concentrating on our own effort and resources.

In his later assessment of the period Nyerere goes on to describe some of the symptoms which were merging to earn for Tanzania Shivji's description as a 'neo-colony par excellence'. These included growing income disparities between some of those people in the centre and the corresponding resentment of these felt by the masses of the people in the agricultural periphery. These same privileged people, as a result of their superior economic positions were able to dominate the accessible financial credit, thus enabling them to 'become landlords and capitalists'. In short, the power and prestige, and influence, of the national bourgeoisie in Tanzania was growing - it was a product of the tiny capitalist centre, its wealth, when compared to that of the overwhelming majority of the people, was considerable. Yet, Nyerere's analysis of even this situation was never in terms of actual class struggle - despite the fact that here was a bourgeoisie whose interests conflicted with those of the masses with whom Nyerere so closely identified himself. He did, though, prescribe Dumont's book as compulsory reading for all TANU MP's - showing that he was aware, at least, of the pitfalls allowing the national bourgeoisie (of which many M.P.'s were part) to indulge itself unheeding the needs of the country as a whole.

It was general in African states at the time to be insufficiently critical of the contradictions of 'modernisation' as the end result of 'development', as it was also general to subject class relations to insufficient scrutiny.⁸² Many Africans were prepared to accept without question, the inevitability of an Africa which would be an economic approximation of Europe but with somehow 'different' social and cultural institutions. The Arusha Declaration represents a challenge to that view.

COMPARING THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CONTEXTS:

It would be accurate to describe the social structure of China at the time of imperialist incursion as 'feudal' - with power, wealth and privilege in the hands of the mandarin class and the imperial court occupying the top of the social class structure. Tanzania's social structure was 'communal': which means that the social, political and economic structures were organised on the basis of the tribe, the clan and the village. In this case it is not useful to talk of a 'class' structure in Tanzania as we are using the term in this study.

In both cases agriculture formed the economic base - in Tanzania this was often shifting agriculture (slash and burn) with herding in some areas, supplemented by hunting and food gathering. In China the peasant-landlord relationship was at the base of economic and social life in the countryside with landownership the basis of property relations. In Tanzania, land was held communally. There is a marked contrast, of course, in the relative scales of the agricultural bases - this has an effect on the impact of imperialism on economic organisation. In China, with the important exception of the coastal enclaves which suffered the full impact of imperialist incursion, feudal property relations and the feudal mode of production remained dominant in the countryside, though they were distorted during the Warlord period and strong in subsequent periods. In Tanzania, a considerable proportion of economic life was effectively reorganised under the influence of the German settlers and later the British. Hence, the effects of colonisation were peculiar to each case - the scale of

China's economy was sufficiently impressive for it to remain to a great extent unaffected in the sense of actual organisation of the means of production with the result that many feudal forms and institutions persisted until quite late in the early part of the present century. In Tanzania the size and nature of the economy did not permit the old economic forms to persist with quite the same residual influence.

In political terms, both countries had periods of adaptation to bourgeois democratic forms. In China, this dates from the establishment of the republic in 1911. In Tanzania, political independence in 1962 is the real watershed in the advent of the bourgeois state. The persistence of bourgeois political forms, and their workability is also peculiar to each country. In China the efficacy of centralised government was subverted when the country effectively fragmented in the Warlord era, following on as they did, increased Japanese incursion, then the civil war. It is accurate to say that bourgeois democracy was never an effective means of political organisation in China. Although the period from 1911 to 1949 is referred to as the 'bourgeois democratic' period - this is mostly a label to characterize the separateness of this as a political era from the feudal era. In Tanzania, on the other hand, the bourgeois state apparatus that was established by the British in the late colonial period, to all intents and purposes, remains today - in form, at least, - with the political organisation of the country centering on the parliament, elections, and the cabinet setup. This difference has had a profound effect on the implementation of the development strategies in each case. In Tanzania the decision-making apparatus has tended toward the Centre,

with the parliament at the focal point. In China, experimentation with a variety of decision-making mechanisms, especially in the early period in the Shen-Kan-Ning border regions has been facilitated by relative weakness of antagonistic political forms in the liberated areas, although deference to feudal symbols of power persisted for long periods in some cases.

The responses of both countries to imperialism were tempered by various traditions. In China, the mandarin class sought to accomodate western capitalism in such a way as to maintain remnants of the old order that would assure the continued pre-eminence of the scholar official. This was attempted through the importation and implementation of 'western learning' in the manner discussed by prominent members of that class. In Tanzania, adaptation of capitalist economic organisation was a direct legacy of the colonial regime in the form of the first Three Year Plan. This manner of adaptation, as has been shown, persisted in the First Five Year Plan also.

In both cases the rise of strong political leadership committed to some form of 'socialism' saw, for the first time in each case, real challenges to capitalist ideas and forms of political and economic organisation as they are manifest in the Periphery. However, the attack on capitalism as a growth model and early attempts to supercede it have contrasting emphases in either case. Nyerere rejected capitalism on more or less ideological grounds - deploring its effects on the traditional African way of Ujamaa, which he saw as the basis of African social and economic life. The Chinese, on the other hand, rejected capitalism as the motor force behind imperialism, and searched for alternate forms of economic and political organisation in

the countryside. Mao's analysis of Chinese classes and exploitation of class conflict as the basis for social change has no (or relatively little) parallel in Nyerere's approach to popular participation on development. This contrast is of fundamental importance to any comparison of Chinese and Tanzanian development strategies.

The early approaches to transition in each country differ also. Nyerere and the Tanzanian political leadership chose from the start to work through the existing state apparatus with the Party and the parliament as the basic institutional forces in transition. The Chinese communists worked first on transforming the economic base in the countryside through land redistribution, etc, relying on mass participation for the support and success of the development strategy. The Tanzanians relied mostly on tutelage by party members - reflecting Nyerere's belief in the influence of correct ideology and political organisation.

Thus as each country moved into their perspective periods of socialist reconstruction and transition, the approaches were already distinguishable. The Chinese in 1949 already had twenty years of grass roots work organising agriculture along 'socialist' lines by emphasizing co-operation and self-reliance, and by mobilising the peasants as the revolutionary class. In 1967 on the eve of the Arusha Declaration Tanzania had begun to attempt to develop by using self-help schemes and through cooperation in the countryside, but there was no well-tried national plan for socialist transition, or for a development strategy that sought to begin transition. Nor had the TANU leadership begun to experiment seriously with alternate modes of political-economic organisation. TANU was slowly broadening its base in the

populace but it was still dominated by the educated leadership as it had always been. This is in strict contrast to the CCP which had a powerful mass base though, again, the leadership was drawn heavily from the urban intelligentsia as the whole discussion of socialist transition had hitherto gone on in the cities with reference to the industrial proletariat as the progressive revolutionary class. Finally, the state apparatus inherited from the colonial regime was a more comprehensive administrative apparatus in Tanzania than in China where remnants of the Ranking regime were scattered throughout the country, and in some cases, whole provinces had been organised by the Communist Party for many years.

In Part III these legacies provide the context within which to describe and compare the strategies for socialist transition in the post-1949 period for China and the Post Arusha Declaration period for Tanzania.

Footnotes to Chapter III

¹Frank H. King, A Concise Economic History of Modern China, (New York, Praeger, 1968), p. 56.

²Kung Chung-wee, "Cultural Revolution in Modern Chinese History," in *China's Uninterrupted Revolution: From 1840 to the Present*, ed., Victor Nee and James Peck, (New York, Pantheon, 1975), p. 218.

³Theodore W. de Bary, Chester Tan and Chan Wing-tsit, eds., Sources of Chinese Tradition 2 vols., (New York, Columbia University Press, 1960), 2:45.

⁴Feng Kuei-fen, "On the Manufacture of Foreign Weapons" in de Bary et. al. Sources, p. 47.

⁵Idem, "On the Adoption of Chinese Learning" in de Bary et.al., Sources, pp. 48-49

⁶Ibid., p. 49.

⁷Tseng Kuo-fen, "On Sending Young Men Abroad to Study" in de Bary et.al. Sources, p. 50.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Hsueh Fu-Ch'eng, "On Reform" in de Bary et.al. Sources, p. 53.

¹⁰Kung, "Cultural Revolution", p. 235.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., p. 236.

¹³Ibid., p. 237.

¹⁴K'ang Yu-wei, "The Need for Reforming Institutions", in de Bary et.al., Sources, p. 73.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 64.

¹⁶Kung, "Cultural Revolution", p. 241.

¹⁷de Bary et.al., Sources, p. 64.

¹⁸Kung, "Cultural Revolution", p. 241.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 225.

²⁰Ibid., p. 245.

²¹King, Economic History, p. 97.

²²Kung, "Cultural Revolution", p. 259.

²³Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, (New York, Grove Press, 1961), pp. 150-157.

²⁴Arif Dirlik, "National Development and Social Revolution in Early Chinese Thought", The China Quarterly 58 (April - June 1974): 287.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Snow, Red Star, p. 161.

²⁷Mao Tse-tung, "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan", in Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung, (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1971).

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Snow, Red Star, Chapter 5.

³⁰Ibid., p. 169.

³¹Mao, "Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses", in Selected Readings, p. 52.

³²Ibid., p. 55.

³³Snow, Red Star, p. 175.

³⁶Peter J. Seybolt, "The Yen-an Revolution in Mass Education", The China Quarterly: 48 (1971): 641-669.

³⁷"The Ten Great Policies of the CCP for Anti-Japanese Resistance and National Salvation, (August 1937)", in Brandt et.al., A Documentary History, p. 243.

³⁸Ibid., p. 244.

³⁹Ibid., p. 242.

⁴⁰Snow, Red Star, p. 232.

⁴¹Mark Seldon, The Yen-an Way in Revolutionary China, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 210.

⁴²Snow, Red Star, p. 234.

⁴³Ibid., p. 236.

⁴⁴Seldon, The Yen-an Way, pp. 224-229.

⁴⁵Snow, Red Star, p. 235.

⁴⁶Seldon, The Yen-an Way, pp. 270-271.

⁴⁷Mao Tse-tung, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War", in Selected Readings, p. 156.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 156.

⁴⁹Brandt, et.al., A Documentary History, p. 372.

⁵⁰Seldon, The Yen-an Way, p. 195-196.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 196.

⁵²Ibid., p. 265.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 242-249.

⁵⁴Nee et.al., China's Uninterrupted Revolution, p. 43.

⁵⁵ John Saul and L. Cliffe, eds., Socialism in Tanzania, 2 vols., (Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1972), 1:9.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

⁵⁷ John Hatch, Tanzania: A Profile, (New York, Praeger, 1972), p. 86.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 58.

⁵⁹ Saul and Cliffe, Socialism in Tanzania, p. 12.

⁶⁰ Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity: 1952-1965. (Dar-es-Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 1.

⁶¹ Idem, Ujamaa - Essays on Socialism, (Dar-es-Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 10.

⁶² Idem, "Tanzania Ten Years After Independence", The African Review 2:1 p.8.

⁶³ Hatch, Tanzania, p. 180.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 137.

⁶⁶ Saul and Cliffe, Socialism in Tanzania, p. 21.

⁶⁷ W. Tordoff, Government and Politics in Tanzania, (Nairobi, East Africa Publishing House, 1967), p. 165.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 160.

⁶⁹ Nyerere, Ten Years After, p. 8.

⁷⁰ Rene Dumont, False Start in Africa, trans. Phyllis N. Ott, 2nd ed. revised (New York, Praeger, 1969).

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 78.

⁷² Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington, (New York, Grove Press Inc., 1968), pp. 152-165.

⁷³Ahmed Mohidden, "Nyerere and Fanon on African Development and Leadership", Pan-African Journal 6:2, 1973, p. 165.

⁷⁴Nyerere, Ujamaa, p. 7.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 12.

⁷⁶Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, pp. 174-175.

⁷⁷Fred G. Burke, "Tanganyika: The Search for Ujamaa" in African Socialism, ed., W.G. Friedland and Carl G. Rosenberg, (London and Nairobi, Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 200.

⁷⁸Dharam P. Ghai, "Reflecting on Tanganyika's Plan", East Africa Journal, (June, 1964), p. 21.

⁷⁹Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, (Dar-es-Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 240.

⁸⁰Nyerere, "Ten Years After", p. 11.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 12. See also Hatch, Tanzania: A Profile, p. 193.

⁸²Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies 6:2 (1968): 155.

CHAPTER IV

EDUCATIONAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND THE BEGINNINGS OF EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES IN CHINA BEFORE 1949 AND IN TANZANIA BEFORE 1967

This chapter traces the development of educational infrastructures in China up to 1949 - the year of the CCP victory, and in Tanzania up to 1967 - the year of the Arusha Declaration. In each case, as has been explained earlier, these cutoff points mark changes in the relationship of each country with the Capitalist Centre, or, at least, changes were made imminent as a result of actions and events that took place in these years. In 1949 the CCP defeated the Kuomintang, thus bringing to an end the so-called 'democratic' period. The party achieved power in its twenty-eighth year; in the former years the groundwork for a coherent educational strategy had been laid - especially in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Regions of which Yen-an was the Centre. The Yen-an Period is regarded as the most productive in Mao Tse-tung's life, for it was during these years that he formulated and refined the revolutionary program that was later to form the basis of China's political-economic and educational strategies, particularly after 1966.

In 1967 the Arusha Declaration proposed significant changes in the status of Tanzania vis a vis the capitalist world. Among the proposals was an educational strategy that promised to radically

reshape the educational ideas and institutions that had been ongoing in Tanzania since the latter part of the nineteenth century. Julius Nyerere, who had himself been a schoolteacher, and Tanzania's first university graduate became progressively dissillusioned with the education system his government had inherited from the colonisers in 1962. Whilst early measures to develop the country recognised the need to extend educational opportunities to as many people as possible, these measures in no way confronted the complex questions that needed to be confronted in order that an educational system that was complementary to the political-economic strategy could be developed. Hence, by 1967, problems such as educated unemployed, a rural-urban dichotomy in educational availability, and questions such as the relevance and purpose of an education that was still, to all intents and purposes the same as colonial education, pressed Nyerere and the TANU leadership to take positive steps to bring education into line with the political-economic realities of the country.

Following the descriptions of the pre-transitional educational strategies and contexts is a postscript in which comparisons are made of the educational situations in either country before they took steps to dissociate from imperialism and construct socialism.

Educational Developments in China Before 1949

A significant difference between China and Tanzania, for the purposes of this study, is the existence in the former of a formal educational infrastructure that pre-dates imperialist incursion. Furthermore, this education system played a vital role in not just maintaining the status quo but in ensuring the continuing domination

by one class. It is partly against this very old tradition in Chinese education that the Communist educational strategy is directed. That is, there is need (or there has been in the past, it is fading) for certain dissociative tactics to be used as part of the overall educational strategy for transition. But I shall return to this point later.

Traditional Chinese education, both in theory and in practice was carried on in the framework of a dominant ideology - namely Confucianism.¹ The concern of Confucius' teaching with the orderly conduct of human affairs and its essentially a theological basis on the other, had a significant effect on the humanism and secularism of traditional education. Confucius was concerned with the perfection of Jen or 'humanness'; it was a process through which man realizes his intrinsic value and dignity as an individual human being and seeks to arrive at a state of harmony with both humanity and nature.²

In theory, at least, there was no aristocracy in China based on birth or lineage. Men were rulers because of their proven moral superiority - proven by their success in mastering knowledge. Others were ruled because they were morally inferior (which was, of course, unproven in fact, but assumed, since they had not demonstrated their knowledge through access to the examination system). These latter were meant to bear burdens - thus the classic dichotomy enunciated by Mencius:

Some labor with their brains, and some labor with their brawn. Those who labor with their brains govern others; those who labor with their brawn are governed by others. Those governed by others feed them. Those who govern others are fed by them. This is a universal principal in the world.... if there were no men of a superior grade, there would be no one to rule the countrymen. If there were no countrymen, there would be no one to support the men of superior grade.³

It is important to understand that it was the knowledgeable man's moral superiority that entitled him to rule. He did not have to acquire technical knowledge - there was a lower stratum of clerks who took care of practical matters like taxation and legal affairs for the scholar officials.

Within this tradition the education system operated under the following characteristics: it was a formal system designed for the selection, rather than the education of the scholar class; there was a private as well as a 'state' school system operating alongside one another; the system was noticeably inflexible and formal.⁴ Under this system there were operating, several different kinds of schools - the government ran educational centres staffed by supervisory personnel charged with the responsibility of selecting persons for government service.⁵ But most schooling was done in private institutions accessible to those of varying means: the scholar-gentry had family schools where a tutor taught the young in the home; clan schools and village schools were administered and attended by clan members and villagers respectively - they varied according to the means of the village or the clan. Finally, in the large cities there were private academies where prominent scholars attracted students for high-level academic work.⁶

The *raison d'être* for these schools was the training and preparation of young men for the imperial examinations. These examinations were taken at various levels from the local prefactual examination to the highest metropolitan examination held triennially in Peking. Competition in the examinations was intense, and only those who could afford it studied for them. Thus the sons of the

well-to-do only had time to prepare for the examinations, in this very simple manner the system remained rigidly hierarchical despite its 'theoretical' meritocratic openness. This intimate relationship between the education system and the class structure goes a long way to explain the extreme reluctance of most of the scholar class to accept the substance, form and techniques of western education.

The scholar class perceived its position vis a vis the imperialists very much in terms of the differences in their knowledge systems - thus the exhortations to learn that characterized the response of China to the west in the Nineteenth century which are discussed in the previous chapter. But in terms of their effect on educational practice these exhortations did have some effect and schools stressing 'western' learning were established. These new schools fell into several distinct groups: (1) schools to train interpreters and foreign affairs specialists; (2) schools to train engineers and skilled workmen for the new shipyards and arsenals; (3) schools to train deck and engine room officers for the modern navy.... (4) schools to train army officers, that is, military academies; (5) schools to train personnel for the telegraph administration; (6) a naval and military medical school; and (7) a school of mining engineering.⁷

But there remained very few of these schools, and, furthermore, the economic and political impact of imperialism on the state destroyed any possibility that an elaborate system of schools could be established, let alone supported. This is the period, as discussed earlier, in which the discussions about an appropriate response to the imperialism were taken over by events themselves. And as has

already been stressed, it is important to bear in mind that:

the modernisation of Chinese education took place in this historical context; it grew in dimension and intensity in response to the impact of the west, not as a result of the spontaneous working of indigenous forces.⁸

After the establishment of the republic in 1917, the prominent Chinese educationist Ts'ai Yua-pei the minister of education, outlined the aims of education and declared that it should be 'beyond political control' - that is, that 'it should be based upon the situation of the people' in contrast to monarchical education which was 'subordinate to government'.⁹ There should, he said, be military education since China was surrounded by her oppressors; there should be moral education, technical ('utilitarian') education and, what he called 'education for a world view' - a 'conception combining beauty and solemnity.... (that) ...is a bridge between the phenomenal world and the world of reality'.¹⁰

Ts'ai was chancellor of Peking University when the May 4th Movement broke out. This is regarded as the turning point in modern Chinese history - and it is the point at which, in line with the previous discussion of the development of the political-economic development strategy, our attention turns to the development of the Communist educational strategy. But it is important to remember that when the Communists achieved victory in 1949 there was a skeletal educational infrastructure that was a legacy of the Kuomintang.

After coming to power in 1927, the Kuomintang realised the political potential of education, it was 'declared a political tool, an ideological weapon in the hands of the party. A standard curriculum in middle school was introduced and Party Doctrine became a

required course in place of social studies'.¹¹ During the period of Kuomintang rule the education superstructure assumed the classical dimensions of education in a neo-colony: there was excessive emphasis on higher education at the expense of other levels - reflecting the domination of educational resources by those who could afford the time and money for extended periods of education; the language, curricula, forms and methods of education from the West predominated - especially in higher education, education was generally urban oriented, while the rural areas were neglected - this was pronounced, again, in higher education where facilities were concentrated in cities - especially Shanghai and Peking. The other indication of this is the now-familiar problem of student alientation: 'once they came and were exposed to urban influences, the students seldom went back to the rural areas'.¹² Finally, the problem of educated unemployed was not unknown in Kuomintang China, and evidence suggests that the reasons for this conform to the classical pattern described in the Introduction.¹³

The communist educational strategy that was being developed in the liberated areas over this same period of time was, as we shall see, different in almost every respect from that which the Kuomintang government had persued. This is an outcome, in part, of the historical conditions within which the strategy was worked out, and of the theoretical base upon which it was founded.

The Educational Strategy of the CCP - The Early Years to 1949.

The first article Mao Tse-tung published was a piece on Physical education in which he outlined the need to concentrate on physical development as well as intellectual development. One commentator

speculates that this article is 'perhaps an early and important indication of Mao's early negative orientation toward book learning' which he regarded as 'impractical' and symbolic of the old order - an objection he reiterated in later years.¹⁴

As Mao's understanding of Marxism-Leninism developed he became aware of education as part of the superstructure of society, and that 'unless the economic base is changed there is little chance that education can be anything more than an propaganda tool in the hands of the bourgeois ruling class'.¹⁵ It was in this period that Mao developed an understanding of the role of education in class struggle.

In his report on the Hunan peasant movement Mao found the peasants organising their own schools, mainly evening schools that were operated by and for the peasants themselves.¹⁶ Mao at this time criticized schools that were adopting western learning - saying that the substance was positive, but that the delivery system was basically weak as there were too many courses, creativity was stifled, and students became passive.¹⁷ Mao had, in 1923, established the Self-Study University in Chang' ta in which the onus was on the student to study, attend classes and discuss.¹⁸

In the Kiangsi Soviets the CCP organised regular schools, part-time schools, and evening schools after the kind Mao had observed in Hunan. Education of Red Army members became important, but the biggest task was the eradication of illiteracy. An extremely important aspect of education at this time was its political content:

Mao was convinced that instructional material should be meaningful to the social class to which it was presented. With the workers and peasants lectures and texts should be politically instructive quite apart from simply transmitting the academic information. Thus, when teaching Chinese to illiterate workers and peasants in

Hunan, Mao on one occasion began writing the characters for "hand" and "foot". He then asked the students to ponder over the fact that although all wealth and power in the world are created with the hands of the workers and peasants they do not receive the wealth they create. Although though both rich and poor have legs to walk with, when the rich go out they are carried by workers and peasants in sedan chairs and rickshaws. This approach infused political concepts in the curriculum in a form digestible and understandable to workers and peasants and became more developed during the Kiangsi and Yen-an periods.¹⁹

Through this same process, Mao was also concerned to de-formalise the relationship, between student and teacher.²⁰

In the Border regions to the north (Shen-Kan-Ning area of which Yen-an was the Centre), the Communists were faced with a massive educational task, the illiteracy rate was somewhere in the order of 95%²¹ and the people were extremely 'backward' and superstitious. In an all out effort to counteract these factors the CCP established two hundred primary schools, a normal school for primary teachers, an agricultural school, a textile school, a trade union school, and a party school. In addition there were schools for training nurses and apprentices - these in addition to the military education apparatus:

What was interesting was the collective use of whatever knowledge they had. These schools were really Communist not only in ideology, but in the utilisation of every scrap of technical experience they could mobilise to "raise the cultural level".²²

Early efforts by the CCP to introduce, expand, or reform education in the liberated areas were enthusiastic, but met with limited success due to a number of factors, most of which are related to the class background of the cadres involved in education, or to the party and government not being sufficiently aware of mass needs

and desires as they gave the people too little opportunity to speak and act for themselves.²³

From the outset the government sought to use education to give the people new outlooks and skills. Educational guidelines set out in 1937 declared that education should: 'raise the cultural and political level of the people, strengthen their national self-confidence and self-respect, and make them wish to struggle voluntarily and actively for the war of resistance and national reconstruction; to nurture cadres for the war of resistance and to contribute to the needs of war in all areas; to make the present and future generations good builder of a new China of the future.'²⁴ These guidelines were supplemented, in 1937, by Mao who determined that education was to be 'anti-imperialist' (i.e., national, or pertaining to Chinese needs), 'anti-feudal' (i.e., scientific), and mass (i.e., it must serve the people).

To bring an educational strategy that embodied these objectives into operation, the government embarked on a 'standardization' campaign on education as part of a general process of consolidation and institutional rationalisation.²⁵ This campaign resulted in centralising of schools so that rural education suffered. It also led to elitism in education as admission policies favoured 'clever' students. It led to a proliferation of courses with students attending as many as thirteen different course per week.²⁶ The standardisation measures also affected cadre education, consolidating it in the interests of efficiency, economy, and higher standards. Finally, and ironically, mass education itself suffered - as much as

anything through the failure of measures taken to romanise Chinese script. According to Michael Lindsay, the reason for its failure was that it simply was not popular with the common people.²⁷ The period and events we are referring to here mark the first appearance of the 'two line struggle' in education in which opposing view points on the relative importance of expertise and revolutionary commitment emerges as a principal contradiction in the revolution itself. Into this context of strain on education, growing elitism in educational institutions and emerging contradictions the party introduced the cheng-feng or rectification campaign in a resurgence of the mass line which was, as we have seen, the basis of the emerging development strategy in the liberated areas.

The cheng-feng movement and the development of the political thought of Mao Tse-tung are the most significant developments in Chinese education for socialism of the so-called Yenan period. Mao Tse-tung thought as the basis of Yenan education: Historical and dialectical materialism provide the basis of the Marxist epistemology and world view. Materialism postulates the separate existences of human consciousness and nature - humans are the subjects in history, confronting the objective world which they change through their labour - thus making history. Ideas are the products of activity in the material world, in Marx's words:

'The idea is nothing else the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought.'²⁸

But it is the mistake of mechanical Marxists (or 'vulgar materialists') to dogmatise this law by asserting that the fundamental relationship between ideas and the objective world is fixedly one-way.

The materialism of Marx was dialectical - that is 'being' and 'consciousness' were interwoven with one another - and hence, the ideas that humans have can and do influence the way in which they change the world. This is at the base of Marx's postulation of the unity of theory and practice:

Marx included practice in the theory of knowledge and viewed practice as the basis and purpose of the cognitive process.²⁹

Mao Tse-tung's educational thought which developed in the Yen-an period is firmly based on the philosophical foundations of historical and dialectical materialism, or Marxism-Leninism. The earliest expression of Mao's theoretical development, and still the most important, is the essay 'On Practice' which grew out of the ideas contained in a lecture he gave at the Anti-Japanese Resistance University in Yen-an in 1937.³⁰ 'The dialectical theory of knowledge', writes Mao, 'places practice in the primary position, holding that human knowledge can in no way be separated from practice and repudiating all the erroneous theories that deny the importance of practice or separate knowledge from practice'.³¹ Proceeding from this fundamental postulate, Mao goes on to elaborate upon and explain how human knowledge arises from practice, and, in turn, serves practice. In doing this, he defines five stages of the acquisition and practical application of knowledge:

1. Sense perception: at this stage only separate aspects of reality are perceived and more general concepts and logical conclusions cannot be drawn.

2. Conceptual stage: at this stage man has engaged in social practice to the point that images pile up in his brain, experiences are repeated enough times to necessitate a cognitive leap after which concepts are formed, thus bringing knowledge to a qualitatively different and higher level...

3. Application of conceptual knowledge: Mao stressed again that knowledge that remained inactive was useless; the knowledge gained in stage two must now be reapplied to practical conditions so that social change is the result....

4. Theory building: this stage requires that the experiences gained in the previous steps result in a general plan of action, theory or program....

5. Adaptation to new conditions: however, the movement of human knowledge is not complete, and Mao stressed the necessity to constantly adapt to new objective conditions, this, of course, makes 'true' knowledge difficult to pinpoint...."³²

Later in the same year Mao delivered a series of lectures at K'ang Ta, these became the basis of his well-known essay 'On Contradiction'. The essay begins with a summary consideration of the Marxian critique of metaphysical philosophy, referring to the 'two world outlooks - the dialectical and the metaphysical'. It moves on to a discussion of the most important single component in Mao Tse-tung thought - contradiction. Contradiction is both universal and particular - it exists in the processes of development of all things and each thing. Every form of notion (itself an ontological concept in Mao's writing) contains within itself its own particular contradiction. Mao distinguishes between the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of contradiction - an understanding of which leads to an inevitable rejection of the 'deterministic' or mechanical Marxism:

Some people think that this is both true of certain contradictions. For instance, in the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the productive forces are the principal aspect; in the contradiction between theory and practice, practice is the principal aspect; in the contradiction between the economic base and the superstructure, the economic base is the principal aspect; and there is no change in their respective positions. This is the mechanical materialist conception, not the dialectical materialist

conception. True, the productive forces, practice, and the economic base generally play the principal and decisive role; whoever denies this is not a materialist. But it must also be admitted that in certain conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory and superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the decisive role. When it is impossible for the productive forces to develop without a change in the relations of production, then the change in the relations of production play the decisive and principal role.³³

This passage becomes extremely important to a consideration of the theoretical foundation of 'socialist' education in China.

Perhaps the most important single contribution Mao Tse-tung has made to Marxist revolutionary theory is the analysis of the duality of contradiction. Mao talks of antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions. The former are those between 'ourselves and the enemy' and non-antagonistic contradictions are those contradictions "between ourselves". He illustrates with reference to the classical contradiction between town and countryside:

Economically, the contradiction between town and country is an extremely antagonistic one both in capitalist society, where under the rule of the bourgeoisie the towns ruthlessly plunder the countryside, and in the Kumontang areas in China.... But in a socialist society and in our revolutionary base areas, this antagonistic contradiction has changed into one that is non-antagonistic; and when communist society is reached it will be abolished.³⁴

The flexibility of Mao's understanding and application of Marxist dialectical materialism is clear in this essay especially in the statement that: "...while we recognise that in the general development of history the material determines the mental, and social being determines social consciousness, we also - and indeed must - recognise the reaction of mental on material things, of social consciousness on social being, and of the superstructure on the

economic base.³⁵ The importance of this passage is not only its ideological flexibility, but also that it lays the groundwork for a theoretical foundation of education.³⁶ The importance of education in Mao's general theory of revolution is clear since, if it is understood that "the reaction of mental on material things" may produce social change, then education - helping people to formulate ideas and apply them - becomes an imperative force in revolutionary society.

The theoretical formulations that Mao articulated in this period form the core of Mao Tse-tung thought. Their applicability to educational practice was tested in this same period during the cheng-feng or rectification campaign.

The Cheng-Feng Campaign

The hallmark of the cheng-feng movement was the linking of theory and practice in the context of intense struggle.³⁷ The bases of the struggle in the Shen-Kan-Ning border regions were: class struggle - where wealthy peasants and upper level cadre still, in some cases, received privileges (among them educational privileges) that were denied the masses of peasants; there was struggle between the privileged towns and the deprived countryside; and there was struggle between those who were literate and educated, and those who were illiterate, uneducated and poor.

As was remarked earlier, the campaign was based on Mao's conviction that all people could become revolutionaries and take the revolution. To this end, its imperatives, and the imperatives of the mass line were to "strengthen leadership" and to "link the leadership with the masses".³⁸ But it was also a movement to unite

some of the disparate and potentially divergent groups who were engaged in making the revolution:

There was little common ideological ground uniting cadres of varying background and experience beyond anti-Japanese nationalist and a vision of a strong and free China. With the exception of ideals and a vision of a strong and free the highest level party cadres and intellectuals, there had been virtually no exposure to Marxist-Leninist thought or any other systematic educational training. Modern and reformist ideas among outside cadre administrators and intellectuals, most of them new to the party, were conceptions developed in China's coastal cities during and after the May 4th movement. Many local cadres, on the other hand, with a commitment to land revolution rooted in their familiarity with peasant misery in the border area, remained deeply imbued with certain traditional values and were bound by complex social relationships and village loyalties. By 1941, at the time of nationwide military setbacks and blockade, increased tensions between the peasantry and the government and between cadres of varying persuasions posed fundamental challenges to the party's program in the border region.³⁹

That is, in Stuart Schramm's words, "the party sought to harmonise the two imperatives of 'conscious action' by individuals and impeccable social discipline". To do this the party launched a cadre education campaign of unprecedented proportions.

But the cheng-feng movement was not only a campaign for cadres, in some cases schools suspended their regular curriculum to concentrate entirely on the cheng-feng Documents. These documents were a collection of eighteen pieces by CCP party leaders with an additional four documents from the Soviet Union. Included among them were the two essays referred to, Mao's 'Reform our Study' and 'Rectify the Party's Style of Work' -- both of which lay stress on practicability and a common sense approach to work and study.

The cheng-feng campaign was communicated through the school system by means of a series of directives issued by the Border Region Government. These directives were concerned with the objectives of schooling - secondary schools, for instance, were to be terminal, no longer, that is, preparatory schools for higher level of education.⁴⁰ They also specified new standards of student enrollment giving local cadres and children of workers and peasants greater opportunities to attend school.

Changes in education as a consequence of the cheng-feng campaign were most marked in curriculum, pedagogy, and in educational forms. In curriculum, additional to the attention given cheng-feng documents, the total number of courses in secondary education was reduced so that there would be a maximum of eight, and only five were to be studied in any one term. Content was specifically designed to promote service to the people and to 'change the dogmatic work style of the past'. New content included history, geography, and politics of the Border region.⁴¹ Specific course content differed in different locations but Chinese language and arithmetic were generally stipulated.⁴²

New educational forms that were introduced in the Yen'an period included literary groups, newspaper reading groups and adult education groups of various kinds - including 'spare time' schools which could be set up at any place, at any time, and could have any number of students attend. There was also educational activity encouraged in clubs which engaged in a variety of educational activities like physical educational activities and writing village newspapers.⁴³ In the regular schools reduced classroom time was ordered by the

directives, provided more opportunity for productive labor and on-the-job training. These were to become features of renewed education after the G.P.C.R.

Many of these innovations in education were stimulated by the relocation of responsibility of educational practice from the Centre to the village communities. During 1944 min pan schools, schools that were set organised and controlled by the people were opened throughout the Border Region. In thousands of small communities that had never had schools 'local cadres, village leaders and labor heroes assumed the responsibility to create appropriate forms for local education.⁴⁴

But the most exciting developments that took place in the period in education was in pedagogy and classroom method. Stimulated by developments at K'ang Ta mass education was now designed to be a process in which ordinary people, interacting with teachers and other cadres, became critically conscious of their environment, contribute to the formulation of concepts designed to change it, and then test the concepts in practice with their labor, thus changing their environment.⁴⁵ In this context 'education was to be a constant process of mutual learning and mutual transformation. The teacher was to take the lead but he was not just to stuff the student full of facts. Rather he was to provide the student with a method of examining and transforming material reality. Student and teacher, being part of the reality, would themselves be transformed in that process.⁴⁶

As with the political-economic which stressed self-reliance and the mass line, the educational strategy of contemporary China

has its genesis in the pre-1949 period - its theoretical basis, at least, was clearly articulated in the period. Some refinements in educational practice remained necessary but the groundwork had been laid for an educational strategy that was also self-reliant and which reflected the mass line.⁴⁷

Educational Developments in Tanzania Prior to the Arusha Declaration 1967.

Since formal, institutionalised education is a feature of literate cultures, it is wrong to attempt to understand precolonial education among the African peoples in Tanzania in these terms. Education was mostly 'informal' - involving socialisation processes including the slightly more formalised educational arrangements like rituals to mark the end of puberty and other rites de passage.⁴⁸

However, among the Islamic peoples of northern and coastal areas, Koranic schools were a familiar institution. The curriculum in these schools was ordinarily confined to memorising and reciting the Koran.⁴⁹ The schools themselves were simply clusters of small boys beneath a tree or in any of a number of commonplace environments.

The German Period

On the eve of World War One over 95% of the schools in 'German' Africa were missionary operated - government schools being confined largely to Moslem areas where parents were unwilling to send their children to Christian school.⁵⁰ The missionary schools were, of course, mainly concerned with the propagation of the Christian faith. But, in adoption, the missionaries viewed themselves as civilisers, as redeemers of the fallen African man: and in believing this, sought

to propagate not simply the Gospel but the moral and social values of the civilisation which they represented and which they, like the colonial administrators, and supreme and unquestioning confidence.⁵¹

The government schools are significant to the development of Tanzanian education, and indeed, Tanzanian society generally because of their use of Swahili as the exclusive medium of instruction. This meant, in addition to the dissemination of the language itself, textbooks and correspondence were published in Swahili. By 1914 there was a flourishing local Swahili press and the publishing of Swahili books and pamphlets on religious and other subjects was growing. In response to this, Swahili was used more and more in the mission schools which far outnumbered those of the government.⁵²

The British Colonial Period

The education of Africans was given a boost in the early part of British rule by the American-funded Phelps-Stokes Commission report of Education in East and Central Africa; and by the publication of the Colonial office memorandum, Educational Policy in British Tropical Africa. The latter was largely in response to the recommendation made by the Phelps-Stokes Commission that government and missions cooperate in education.⁵³ But in addition to this, the commission recommended that adult education be given some attention to avoid possible conflict between the schooled young and their parents; and that education should be 'for life' - that is, the purely academic aspect of education should not overpower the fact that education was a possible bridge between 'traditional' and 'modern' lifestyles.⁵⁴ These very sentiments are echoed in President Nyerere's own

educational writings, yet, as we shall see, they foreshadow some of the contradictions in neo-colonial and present-day Tanzania to which subsequent educational practice gave rise.

Cooperation between the government and the missions, however, bedevilled education in Tanzania for much of the period. Conflicts arose out of opposing viewpoints on the functions and ideologies of schooling. The government, for its part, regarded schools as training institutions for lower level bureaucrats to fill the expanding civil service - this emphasis is the genesis of the connection between schooling and white-collar aspiration that will be dealt with below. On the other hand, the missions sought to civilize and Christianize the whole country by education.⁵⁵ Amid this conflict grew yet another stream of the developing education system - Native Authority Schools. During the 1914-1918 War educational activity by both missionaries and Government was disrupted in many areas, in some of these local native leaders took over the day-to-day operations of the schools. In the conflict between missionary and Government educators the Native Authority Schools usually sided with the latter - viewing the education of the local chiefs, headmen and their sons (i.e., the ruling elite) as the principal purpose of education. The education of clerks etc. would, of course, remain the task of the Government schools.⁵⁶

By 1945 there were over two hundred Government and Native Authority Schools in Tanzania. Missionary voluntary agency schools numbered over 800 - five-hundred of which were registered but unassisted by Government. Despite this seemingly large number of schools, the total number of children in primary schools only amounted

to about 10% of the school-age population.⁵⁷ There were very few secondary schools and the only tertiary institution attended by Africans was Makerere College in Uganda.⁵⁸

In 1947 the Government drew up a ten-year development plan for education (1947-56) which laid considerable emphasis on the expansion of primary education - especially that of African children. During the period between the wars the educational system had separated along racial lines, with different schools for Europeans, Asians and Africans. This was, consciously or unconsciously, part of the British 'divide and rule' policy in administering the territory. In the period immediately after the war the separate systems were legally confirmed.⁵⁹

The other change in the educational setup which the plan gave rise to (in 1950) was the restructuring of the two-tiered system with six years primary followed by four years secondary being substituted by a new pattern which reduced the basic primary level education to a four-year period. This was followed by four years of middle and four years secondary school with elimination examinations between each level. The basic four years was largely for the dissemination of literacy which was strongly favoured by UNESCO at the time. For the 20% of students who managed to reach the second four-year level it meant a longer and perhaps more useful period of primary education. Nevertheless, for the mass of those who did not get beyond the fourth year (i.e., to the top of the initial level) there were no means of extending their formal education - hence they had completed their schooling by their tenth year.⁶⁰

The outcome of the plan was an expanded system in Tanzania. By 1956 39% of the initial four-year level age group were in school;

places in secondary school had increased dramatically and the supply of teachers had grown. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that anything like universal availability of education existed. To illustrate - of the 2,500 students in secondary schools only 204 were girls.⁶¹

The patterns of growth of the education system stimulated by the moves of the 1947-56 period continued up to independence in 1961 - places increasing, schools expanding and the administrative apparatus growing more complex. But this is not the whole story - the question that was too rarely confronted was: 'Education for what?.' It had long been the complaint of some educationists and community leaders that education was too 'bookish' and that it was actively directed against the preservation and growth of African heritage and culture. Furthermore, the effect of schools, and indeed their purpose, was less to fit the pupils for a more productive life in their own rural communities than to encourage their aspirations to leave the village with its poverty and hardship. That parents encouraged this attitude and, in fact, demand that schools continue to provide 'academic' education is less of a paradox when it is recalled that the higher social and economic rewards were to be attained in the centre - the bureaucracy offered a regular salary, security, and considerable prestige to boys who, if they remained in and of the village faced a life of scarcity and deprivation by comparison. Hence, any moves to vocationalise education by introducing agricultural courses and technically oriented education were feircely resisted by the majority of African parents who saw these moves as discriminating measures against their children, designed to confine them to the farm of the workshop.

The Post-Independence Period to 1967

Tanzania achieved independence in the period immediately following the Addis⁵ Ababa and Karachi conferences on education and development. The purpose of these conferences was to discuss the educational needs of the countries of Asia and Africa which were just emerging from colonialism. The principal defect in the conferences themselves was the failure to critically examine the nature of 'development' as it was envisaged by the participating countries. As a corollary to this, 'education' was viewed as a necessary adjunct to development, but the meaning of 'education' was, likewise, inadequately scrutinised. Thus the rhetorical environment, at least, in which education was an agent of development was viewed, and in which independent Tanzania's education would have been expected to grow did much to obscure the ill effects of education in underdeveloped societies.

Nevertheless, the developments in Tanzanian education in the period did not betray a wholesale and naive attachment to these claims. The reorganisation of educational structures especially in the primary system, was motivated by a fairly realistic appraisal of certain conditions generated by both the political-economic realities of Tanzania and by the education system itself.

Immediately after independence the structure of the primary system was altered from a 4:4 (as described above) to a 4:2:2 system; and then to a 4:3 system with the aim of providing four years of primary education to everyone. Thus, the drop-outs that occurred in the past at levels IV and VI were reduced. This extended primary

system also reduced the need for rural boarding schools, and more communities were able to provide extended primary education to their children.

Along with these moves, in the Education Ordinance of 1962, the government placed the responsibility for administration and finance of primary education on Local Education Authorities. This was designed to strengthen local input into the education of village children and to encourage Local Education Authorities to put forward development schemes for education they could manage themselves. It was also designed to 'dam off' political pressure for more education, and to redirect most of this pressure from the central government.⁶²

Other important moves in the period included:

- the abolition of the separate education authorities administering education along racial lines for Europeans, Asians and Africans,
- the opening of the University College of Dar es Salaam
- the opening of Kivukoni College
- the aim expressed in the First Five Year Plan to make Tanzania self-sufficient in manpower by 1980, and the tying of the educational strategem to bring this about to periodic manpower projections.

This last point, however, contained some potential for conflict since it was to increase the bargaining power of the educated, as competition on the supply side was limited.⁶³ These problems were to be a source of concern, particularly to Nyerere and the socialist leadership in the following years.

Thus, on the eve of the Arusha Declaration in 1967, Tanzania hid an educational infrastructure that was, by and large, a modified form of the colonial education system, since the changes that had taken place since independence were mainly adaptive changes -

leaving the rationale for the education system intact. The manner in which it served Tanzania as a neo-colony was similar to the way it had served the colony of Tanganyika: providing middle and lower level personnel to the corporate and public bureaucracies; providing basic literacy education to workers and peasants, but not providing a type of education on a large enough scale to significantly alter Tanzania's status as a peripheral society.

The inadequacies of Pre-Arusha education were summed up by Nyerere himself in the Education for Self-Reliance document. The education that Tanzania was providing, he charged, was basically elitist education 'designed to meet the interests and the needs of the very small small proportion of those who enter the school system'. In addition, it divorced the participants from the society for which it was supposed to be preparing them. Third, it encouraged in pupils the idea that all knowledge that was worthwhile is that knowledge received from books or from within the formal education system. And finally, education taken away from productive work some of the ablest and healthiest young men and women.⁶⁴ With these shortcomings in mind, Nyerere set down the outline of a strategy designed first to overcome these contradictions, second to complement the principles laid down in the Arusha Declaration, and finally, to bring education into the process of transition to socialism.

POSTSCRIPT TO PART II

Once more owing to the differences in the lengths of time during which the 'socialist' educational strategies could be worked out in each country, it is difficult to make precise, meaningful comparisons of the pre-transitional educational strategies in China as compared with Tanzania. Nevertheless, it is fruitful to compare the educational infrastructures that the CCP and TANU inherited from the pre-transitional rulers.

Generally speaking, what we have called educational underdevelopment was a factor in underdevelopment. Exact figures on the availability of school places are almost impossible to assess, a difficulty exacerbated by the impreciseness of the term 'availability', since in many rural areas in particular, it was common in both countries for a minority of the people to have access to perhaps three, or even fewer years of schooling. Nevertheless, this was intensified in the countryside - pointing to a comparable dichotomy in the availability of schooling in rural compared with urban areas. One of the effects of this dichotomy was the flow of 'educated' rural youths to urban fringes where they expected to obtain work but where they encountered competition for employment from urban youths who, in many cases, had had more years of schooling. It is safe to say, the absence of accurate data notwithstanding, that this problem would have been felt in both China and Tanzania.

The problem of availability was intensified by shortages of school places, teacher shortages - particularly of qualified teachers, and adequate facilities. All these were factors in all but a few comfortable enclaves in the centres - Shanghai, Canton, Peking, and Dar es Salaam.

In both countries, illiteracy was widespread. But a note ought to be taken about the value and place of written language in either case. In China, facility with written language was a crucial factor in political and economic life, and for years, one of the means the mandarin class had at its disposal for maintaining its pre-eminence was through the existence of the imperial examination system which demanded virtuosity in written expression. When the examination was abolished in 1905, various measures to revamp the education system, particularly the content of courses, were frustrated by adherence to the mystique surrounding the written language - and, of course, to the fact that it was also still, the abolition of the examination notwithstanding, a crucial element in political and economic life. Even early attempts to romanise the script in an endeavour to make it more accessible were resisted by the people, or at least met with suspicion. In Tanzania where there was no indigenous written language (with the exception of Arabic among the few Moslems) before colonisation, a connection between political and economic life and literacy grew up but it mostly pertained to the language of the coloniser - English. Though, as has been pointed out, Kiswahili was given written form in the early part of the present century, and was widely used in government schools, English was the language of the Centre, and facility in it was necessary for individual economic advancement.

Thus, in both cases language and literacy occupied important places in the lives of Chinese and Tanzanians before their respective dissociations. In China, written language had long associations with traditional power and prestige symbols, and hence must be regarded as a potentially regressive force in the superstructure. In Tanzania, however, this association was with English - the language also, of science, commerce - 'modernisation'* - and must, tentatively, at least be regarded as a progressive force. But as long as Kiswahili remained a key unifying agent in the society as a whole, it became important either that English were superceded as the language of commerce, science, education, etc., or that the country became bilingual. Many of the educational problems that persist in Post-Arusha Tanzania emanate from this conflict.

The educational systems themselves, and thus the educational forms, were basically the same as those found in the capitalist world, that is, three-tiered, lock-step systems where entrance to the higher level is contingent upon completion on the level immediately below. The combinations of years of duration in each level varied from time to time but these variations do not seem to be terribly important when it is realised that the institution of schooling is

* It is important, at this point to make a clear distinction between 'modernisation' as a goal (as it is being used here), and 'modernisation' as a process (as it is used by 'modernisation' theorists). This distinction is not spurious since the goal of 'modernisation' may well mean 'modern' industry and technology operating in an institutional environment that is far different to that usually unquestioned by 'modernisation' theorists. Used in this sense, then, it is valid to refer to 'modernisation' as a 'progressive' force.

itself unchanged even in the face of changing year-to-year ratios. What is important, however, is the fact that neither of the lower levels was terminal (in both cases). Elementary schools were generally oriented as preparatory schools for the secondary level, and the latter were regarded as preparatory for the tertiary level (university). This situation has an effect on the material that is taught at each level - an elementary school that operates on the supposition (or pretense) that all or most of its graduates are going to proceed to a higher level will inevitably concentrate on fitting its students for entrance to the higher level (the same applies to secondary schools and university). This may or may not mean (and the former is usually the case) that the education received is, in more ways than one, incomplete. If, on the other hand, a school recognises that a student will join the work force upon completion of his or her schooling, the education imparted is more likely to be self-contained, skill directed, etc. If, in areas such as curriculum planning, cognisance is taken of the fact that what is being taken is, in fact, terminal education, then the needs of the students are more likely to be properly met. This is a common dilemma in educational underdevelopment, and certainly was the case in the two societies under consideration.

What is distinctive about the systems as systems is that within both there had been widespread experiences with local control. In Tanzania, the Native Authority Schools that grew up, or were maintained, after World War I became a prominent feature of the colonial education system. In China, as Mao found in Hunan, the

peasants had organised their own schools as part of the 'peasant movement'. These indications reveal a tradition of self-reliant response in a given situation, and may account, in part at least, for the viability of 'education for self-reliance' in some form or another in each case.

Finally, a comparison should be made on the topic of 'relevance'. This topic has received a lot of attention in recent years - especially the "relevance" of schooling for the underdeveloped world. "Relevance" usually refers to the appropriateness of education to political and economic realities, although a discussion of relevance may also be sparked by conflicts in school and societal moral or social values. In China and Tanzania the education offered was in many cases (especially at the secondary and tertiary levels) more relevant to employment in the centre, hence a great proportion of educational resources, including educated manpower was concentrated in the centre - adding to the contradiction between centre and periphery. The substantial material in school courses is often contradictory in the Periphery also - with local history, geography and politics usually forsaken for that of the Centre. This was clearly the case in both Chinese and Tanzanian schools.

In the incipient transitional strategies in both societies, experiments were carried out with educational forms and with local control. But the degree of success of each was dependent upon the closeness of the new forms, especially, to the forces that were instrumental in precipitating changes to the economic base. In Tanzania, the Self-Help schemes stimulated by the 'People's Plan' in the early nineteen-sixties encouraged the construction of village

schools through local community initiative. It is difficult to obtain data on the success or failure of these individual initiatives, and it would be difficult to make any speculations owing to the relative success of local initiative in school organisation in the earlier period. However, problems such as teacher and material shortages would doubtless have come up. The min pan schools were widespread in China even before the cheng-feng campaign which brought control of schools back to local level.

The important difference between these two exercises in local control and organisation of schooling lies in the extent to which they were underwritten or supported by the forces responsible for affecting real political and economic changes in the communities and, the extent to which they were actually related to the political-economic changes, if any, that were going on. In the Shen-Kan-Ning Border region, the political-economic strategy, as we have seen, centred upon the village and stressed self-reliance and participation by the peasants, this was the case after the cheng-feng campaign at least. Hence the forces of political-economic change, the local cadres and party leaders were fully behind the educational strategies and their significance was well explained to the people. In Tanzania, on the other hand, the self-help schemes were not the harbingers of radical changes in the countryside from a political-economic point of view, since the forces of political-economic change were still, by and large, concentrated in the centre and the self-help schemes were not an attempt to relocate them, or to radically shift the focus of political and economic life from the centre to the periphery. Hence, the village schools developed in this period were locally constructed

and controlled schools which, given the prevailing political and economic conditions, probably simply became part of the general pattern of educational underdevelopment. This is not to say that they served no useful purpose - it is simply a comment on the relationship between schooling and political-economic change that is relevant to the Tanzanian case in the early period of TANU rule.

In both countries, education was regarded by the progressive leadership of transitional forces as a crucial part of the super-structure - this was as much a response to traditional educational values as to the need to awaken the political awareness of the people. In China the whole process of involvement, or mobilisation by the masses of people was a gigantic educational exercise in revolution. In Tanzania, the revolution was mitigated by the relationship between educational changes and those forces pressing for institutional changes in the political and economic order. The later success or failure of educational strategies must be assessed in the light of this relationship - in the case of both China from 1949 to 1966 and in Post-Arusha Tanzania.

Footnotes to Chapter IV

¹C.T. Hu, Chinese Education Under Communism, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 4.

²Ibid., p. 6.

³Ibid., p. 3.

⁴Ibid., p. 4.

⁵Ibid., p. 12.

⁶Ibid.

⁷K. Biggerstaff, The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China, (Ithica, Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 46.

⁸Hu, Chinese Education, p. 17

⁹Teng Ssu-yu and J.K. Fairbank, eds., China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey 1839 - 1923, (New York, Atheneum Press, 1967), p. 235.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 237.

¹¹Y.C. Wang, "Intellectuals and Society in China," Comparative Studies in Society and History 3 (1961): 413.

¹²Ibid., p. 417.

¹³Ibid., pp. 419-420.

¹⁴John N. Hawkins, Mao Tse-tung and Education, (Hamden, Linnet Books, 1974), p. 52.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 54.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 82.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 99.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 100.

²⁰Ibid., p. 121.

²¹Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, (New York, Grove Press, 1961), p. 254.

²²Ibid., p. 255.

²³Peter J. Seybolt, "The Yen-an Revolution in Mass Education" The China Quarterly: p. 665.

²⁴Ibid., p. 647.

²⁵Ibid., p. 650.

²⁶Ibid., p. 652.

²⁷Ibid., p. 654.

²⁸Quoted in Hawkins, Mao Tse-tung and Education, p. 9.

²⁹Ibid., p. 10.

³⁰Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice" in Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung, (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1971), p. 66.

³¹Ibid., p. 67.

³²Hawkins, Mao Tse-tung and Education, pp. 59-60.

³³Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction" in Selected Readings, p. 116.

³⁴Ibid., 127.

³⁵Ibid., p. 126. See also Hawkins, Mao Tse-tung and Education, p. 61.

- ³⁶Hawkins, Mao Tse-tung and Education, p. 61.
- ³⁷Mark Seldon, The Yen-an Way In Revolutionary China, (Cambridge,
- ³⁸Seybolt, "The Yen-an Revolution," p. 659.
- ³⁹Seldon, The Yen-an Way, p. 189.
- ⁴⁰Seybolt, "The Yen-an Way", p. 659.
- ⁴¹Ibid., pp. 659-660.
- ⁴²Ibid., p. 663.
- ⁴³Hawkins, Mao Tse-tung and Education, pp. 146-147.
- ⁴⁴Seldon, The Yen-an Way, pp. 267-268.
- ⁴⁵Seybolt, "The Yen-an Revolution", p. 661.
- ⁴⁶Ibid., p. 660.
- ⁴⁷Ibid., p. 662.
- ⁴⁸D.G. Scanlon, ed., Traditions in African Education, (New York, Teachers' College Press, 1964), p. 4.
- ⁴⁹Ibid., p. 13.
- ⁵⁰Ibid., p. 27.
- ⁵¹J. Cameron and W.A. Dodd, Society, Schools and Progress in Tanzania, (Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1970), p. 54.
- ⁵²Ibid., p. 57.
- ⁵³Ibid., p. 60.
- ⁵⁴L.F. Dolan, "Transition from Colonialism to Self-Reliance in Tanzanian Education", University of Michigan School of Education, 1970, (mimeographed), p. 33.
- ⁵⁵Cameron and Dodd, Society, Schools and Progress, p. 63.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 65.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 102.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 71.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 103.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 104.

⁶²Aart Van der Laar, "Arusha: Before and After", East Africa Journal 11, (November 1968): 17.

⁶³Ibid., p. 17.

⁶⁴Julius K. Nyerere, "Education for Self-Reliance", in Ujamaa - Essays on Socialism, (Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 275-279.

PART III

STRATEGIES FOR THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM

Preamble

Chapter V: The Political-Economic Strategy of China
in the Post-1949 Period.

Chapter VI: The Political-Economic Strategy of
Tanzania in the Post-Arusha Declaration
Period.

Postscript

Preamble to Part III

Strategies for the Transition to Socialism

The point of comparison of China and Tanzania, as has already been pointed out, is that both societies claim they are in the process of transition to socialism. So far we have not considered the theoretical implications of this claim so much as we have tentatively allowed that both are, to varying degrees, dissociating themselves from the dependency relationship. In this preamble I mean to allude, very briefly, to some of the theoretical problems that "transition" gives rise to. I do not expect to make any contribution for my own part, but, rather, mean to draw heavily on the discussion on the transition to socialism that has gone on between Paul Sweezy and Charles Bettelheim. To my knowledge the theoretical questions surrounding the transition to socialism have nowhere been more extensively probed than in this discussion - except, perhaps in Bettelheim's own book on the subject which will not be referred to here, or except perhaps also, in the work of Mao Tse-tung - which Bettelheim appears to draw heavily upon anyway. It is neither the place nor my intention to judge whether Tanzania or China or both are following paths of transition that are logically in keeping with Marxism-Leninism that is beyond my own ability and the scope of this thesis. It is my intention to demonstrate that I am familiar with some of

the difficulties that can arise when talking in terms of the 'transition' to 'socialism' - hence, the following will appear schematic.

Marx's often-quoted statement that in the various stages of history, the new society develops in the womb of the old does not tell us enough specifically about how socialism grows out of capitalism. According to Sweezy, 'the transition to socialism does not, and in the nature of the case, cannot, take the same course as the transition from feudalism to capitalism'.¹ The transition to socialism is dependent upon the existence of a socialist consciousness among the proletariat and hence 'socialist human nature is not formed within the framework of capitalism (as is capitalism within the framework of feudal society) but only in the struggle against capitalism',² (the parenthesis is mine). Lest this leap leave too many questions unanswered, it is necessary to show how Sweezy and Bettelheim conceive of the process of transition. The framework outlined in the introduction, establishing the global nature of capitalism and the conflicting relationship between the periphery of Periphery and the centres of Periphery and Centre must be borne in mind here since the bourgeoisie is an international bourgeoisie with agents in the Periphery (the 'national bourgeoisie'), and the struggle against it, against capitalism, is an international struggle. This is not to conclude that all those people on the periphery of the Periphery form, by virtue of their existence, a 'surrogate' proletariat which can fulfil the historic mission of the proletariat (as Marx and Lenin described it) and thus revamp the theoretical suitability of classical Marxism. On the contrary, it is the proletariat still

that is the progressive class, although this ought not to be interpreted too dogmatically.

The proletarian class in the Periphery, due to the nature of capitalist investment in it, is necessarily small in terms of its numbers. But this in itself need not necessarily determine the outcome of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the Periphery (a struggle which, if it only involved the proletariat would inevitably result in its defeat due to the immense power of the bourgeoisie and its international backers). According to Sweezy the size of the proletariat is less important than 'the existence or non-existence in the population of a sizeable element capable of playing the role assigned the proletariat in classical Marxist theory - an element with essentially proletarian attitudes and values, even though it may not be the product of a specifically proletarian experience... The history of the last few decades suggests that the most likely way for such a 'substitute proletariat' to arise is through prolonged revolutionary warfare involving masses of people'.³ This 'substitute proletariat' can be radicalised and can achieve the same ends as the proletariat in classical Marxism since 'once Marxism-Leninism exists as a revolutionary party which "embodies" this ideology and translates it into practice, the scope of this theory (the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary proletarian theory) remains by no means confined to the proletariat along':⁴

This specific character of the proletarian revolution means that if the revolution is made possible by the global existence of the capitalist mode of production and by the existence of the proletariat, it concerns not only the proletariat, but also all the exploited, all the oppressed and all those who are committed to the elimination of exploitation and oppression.... it is quite possible for a proletarian revolution to be

victorious even in countries where the working class is numerically weak.... The proletarian character of the revolution, in fact, depends more on the dominant role of the proletarian ideology and of the party which embodies this ideology, than on the "numerical" strength of the proletariat.⁵

After the victory of the revolution there are several important components of the 'dictatorship' that is established that may or may not (depending on whether they are present or not) determine whether the direction of the 'revolution' is to be two towards socialism or towards the restoration of capitalism. In addition to an 'element with essentially proletarian attitudes' as has already been singled out, there must be a strong, experienced leadership that is dedicated to socialism: these two imply the existence of a well-thought ideology. Finally, Sweezy argues, 'each people has, so to speak, an historically formed character which may be more or less compatible with socialist goals'.⁶

The first two of these are reasonably readily recognised in the case of China, as is the third (i.e., the existence of a well-thought ideology). The existence of the last is more problematic - establishing it would have to depend on the historical scope that was used to determine whether the Chinese people have 'an historically formed character which is compatible with socialist goals'. In relation to Tanzania, the post-Mwongozo period, as Shivji has shown, leaves little doubt about the existence of a growing political consciousness among the proletariat⁷ although it remains the role of the proletarian ideology to develop what he calls 'class instinct' into 'class consciousness'. As for the Tanzanian leadership, it is difficult to draw any conclusions here about the 'dedication to

socialism' of Nyerere and the TANU leaders - that is if 'socialism' is regarded as problematic. It is less difficult to decide that it is probably not a 'proletarian' leadership inasmuch as there is conflict between the bureaucratic capitalist class (the class upon which the present leadership bases its power) and the workers. Where the complexities arise, in relation to Tanzania is when one considers the 'viability' of a substitute proletariat, since there has been no real prolonged revolutionary struggle to unite the oppressed as there has been, say, in China, or in other parts of Africa. As for the 'historically formed character of the people', this remains a very interesting question, Nyerere, at least, believes that this is a characteristic of the people of Tanzania because of the tradition of 'Ujamaa' which 'describes their socialism'.

Now we turn to the crucial question as posed by Sweezy: What determines whether the victorious class, or the dictatorship, will move towards socialism or will restore capitalism? The answer is 'revolutionary practice' - the ongoing class struggle that must continue in order to avoid the entrenchment of a bureaucratic class and in order to educate the workers so they will recognise and fight for their class interests. In the case of China, I think (as do Sweezy and Bettelheim) the GPCR and its aftermath affirm that this is going on - although it is by no means over, as Mao's statement that there must be 'many more cultural revolutions' affirms. In Tanzania, according to Shivji's analysis, the struggle is at a far different stage - the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is ascendent, and the formal power is in its hands - part of its class base is its connections with the international bourgeoisie - this is not the

case with China's bureaucratic class. But as the publication of Mwongozo, and the struggles of the post-Mwongozo period show, the proletariat is struggling to assert its position - in other words, the class struggle continues, but it is a struggle between classes that are at different stages of the transition to socialism than their counterparts in China appear to be.

Thus what follows is a description of the political-economic strategies each country is following in order to affect the transition to 'socialism'. It is just that - a description - although from time to time what I think about the likelihood of the effectiveness of the transition comes through. At the end, in the postscript, I consider it my task simply to make some comparative statements about the strategies for political-economic 'development', not to evaluate the relative likelihood of these strategies' capacities to bring about 'socialism'. The purpose of the thesis is to describe and analyse the educational strategies and to show how they fit into the political-economic strategies, and to compare the experiences of the two countries.

CHAPTER V

THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF CHINA
IN THE POST-1949 PERIOD

The post-1949 period in China has been one during which the Chinese Communist Party has sought a development strategy which reflects the historical and contemporary realities of Chinese life, and through which China would 'develop steadily, under the leadership of the Communist Party, from an agricultural into an industrial country and from a new democratic into a socialist and communist society.'⁹

The historical realities which shaped the early decisions of the CCP included the fact that hitherto, the liberated areas in which the Party had cultivated its strength and its popular base, were rural areas, the populations of which were overwhelmingly peasants. The Party infrastructure reflected the policies of local control (through village committees) and self-reliance. Furthermore, the experiences of the CCP as a government were mitigated by the necessity to maintain a military infrastructure, the influence of which were widespread throughout the liberated areas where the Peoples' Liberation Army had acted as workers, as administrators, as educators, had organised co-operatives, and had been absorbed into peasant life generally.

The contemporary realities corresponding to these two sets of factors were, first, the fact that the post-Yenan period saw a 'return to the cities'.¹⁰ The Central Committee of the CCP at the Second Session of the Seventh Plenum in March 1949 discussed 'the question of shifting the centre of gravity of Party work under the present situation from the rural areas to the cities.'¹¹ This involved not merely a shift in location of the administrative apparatus, but a whole shift in strategy and tactics. It was to be a period in which the Party would begin 'leading the countryside from the cities' and linking 'the relations between workers and peasants and between industry and agriculture.'¹² In doing this 'the Party must rely on the working class, rally the other laboring masses, win over the intelligents and win over as many as possible of the petty bourgeoisie and liberal bourgeoisie.'¹³

Militarily, of course, having largely overcome the internal threat by winning the civil war and through the subsequent retreat of Chiang's forces to Taiwan, China did not face any direct threat, although the Korean War soon significantly altered that position. Hence the PLA, which had become so thoroughly integrated with the process of revolution in the countryside had to readjust, above all, to a peaceful transition to socialism. Nevertheless, Mao always regarded the role of the army as crucial to the success of the revolution - he had said as far back as 1938 that 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun', but since he also believed that 'the Party commands the gun',¹⁴ there was potential conflict in a period in which the military phase of the revolution had given way to the phase of peaceful transition where there was a possibility

of a corresponding shift in importance from the army to the Party machine. This is not to suggest that the Party and the army had grown separately in the preceding period. Quite the contrary, however, in a situation of protracted guerilla war the army was, quite obviously pre-eminent in a situation of peaceful civil construction this preminence could give way to an emerging Party bureaucracy.

Nevertheless, in terms of development strategy it was envisaged that the PLA would systematically take part in agricultural and industrial production in order to assist in national construction work.¹⁵

The principal characteristics of the early post-1949 period arose out of several sets of circumstances which were later to emerge as sources of contradiction in the unfolding of the Chinese revolution. These were: first, the CCP had become the national government of the most populous nation on earth, and as such, had to devise a national development strategy in which national and local interests were interwoven but through which both were equally realizable. Second, the cities were to become the immediate focal points of the development strategy to construct a socialist society. This was regarded as a manifestation of the second phase a revolution which had initially been predominantly rural. Third the military phase had given way to a phase of peaceful construction. Fourth, the move to the cities meant that the Party faced an urban class structure vastly different from that of the countryside. Finally, China sought to learn from the experience of the Soviet Union which was widely regarded as the appropriate model for this phase of the revolution in which the movement to socialism would begin.

It is necessary, at this stage, to discuss the Chinese view of socialist development vis-a-vis the Soviet model in order to understand how the latter became a source of bitter debate over the two decades following 1949.

As mentioned earlier there is no absolute or 'correct' process of transition from feudal to bourgeois or from bourgeois to socialist society. The characteristic features of the old society will be indelibly imprinted on the process of transition to the new. It is unarguable that socialism in China will not be ultimately and essentially "Chinese" in character, reflecting the origins and development of the revolution itself. Yet the Chinese revolution has always been proclaimed a 'Marxist-Leninist' revolution. What does this mean? I believe that above all it refers to the manner in which the analysis of Chinese society which the communists have undertaken, and continue to undertake, reflects the social theory of Marx and Lenin as it spells out the nature of class and class conflict, of the dialectical relationship between old and new productive forces, of the conflict between town and country, and, most important in the Chinese revolution of the relationship between 'base' and 'superstructure', 'being' and 'consciousness', 'infrastructure' and 'ideology'. It was the task of Mao Tse-tung and the CCP leaders to scrutinize Chinese society using these analytical tools, and to execute tactics and strategy in accordance with what they discovered. John Gurley has commented that the rectification (cheng-feng) movement was meant to apply the Marxist-Leninist world outlook to Chinese problems, but also 'to increase cadres' powers of analysis, their ability to see the world

correctly and hence to pursue realistic and intelligent goals:¹⁶

Mao expressed this in what Gurley describes as a 'remarkable' passage:

Our comrades must understand that we do not study Marxism-Leninism because it is pleasing to the eye, or because it has some mystical value, like the doctrines of the Taoist priests who ascend Mao shan to learn how to subdue devils and evil spirits. Marxism-Leninism has no beauty, nor has it any mystical value. It is only extremely useful.¹⁷

The signification of Marxism-Leninism dates from Mao's realization that the peasantry was the revolutionary class in China. In the face of the immense numerical significance of the Chinese peasantry, and the corresponding weakness of the urban proletariat, coupled with the threat to China posed by the imperialist powers, it would have been patently absurd for the CCP to attempt to bring about socialist revolution from an urban proletarian base.

Hence, the Party itself was, in the Chinese strategy, conceptualised as the link between proletarian, 'progressive bourgeois' and intellectual elements and the peasantry. To this extent the Maoist revolutionary strategy is characteristically anti-dogmatic, and hostile to the 'mechanical' Marxists who proclaim the proletariat alone as the progressive class, and, as such, in a unique position to bring about socialist revolution.

Mao's recognition of the revolutionary potential of all men, regardless of class, is accompanied by a strategy to realize revolution through the following progressive stages: first, analyse the class structure, separating progressive revolutionary elements from 'reactionary' elements. In doing this, analyse the social relations between the people and the economic base upon which they are predicated.

Move to alter these relations through altering production relations - specifically through land reform, through establishing cooperatives and mutual-aid arrangements, and through the introduction of local committees to engage the people in decision making about their own lives. The old class remnants are re-educated, and the education and political mobilisation of the people generally is continued. Ongoing education and re-education heightens political consciousness in the people, and helps them define and redefine their culture.¹⁸ This is the process of cultural revolution.

This revolutionary strategy is in stark contrast to rigid, mechanistic Marxism which interprets Marx in dogmatic fashion, insisting that alterations in the economic infrastructure alone can trigger off the necessary prerequisites for cultural (superstructural) change. This, according to Mao, is the world view implicit in the Soviet model of development - particularly as it is defined by those in the CCP who have sought to apply it to China.

Obviously this hostile view of Soviet development strategy has not always prevailed in China. The relations between the CCP and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had always been good, the Chinese never challenging the pre-eminence of the latter as undisputed leader of the Communist International.

In the early years of the Peoples' Republic the assistance the Chinese could rely on from the Soviets was never in doubt, nor, indeed, was the fact that the situations of China and post-1917 Russia were similar.¹⁹ Yet the Chinese leaders did acknowledge that 'the CCP must have its own principles' and that it was not necessary to travel "the same path as the Soviet Union."²⁰ Hence, in the first

five-year plan which commented in 1953 account was taken of 'both the actual conditions in (China) and the Soviet Union',²¹ and it was stated that: 'we will make fewer mistakes if we continuously study the pioneering experience of the Soviet Union in building socialism'.²²

Confronted with the need to develop China's industrial base, the PRC accepted huge amounts of assistance from the Soviet Union in the design and construction of heavy industrial plants,²³ in processing non-ferrous metals,²⁴ in the design and construction of power generation facilities,²⁵ in oil production plant and equipment,²⁶ and in machinery building.²⁷ In addition to these, Soviet assistance was received in the medical supplies industry.²⁸ Finally, trade relations between the two countries were extended to 'help increase economic co-operation within the socialist camp.'²⁹

The projected plans for large-scale industrialization are prominent in the plan, if not grandiose. In a report on the progress of the Five-Year Plan read to the Third Session of the First National Peoples' Congress in June 1965, Li Fu-chun, the Chairman of the State Planning Commission remarked of the interrelation between heavy industry, light industry and agriculture:

Priority development of heavy industry is the central link in the socialist industrialization of our country.³⁰

Yet in the plan itself there is also predictable emphasis on the development of the agricultural sector - prefaced by an almost-cautionary remark quoted from Mao:

"The peasants - the mainstay of the market for China's industry. Only the peasants can supply an abundance of foodstuffs and raw materials and consume manufactured goods in huge amounts."³¹

To this end, collectivisation was gradually extended in the initial phase of development - speeded up by Mao's intervention in 1955 which was prompted by his fear of growing 'reversion of capitalist agriculture.'³²

Thus, on the eve of the Great Leap Forward in 1958, China had embarked on a development strategy which was marked by extensive reliance on Soviet aid in the 'priority sector' - heavy industry. In the agricultural sector China was moving from a country of small owner-cultivators towards co-operatives and collectivization as first steps towards the ultimate goal of full socialisation.³³

In response to these moves in agriculture, Mao castigated some party members who were 'tottering along like women with bound feet and constantly complaining, "you're going too fast"',³⁴ indicating the presence of dissension within the Party on the question of the transformation of the countryside. It was a situation in which, according to Mao, 'the mass movement (was) running ahead of the leadership'.³⁵ But, Mao warned, the co-operative movement must proceed cautiously as some peasants were 'not sufficiently politically conscious to take the socialist road.'³⁶ Nevertheless, the policy of having industry and agriculture keep pace with one another was successful in the Soviet Union and 'the road travelled by the Soviet Union is our model.'³⁷

Still, as early as 1956 Mao began to perceive problems with the development strategy he had applauded just one year earlier. In discussing the 'Ten Great Relationships' he said of the first (the relationship between industry and agriculture, and between heavy and

light industry) that more emphasis ought to be placed in the future on agriculture and light industry, although heavy industry would remain the "key sector".³⁸ The rationale for this was the needs of the people, excessive attention to the development of heavy industry meant the risk of less attention being paid to the peoples' livelihood.³⁹

Mao's concern with the well-being of the masses coupled with his conviction that a development strategy which did not take their well-being into account as the primary factor would inevitably fail were expressed more forcibly in the following year in his famous essay On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People.

Having discovered that clearly contradictions do continue to exist in socialist society, identified as 'survivals of bourgeois ideology, certain bureaucratic ways of doing things in our state organs and certain defects in certain links in our state institutions (which) are in contradiction with the socialist economic base.'⁴⁰

Mao went on to propose that certain elements needed 'remoulding' - especially the intellectuals, but even including some workers.⁴¹

Concerned at the events in Hungary the previous year, Mao declared that the hopes of certain people in China were 'counter to the interests of the masses'. He affirmed that the Hungarian incidents indicated the presence of 'reactionaries inside a socialist country ...attempting to achieve their conspiritorial aims by taking advantage of contradictions among the people to foment dissension and stir up disorder'.⁴²

It seems that, as Mao's conception of 'cultural revolution' as a development strategy evolved during this period he was ruminating on these various contradictions and how they could be rectified.

In a famous speech in 1958 Mao declared:

Our country is both poor and blank. Those who are poor have nothing to call their own. Those who are blank are like a sheet of white paper. To be poor is fine because it makes you inclined to be revolutionary. With blank paper many things can be done. You can write on it or draw designs. Blank paper is best for writing on.⁴³

The writing Mao proposed took the form of the Great Leap Forward, 'the biggest and most ambitious experiment in human mobilisation in history'.⁴⁴ The Leap concentrated on two fronts: 'walking on two legs' in industry ('which meant the simultaneous development of medium, small, and large industry and the simultaneous use of indigenous techniques and modern methods')⁴⁵ and the development of the communes in agriculture.

The former has been widely acclaimed a failure by western commentators, a view challenged by Wheelwright and McFarlane who assert that the localisation of control, the experimentation and widespread success with medium-level technology have resulted in a considerable degree of self-reliance.⁴⁶ As for the celebrated 'backyard' smelters, Joshua Horn points to a single, yet forgotten, (or ignored) positive dimension of the fact that 'everybody in China now knows how steel is made' - it increases the invulnerability of China.⁴⁷

The communes were attacked by no lesser figure than Nikita Khrushchev who, during a visit to China in 1958, denounced them as 'ridiculous'. But, again, research by Wheelwright and McFarlane contradicts this view. They claim that the communes were 'primarily exercises in agrarian socialism - in collective labor, a collective way of life, a method of bringing new activities to the village.'⁴⁸

The Great Leap Forward can be regarded as the turning point for China's development strategy, the point at which the country began to concentrate on the cultivation of her own resources - especially that with which she was best endowed - labour - for the development of self-reliance. Corresponding to the Leap is a period when disillusionment with the Soviet model of transition to socialism set in. The essence of this renewed skepticism towards the Soviet Union is neatly summed up in a single sentence from a talk by Mao in Chengtu in March 1958: 'The Soviet Union does not talk about the contradictions between the leaders and the led.'⁴⁹

At the same conference an interesting exchange of interjections during Mao's speech, between Lin Piao and Ch'en I gives an insight into the progressive deterioration in the Chinese attitude to the Soviets, and, more important, a suggestion of the dependency relationship between the two countries:

"Chief Ch'en (vice-premier Ch'en I) interjected: Soviet comrades who have returned home said that when they came, they brought their experiences with them; now they are returning they are taking our experiences back' ...Chief Lin said: ...When it comes to the superstructure ...we have our own fully developed system. Lenin died too early. He did not have time to attend to this question. Stalin had no developed system. We do not have to learn from the Soviet Union. As regards tactics, we can learn half and leave half. Their tactics are questionable both ideologically and as regards their attitudes to the masses.⁵⁰

What is remarkable about Lin's comment is its unequivocal implication that what is learned from the Soviet Union (i.e., processes and techniques associated with the production system itself - or, in conventional Marxist terms, the base) can be regarded as separate from the superstructure - dealings with which the Chinese

'do not have to learn from the Soviet Union'. It may be speculated from this that what Lin is articulating here (albeit obliquely) is a resounding faith in the Chinese 'culture'. Without carrying this too far, is this not similar to accepting foreign learning for application (ironically, to 'the base') but using Chinese learning for that which is obviously considered more important? - dealings with the masses?

The withdrawal of Soviet aid and personnel in 1960 came at a time of crisis in China's economic expansion.⁵¹ The loss of technological and planning assistance taxed heavy industry painfully; nonetheless, it caused Chairman Mao Tse-tung to 'stress even more the policy of self-reliance and technological independence.'⁵² Faced with the need to continue to expand the economy, not to mention the need to meet immediate day-to-day requirements of the people, the Chinese leaders were left with two choices: to attempt to carry on along the path they had been following over the longer term since 1949 - substituting Chinese expertise for missing Soviet personnel; or to completely reassess the development strategy in the light of the current situation, and in the light of the only alternative with which they had had experience - the 'Yenan Way'. This was a real debate, it is at the heart of the struggle which culminated in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution - itself a manifestation of the ascendancy of the Maoist mass line and the retreat of the Soviet line.

It is, of course, dangerous to simplify the complex events and forces in Chinese political and economic life in this fashion. Nevertheless, the strategy of cultural revolution has at its core

the conviction that Mao had articulated since Yenan - that the political conscience of the people must be raised and their mass energy mobilised to affect the transformation of China to socialism. At the same time the opposition forces advocated gradualism, the supremacy of 'expertise' over 'redness', the application of rationalised, Soviet-style procedures to industry and agriculture, and a general preference for the 'Soviet' line in development.

In the immediate aftermath of the 'crisis years' at the end of the 'fifties, following a series of natural calamities and production failures which resulted in food shortages, and famine in some areas, the Eighth Congress of the CCP adopted a 'New Economic Policy' to 'reinforce the agricultural front by making agriculture the foundation of the national economy and giving industry second priority.'⁵³ With the reintroduction of private plots, incentive payments, and a more 'relaxed' market, the period threatened the beginning of a new market-socialist economy.⁵⁴ This movement reflects the temporary eclipse of Mao's economic strategy, but the Socialist Education Movement marked the beginning of the counter offensive which culminated in the CPCPR.

The Socialist Education Movement (which will be dealt with in greater detail in the following chapter) commenced in 1962 and passed through a series of stages before 1966. It took the form of a nationwide 'rectification' campaign, aimed at overcoming a variety of 'unhealthy tendencies' evident throughout the countryside, including: inclinations toward capitalism among the peasants and malpractice and some corruption at various official levels.⁵⁵ It was aimed at resolving the 'principal contradiction' in China - the

contradiction between socialism and capitalism.⁵⁶ Finally, it sought to eradicate those people in positions of authority taking the 'capitalist road'.⁵⁷

The solutions to these problems was conceived in political terms: to intensify class consciousness and class struggle, to use the method of criticism and self-criticism to reform work styles, but essentially to 'educate people in the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge, so that they can orientate their thinking correctly, become good at investigation and study and at summing up experience, overcome difficulties, commit fewer mistakes, do their work better, and struggle hard so as to build China into a great and powerful socialist country.'⁵⁸

Exhortations to study the thought of Mao Tse-tung intensified during this period. The movement to promote the study of Mao Tse-tung thought stressed also the need for promoting self-reliance and self-sacrifice.⁵⁹ It underlined the emphasis on developing socialist consciousness and heightening class awareness among the masses and revolutionising the party leadership.⁶⁰

Whilst it is difficult to describe with any accuracy the degree to which the Socialist Education Movement as an exercise (or series of exercises) in political mobilisation made the GPCR simply part of a 'sequence of events in China's development, it is clear that the application of this procedure in attempts to solve political and economic problems links the two as parts of the working-out of the Maoist development strategy. The two are also linked, of course, in the same manner, with the Great Leap Forward. What I am

arguing here is that cultural revolution as a development strategy does not begin with the GPCR - rather it has its genesis in the Kiangsi soviets, its theoretical maturation in Yenan, it confronts fundamental contradictions in the Great Leap Forward, and, by the 'sixties, beginning with the Socialist Education Movement, these contradictions were challenged as the process by which China was to develop toward socialist society acquires the support, and the understanding of the masses. But these phases, whilst interwoven in a complex pattern accross recent Chinese history, barely touched the surface when compared with the GPCR which radically altered the course of history itself.

China's Development Strategy - The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution:

I have already suggested that the period 1956-68 marks the real beginning of the development strategy that is cultural revolution. What I have meant by this is that the process of trial and error which is the predominant characteristic of the search for a suitable development strategy in China up to the middle of the nineteen-sixties was superceded, with the advent of the GPCR, by a development strategy which reflected more accurately the struggle for socialism in China. I have also suggested that the strategy is more suitable in that it stresses national self-reliance - a point I will return to shortly. The success of this strategy lies in involving the people in decision-making at all levels, and in carrying out these decisions, which effect their daily lives, to their logical conclusions. It is a strategy, in short, of involvement, of responsibility, and of self-help.

According to Mao, the Cultural Revolution is a third stage in the Chinese revolution itself. It follows a twenty-eight-year democratic revolution, and a seventeen-year socialist revolution.⁶¹ How does this third stage differ from the other two earlier stages? And what are its essential features?

First, in the three phases of the socialist revolution since 1949, as has already been discussed, there were essentially two development strategies at work. The first stressed development through leading sectors, and the other stressed self-reliance and political mobilisation of the masses. The GPCR is the point at which the latter emerges pre-eminent as the national strategy. Second, there is renewed emphasis on refining 'cultural revolution' as a process, through the application of "struggle-criticism-transformation". Third, it is perhaps the first occasion upon which the Chinese masses truly 'take command' in a manner that even Mao himself did not anticipate - although he was soon to grasp what was happening.⁶² Fourth, although too much can be made of this point (and has been, notably by Robert J. Lifton and Richard Solomon, among others)⁶³ Mao's position in the Chinese hierarchy had become, if not tenuous, then unsatisfactory to him - in view of the moves he saw going on around him. Evidence for this is far more sparse than scholars would have us believe, yet in 1966 Mao is reported to have said: 'Its not so bad that I am not allowed to complete my work, but I don't like being treated like a dead ancestor.'⁶⁴ It should be emphasized, nevertheless, that Mao's dissatisfaction with his position is relative to the direction in which he perceived the post-1962 development strategy was taking the country, and to his

capacity to do something about it - it is not a situation in which he grew restless at the prospect of his quest for 'revolutionary immortality' being frustrated. Nor is his reaction to his position a reach for promethean grandeur. Fifth, whilst there had been purges of Party officials in the past, the GPCR marks the first period in which the Party itself was subject to mass criticism and upheaval. The structure and composition of the Party that emerged in 1970 was immeasurably different from that of ten years earlier. Finally, and I mean to treat this point in greater detail below, the GPCR was a period in which national self-reliance was heavily emphasized.

The importance of self-reliance as a principle in development strategy has, to some extent at least, been foisted onto China by its relative isolation from the world at large - and especially through the dramatically altered pattern of events following the withdrawal of Soviet assistance. Nevertheless, two points explain the emergence of self-reliance as a value in China in the past ten years. First as has already been shown, the Maoist development strategy matured in a period when self-reliance was a matter of survival - due to the isolation of the CCP in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia region. During this period Mao became irrevocably convinced of the infinite creative capacity of the Chinese peasants and workers to develop through the correct application of their own resources. Hence, when relative isolation again confronted China in the post-1960 period, Mao fell back on this conviction - which, nonetheless, as has also been shown, he had, in fact, adhered to through the intervening years.

Second, in the previous chapter I discussed the nature of the dependency relationship that arises between imperialist powers and Third-World countries. Although little research has been done on the subject, it seems reasonable to assume, given the behavior of economically and technologically strong countries toward the weak, that the relationship between the Soviet Union and China can be understood accurately within the general rubric of dependency relationships. Certainly in the past ten years the charge 'social imperialism' has been frequently levelled at the Russians by the Chinese denouncing the former's relationships with Third-World countries. This is not, I would argue, simply part of the unfathomable rhetoric of foreign relations which many countries, including China and the Soviet Union (and, indeed, the 'Western' countries) deploy in their international utterances. On the contrary, I believe it indicates an awareness of the deeper significance of Soviet-Third World relations acquired by the Chinese through harsh experience. This experience has certainly made the Chinese more critically aware of the contradictions inherent in espousing any development strategy which is the product of another geographical, economic, historical, and ideological environment. More particularly, it has sharpened their awareness of the 'hidden' content in something as seemingly-innocuous as advanced technology and, more obviously, planning and organisation. To this extent, therefore, China's emphasis on 'self-reliance' is not simply a product of the country's isolation - although this plays a part - it is very definitely an expression of preference. But what does self-reliance specifically mean in the present Chinese context?

Self-Reliance and the Development Strategy

There are three levels at which self-reliance operates in the Chinese context: at the level of the individual - where individuals are encouraged to be self-sufficient, innovative, thoughtful and creative in their application of Mao Tse-tung thought to their everyday lives; at the village, commune, or 'societal' level - where self-reliance in production, in technique, in organisation are encouraged in an endeavour, not to develop a pastiche of autonomous regions accross the countryside, but as a means of strenghtening the economic, social, and political viability of the whole country. Wheelwright and McFarlane regard self-reliance at this level as a 'key element' in motivation in the communes. It is a desire to 'make-do' with local resources rather than develop the constraints of dependency on regional or 'state' administrative organs.⁶⁵ Self-sufficiency in the communes is implied in the principle of the 'three never-asks' - never ask the state for grain, money or materials.⁶⁶ It is intended that self-reliance will become an important facet of 'agrarian socialism' of which the communes are the basis; at the third level, the national level, the Chinese are striving for self-sufficiency - expecially in foodstuffs. Where China has to buy food, it seeks to pay for these purchases through its own exports (hence imported wheat is paid for by the export of rice). But national self-reliance is a broad concept determining the manner in which China will develop technologically, industrially, in agriculture, in education - in fact in every way it is meaningful to apply the principle as it defines work patterns, social forms and political organisation.

National self-reliance also has an important strategic aspect: since the departure of the Soviet Union and the disruption of relations between the two countries, their strategic outlooks have been less than complementary. The periodic skirmishes on China's northern borders with the Soviet Union and the threat of American aggression in the south increased China's sense of isolation in the nineteen sixties, with the result that self-reliance became a strategic imperative.

It is worth, at this point, making a note of the role of self-reliance in developing China's technological capacity. Developing an 'indigenous' technology is no simple matter - particularly where the challenges are as enormous as they are in China. Yet, for reasons already indicated, the Chinese regard this as a necessity for the continuation of an appropriate development strategy. Essential to self-reliance as a motivational force is an economic outlook that differs vastly from that of the west and of the Soviet Union - basic to both of which is an outlook the Chinese refer to as 'economism'. The difference is best understood by examining the criteria according to which resources are allocated and techniques are selected. Whereas in the West the principal criteria refer to efficiency (conceived in narrow 'rate of return' terms) and profitability, these are officially discouraged as criteria in China.⁶⁷ Instead the Chinese emphasize the human factor in economic development. 'Maoists believe that while a principal aim of nations should be to raise the material welfare of the population, this should only be done within the context of the development of

of human beings and of encouraging them to realize fully their manifold creative powers.⁶⁸ Hence development is conceptualized within the framework of ideological preparedness of the masses. This implies not simply studying the thought of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, but the breaking down of specialization, dismantling bureaucracies and by 'undermining the other centralizing and divisive tendencies that give rise to experts.'⁶⁹ This may well, of course, have some effect on the pace of national construction; but this can be withstood, in the Maoist view, in the interest of human involvement and human development.⁷⁰

The purpose of a self-reliant technology is to fit the technology to the objective conditions in which it is to operate. This imposes constraints upon design, scale, and complexity. One of the conditions which the Chinese have sought to meet in technological design is the huge labor force at their disposal - this is done through the policy of 'reverse engineering' which is designed to convert capital-intensive technology into more labor-intensive technology.⁷¹ Another objective condition is the shortage of heavy production machinery: successful attempts to overcome this were witnessed in Shanghai by Wheelwright and McFarlane, where lathes and other equipment were produced from 'scraps of iron and copper in the spare time of the workers'.⁷² Where foreign technology has to be copied it is done with a critical eye on the negative aspects of importing technology - particularly the associations of 'expertness' that may accompany the training of operating personnel. Before the GPCR there was a tendency for highly specialized technicians to behave in an 'unhealthy' fashion that overemphasized

their 'technocratic bias'. It is part of the strategy of self-reliance to fit the technology as far as possible to an environment in which the contribution of each worker is regarded as important to the total output.

Conclusion

The search for a development strategy in China is not over. Mao's statement during the GPCR that the people should expect 'many more cultural revolutions' is not, as some critics have seen it, a forewarning of horrendous upheaval and national catastrophe. On the contrary, it is an indication of an extremely complex and sophisticated insight into the future path of Chinese society as it develops toward socialism. But what form will Chinese socialism take? First, the question itself betrays a naivete about historical processes and patterns of social change. It does so because the asking suggests that there is a vision which must somehow have been translated into a blueprint which is to be followed. Second, it indicates serious misunderstanding of the present in China. The strategy of cultural revolution, the strategy now being pursued in China is, by definition the antithesis of a development strategy which makes a fetish of social engineering, in which rate of return is deftly calculated on every activity, and in which the human dilemma is untold. It is a development strategy that evolves as the definition and redifinition of Chinese 'culture' unfolds in a dialectical progression from contradiction, through awareness, to transformation - and the transformed reality reveals further underlying contradictions. As the process involves the masses more and more, their capacity to

take command' increases, until they, the people become the dynamic, motor force in Chinese history - and as they see that human destiny is itself the product of human transformation, they begin to realize themselves as the makers of history. As Marx said long ago - "It is the riddle of history solved and knows itself to be the solution.

Footnotes to Chapter V

¹Paul M. Sweezy and Charles Bettelheim, On The Transition to Socialism, (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1971), p. 110.

²Ibid., p. 116.

³Ibid., p. 52.

⁴Ibid., p. 69.

⁵Ibid.,

⁶Ibid., p. 52.

⁷Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, (London, Heinemann, 1976), pp. 123-133.

⁸Ibid., p. 145.

⁹Mao Tse-tung, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", in Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung, (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1971), p. 380.

¹⁰Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, John K. Fairbank, eds. A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 439-443.

¹¹"Resolutions of the Second Session of the Seventh Plenum of The Chinese Communist Party", (March, 1949), *ibid.*, p. 443.

¹²*Ibid.*, pp. 443-444.

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴Stanley Karnow, Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution (New York, Viking Press, 1972), pp. 59-61.

¹⁵"The Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress", in New China: Three Views, ed., O. Van der Sprenkel, (London, Turnstile Press, 1950), p. 207.

¹⁶John G. Gurley, "The Formation of Mao's Economic Strategy", Monthly Review 27:3, p. 99.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸C.F. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed.

¹⁹Mao, "People's Democratic Dictatorship", p. 382.

²⁰Brandt, et.al., A Documentary History, p. 374.

²¹First Five-Year Plan for Development of the National Economy of the People's Republic of China in 1953-1957, (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1956), p. 17.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid., pp. 38-44; 55-57.

²⁴Ibid., p. 60.

²⁵Ibid., p. 61-67.

²⁶Ibid., p. 73.

²⁷Ibid., p. 75-84.

²⁸Ibid., p. 93.

²⁹Ibid., p. 163.

³⁰New China Advances to Socialism: A Selection of Speeches Delivered at the Third Session of the First National People's Congress, (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1956), p. 87.

³¹First Five-Year Plan, p. 113.

³²E.L. Wheelwright and Bruce McFarlane, The Chinese Road To Socialism, (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 37.

³³Ibid., p. 33.

³⁴Mao Tse-tung, "On the Question of Agricultural Co-operation," Selected Readings, p. 389.

³⁵Ibid., p. 390.

³⁶Ibid., p. 401.

³⁷Ibid., p. 403.

³⁸Mao Tse-tung, "On the Ten Great Relationships," Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters: 1956-1971, ed., Stuart Schram, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1974), p. 63.

³⁹Ibid., p. 64.

⁴⁰Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," Selected Readings, p. 455.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 455-458.

⁴²Ibid., p. 441.

⁴³Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at the Supreme State Conference," Schram, Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, p. 92.

⁴⁴Karnow, Mao and China, p. 92.

⁴⁵Wheelwright and McFarlane, China's Road to Socialism, p. 43.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 43-62.

⁴⁷Joshua Horn made this remark during a speech in New York in 1972 which was distributed as the film, "Away with All Pests."

⁴⁸Wheelwright and McFarlane, China's Road to Socialism, p. 49.

⁴⁹Mao Tse-tung, "Talk at the Chengtu Conference - 'On the Pattern of Development'", (20th March, 1958), Schram, Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, p. 108.

⁵⁰Idem, "Speech at the Group Leaders' Forum of the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Affairs Committee", (June, 1958), *ibid.*, p.29.

⁵¹Wheelwright and McFarlane, China's Road to Socialism, p. 53.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibid., p. 66.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 75.

⁵⁵Richard Baum and Frederick C. Teiwes, Ssu-ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962-1966, (Berkely, China Research Monographs, 1968), p. 12.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 35.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 48.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 59.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 44.

⁶¹Mao Tse-tung, "Talk at the Report Meeting", (October, 1966), Schram, Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, p. 265.

⁶²Ibid., pp. 268, 271

⁶³Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture, (Berkely, University of California Press, 1971); Robert J. Lifton, Revolutionary Immortality: Mao-Tse tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, (New York, Random House, 1968).

⁶⁴Mao Tse-tung, "Talk at the Report Meeting", pp. 226-227.

⁶⁵Wheelwright and McFarlane, China's Road to Socialism, p. 187.

⁶⁶James Peck, "Revolution versus Modernisation and Revisionism," in Nee and Peck, China's Uninterrupted Revolution, p. 112.

⁶⁷John G. Gurley, "Capitalist and Maoist Economic Development," in America's Asia, ed., E. Freidman and M. Sheldon, (New York, Pantheon, 1969), p. 332.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 333.

⁷⁰Ibid., passim.

⁷¹Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller, Global Reach, the Power of the Multinational Corporations, (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1974), p. 171.

⁷²Wheelwright and McFarlane, China's Road to Socialism, p. 164.

CHAPTER VI

THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF TANZANIA IN THE POST-ARUSHA DECLARATION PERIOD

If Ujamaa was the philosophical basis of African socialism in Tanzania, the Arusha Declaration with its theme of development through self-reliance is the set of guidelines by which it is to be brought about. Despite the surprised reaction to the Declaration in some quarters (especially from abroad, but including from some elements within the capitalist centre) it is quite clearly foreshadowed in both Nyerere's thinking over the five-year period immediately prior to 1967 and in the activities and policies of the TANU government itself. In fact, not eight months earlier Nyerere addressed the National Assembly at the commencement of the Budget Session, his speech at the time can be regarded as a forerunner in a very strict sense of the Declaration itself. The President discussed the restraints imposed by foreign borrowing, the necessity to plan in accordance with internal capital formation, the need to increase productivity, and the importance of self-reliance in economic development.¹ All of these concerns are dealt with in the Declaration itself.

The discussion that follows is an attempt to capture the essence of Tanzanian socialist development as it is articulated in the Arusha Declaration, although reference is made to numerous

other important documents and speeches of the period immediately following the presentation of the Declaration to the Parliament in 1967. In keeping with the analytic model suggested earlier, when discussing the ideology of Ujamaa, an attempt will be made to isolate the 'dissociative' and 'associative' factors in the Declaration and subsequent documents.

Industry and Agriculture

As in many underdeveloped countries the Tanzanian economy is predominantly rural-based with an estimated 90% of the labor force self-employed in agriculture.² Nyerere considered this fact must dominate any discussion on the transition to socialism in Tanzania:

For the foreseeable future the vast majority of our people will continue to work on the land. The land is the only basis for Tanzanian development; we have no other. Therefore, if our rural life is not based on the principles of socialism our country will not be socialist, regardless of how we organise our industrial sector, and regardless of our commercial and political arrangements.³

Agricultural products were also the principal earners of foreign exchange - but that same foreign exchange was used to develop not the rural areas but the centre. Thus the people who benefit from development brought about by borrowed money were not the same people who repaid the loans.⁴ Nyerere regarded this as exploitation of the rural areas - exploitation that must cease if Tanzania were to build socialism.

In this connection, Nyerere argued that since investment in heavy industry depended upon export earnings from the agricultural sector and on skilled manpower which the country did not possess, Tanzanians should stop dreaming of developing the country through

the establishment of large modern industries.⁵ Instead, Tanzania should concentrate on developing the agricultural base by transforming the technology to a more efficient and more appropriate 'intermediate' technology (from hoes to ox-loughs). When this technological revolution has taken place all over the country 'we shall be able to move from the oxen-plough to the tractor'.⁶ This is preferable to immediate large-scale modernisation and rural proleterianisation as it avoids massive social disruption and human suffering.⁷

Nyerere did not advocate completely ignoring industrial development - he recognised quite clearly the valuable contribution that industry might make to the country's development. Nevertheless, the kind of industrialisation envisaged was not the kind usually proffered by capitalist investors. Rather than build factories and plants designed in the Centre for the production and distribution of goods and services integral to the survival of capitalism, industrialisation must first have a cooperative rural base - it must be related to the needs of agriculture as the dominant sector. It should, moreover, be done more in terms of 'cottage industries' - although not with people knitting sweaters and making shirts at home but with people coming together in the same place and working out an appropriate division of labor. Old crafts so that the industrial base is concomitant with the village - agricultural base.⁸

The policy of concentrating on the development of an agricultural base is part of the disengagement from imperialism since it has as an underlying objective greater self-sufficiency in food and agricultural products. Achieving this self-sufficiency would modify Tanzanians dependence on international food markets.

Furthermore, the kind of agricultural development proposed makes best use of indigeous methods and technology - thus also modifying the country's dependence on machinery and technical know-how from the centre. It is dissociative also in that the country's international borrowing capacity is to be deliberately calculated in terms of the anticipated return to the foreign exchange earning sector - thus putting pressure on the centre to conform in its investment outlook to its own exchange earning capacity. Finally, it is dissociative in that it is deliberately designed to overcome the contradiction between Centre and Periphery (because of the foreign borrowing policy that it embodies) and between centre and periphery.

The policy of putting emphasis on agriculture is associative - that is, strategic to the transformation to socialism - in that it emphasizes local decision making and the cultivation of phenomenon of exploitation. By overcoming exploitation of one man by another, of the agricultural by the industrial sectors, of indigenous by advanced technology and of country by town the contradictions impeding the construction to socialism can be overcome.

The Urban-Rural Dichotomy

The concentration of resources in urban areas - and especially the disproportionate utilisation of foreign exchange in these areas at the expense of the earning sector - are among the contradictions to which the development strategy of Tanzania addresses itself. The Arusha Declaration points to the extent to which the development strategy which had been pursued favoured the urban areas and how this is both contradictory and exploitative. An illustration used

by Nyerere is hospitals which are built, at considerable cost, in towns where only a minority of the people have direct access to them. The same is true of tarmac roads which are mostly in the cities as are the vehicles for which they are built. Dissociative measures to overcome these contradictions begin with critical look at the relative needs of town and country and how these needs are being met. If it is true, as Ivan Illich has suggested, that for every piece of major surgery in the Third World hospitals one hundred lives could be saved through improving sanitary facilities; and that every motor car produced denies fifty people good transportation by bus, then the needs of the masses in the periphery are being subverted. Even if these illustrations are an exaggeration they demonstrate the point Nyerere was trying to make when he referred in the Arusha documents, to the needs of the people. In the Arusha Declaration itself he calls on the country to 'pay heed to peasant'.

Further dissociative measures taken to overcome the contradictions of the rural-urban dichotomy have been listed by Saul and Arrighi:

Witness the curbing of student pretensions at the university college, the subsequent civil-service salary cuts, the recent disciplining of the extravagant wage demands by NUTA (the national trade union) and, most of all, by the Arusha Declaration which has enacted a self-denying ordinance against certain kinds of economic aggrandisement by the elite (especially as regards the ownership of property) and thus called upon them to exemplify their socialist commitment.⁹

The associative response to the rural-urban contradiction has been, of course, the promotion of Ujamaa villages. In rural Tanzania the village has always been a focal point of the economic, social

and political lives of the people. Landownership has been communal - in the sense that the land is considered in the same way as the air - not a possession limited by boundaries.¹⁰ Hence the Ujamaa village as a concept, with its emphasis on communal ownership, cooperation and mutual responsibility has its roots in the traditions of the countryside. The policies related to the villages in the Arusha Declaration documents - especially in the policy document 'Socialism and Rural Development' - take the traditional village as their starting point. In the traditional village, Nyerere pointed out, there were three basic principles which reflected Ujamaa as a guiding philosophy - these related to equality among villagers, property and sharing, and the obligation to work.

In developing Tanzania, the President went on, the village community must be the nucleus of the development process, providing work, economic and social security, and the basis of economic transactions with other communities. Investment in the development strategy would be infrastructural investment undertaken by the community with community-produced surplus and labor, and supplemented, where necessary, with government sources. The village would be responsible for its own investment decisions - including those relating to agriculture and animal husbandry which are the dominant economic activities. Villages can cooperate among one another in joint ventures to purchase machinery, transport vehicles, or to undertake ventures for joint-use facilities such as water supply, A nation of such village communities would be a socialist nation. For the essential element in them would be the equality of all members of the community, and the members self-government in all matters which concerned only their own affairs.

The successful implementation of the Ujamaa village project was dependent upon a number of factors - among them the cooperativeness of the people and the emergence of good leadership. These two are interwoven and were discussed in the Arusha Declaration document itself. Nyerere made it clear that the transition to Ujamaa villages depended heavily on the people themselves making the decision to make the move. Some people would make the transition quickly, some would wait for some time. Traditional uneasiness at radical departures from tried and trusted practices was often an inhibiting factor, and this must be taken into account.

The transition could, perhaps take place in three stages, Nyerere suggested: the first with the villagers moving their houses to a single village compound; the second, experimentation with some communal project (like cultivating a plot); and the third, after the people have gained confidence, full-time involvement in a village farm.

The encouragement to begin should come from within the village, perhaps beginning with some of the younger people, or with a TANU cell. This was to be an important aspect of the Ujamaa village movement as it was completely antithetical to the spirit of self-reliance to impose from outside the order to incorporate into a Ujamaa village. This also illustrates the associative factor in rural development - the communities were encouraged to make their own decisions about economic strategy. Unfortunately, it is precisely this point that has troubled some of the Ujamaa villages since they began in the 1967-68 period. Late in 1968 Nyerere felt it necessary

to reiterate the point that the principal object of Tanzanian development thinking was people and not things. We went on to spell out clearly what this meant in terms of the Ujamaa villages:

Ujamaa villages are intended to be socialist organisations created by the people, and governed by those who live and work in them. They cannot be created from outside, nor governed from outside. No-one can be forced into an Ujamaa village, and no official, at any level, can go and tell the members of an Ujamaa village what they should do together and what they should continue to do as individual farmers.... An Ujamaa village is a voluntary association of people who decide of their own free will to live together and work together for their common good.... They, and no-one else, will make all the decisions about their working and living arrangements.¹¹

Self-Reliance

Self-reliance is the summary theme in the Tanzanian development strategy - it is at the heart of the rural development policy, the national investment policy, and the educational policy - to name a few. It was born out of Nyerere's acute awareness of the vulnerability of poor nations in the capitalist world order. The temptation to borrow huge sums from abroad, to invite global-corporation investment, to secure knowledge and technology from the Centre has dangers - most of which relate to the consequent 'uneven development' which the wholesale adoption of these offerings gives rise to. The African experience has shown that contrary to the bourgeoisie economists' predictions about intersectoral 'catch-up' that makes uneven development succeed, this kind of 'development' merely results in the gap between the centre and the periphery widening. Hence, in the interest of maintaining balanced development by investing in the agricultural sector, and in the

interest of closing the gap between centre and periphery of the economy, Tanzania has been intentionally circumspect in its policy on international reliance.

The policy of self-reliance is in fact a response to the objective conditions and constraints operating in Tanzanian society. Land and people are singled out as the two resources upon which socialism ought to be built, but whilst the development strategy seeks maximum utilization of these resources, it does not demand that other available resources ought to be rejected or ignored. Hence, later in 1967 Nyerere warned that self-reliance should not be made an excuse for stupidity - if a foreign, qualified person was willing to work for the country and the people, he should not be passed over simply because he was not a Tanzanian citizen. Similarly, if a foreign country offers financial assistance for a project, this should not be rejected because it is from a foreign source. What Tanzania must do, though, is to ensure that development aid is spent in the interest of the whole country and in the manner set down in the policy guidelines.¹²

Foreign Assistance

The question of the role of foreign assistance - both 'aid' and 'investment' - is a perplexing one for most underdeveloped countries. For, whilst the immediate benefits of, for instance aid for rural development may be forthcoming, it may, in the long run lead to a particular kind of dependence which is unhealthy. This kind of dependence was certainly on Nyerere's mind in the Budget Speech already referred to in 1966 when he warned that Tanzania may be making a mistake if it relied on outside assistance for investment

funds. By the time of the Arusha Declaration he made his position more clear - declaring that money is no weapon for a poor man to fight with: 'We are trying to overcome our economic weaknesses by using the weapons of the economically strong - weapons which, in fact, we do not possess'.¹³

The folly in this kind of reliance upon external sources has two facets, the President went on, first, the money will simply not be forthcoming - since the number of needy countries in the world is great and the proportion of GNP given them by the First World is not growing in real terms. Second, the political strings attached to international aid giving are too stringent and will endanger the country's independence.¹⁴

Nyerere's attitude to foreign assistance is not to completely reject it. The Friendship Textile Mill which opened in 1968 was funded entirely by interest-free loans from China, and it employed Chinese technicians in the construction. This mill represents the kind of foreign assistance the Tanzanian government has sought to encourage - it is more labor intensive than a similar mill financed by assistance from the capitalist world would normally be; and the Chinese technicians employed on the project brought not just their technological expertise but also their particular approach to training, decision-making and management. In the case of the Tanzam Railway, also built with Chinese assistance, the Tanzanian government did not simply award the contract because of their ideological agreement with the Chinese - they were careful to also select the cheapest tender.

Hence, the Tanzanian policy with regard to foreign assistance is one of measured restraint. In an effort to prevent being of further caught up in the dependency structure between the capitalist world and the Third World the policy articulated in the Arusha Declaration was founded on the conviction that it was dangerous to spend more than one had earned. The Tanzanian experience with foreign investment prior to 1967 had been unfortunate; foreign borrowing at a time of falling export prices only succeeded in making up the investment surplus lost in the trade slump, leaving Tanzania in the same position as she would have been without borrowing (given good markets for her produce) but with the added burden of a foreign debt. The policy of self-reliance in this area was decided upon after a careful assessment of the stakes in international financing - stakes which invariably favor the 'donor' countries.

Socialism

I have been describing above the strategy embodied in the Arusha declaration as it marked the attempts by Tanzania to both disengage from imperialism and to construct socialism: that is I have discussed the dissociative and associative aspects of the strategy. It remains now to examine the nature of Tanzanian socialism as it is expressed in the policy documents. Without repeating at length the remarks in the previous chapter referring to Chinese socialism, I should reiterate that the face of socialism in any country will ultimately bear the impression of the old society. That is 'socialism' in its Tanzanian context refers as much as anything to the extent to which the society in transition is able to determine for itself and in terms of its own institutions, the shape of its

future destiny. In fact 'socialism' has become such a perjorative term, especially in the capitalist world, that one hesitates to make use of the term at all - let alone attempt to assign it some specific meaning. Nonetheless, as it is expressed in the Arusha Declaration documents socialism is still an ideology, 'a state of mind' as Nyerere had said in his earlier paper *Ujamaa - The Basis of African Socialism*. But it also refers to ownership and control of the means of production, to exploitation, and to work.

Socialism as a historical phase in Tanzania refers less to a period in which the institutions of human existence are refined than to constructing appropriate institutions that will supervise the transition to a state in which the economic base is sufficiently productive to ensure a decent life for the masses of the people. Integral to this purpose is the control of those means of production so that economic development can be directed according to criteria which have already been articulated in the ideology - rather than to criteria of profit and growth - although Nyerere is careful to point out that these should not be ignored.

Immediately after the Arusha Declaration was presented to the Parliament, numerous nationalisations of privately owned industries took place. Most of these were connected with global corporate giants like British American Tobacco and Bata shoes but they also included all the private banks and insurance companies operating in the country. Not long after this series of nationalisations Nyerere explained the principle behind what he referred to as 'economic nationalism':

Every country - whether it be capitalist, communist, socialist or fascist - wants to control its own

economy.... but this economic nationalism does not have anything to do with the ideologies of socialism, capitalism or communism. It is universal among nation states.¹⁶

But what differs among nation states, Nyerere continued, is not whether nations control their economies, but how they do it - and the only way it can be achieved is through the economic institutions of socialism.¹⁷ In Tanzania, these institutions include the National Development Corporation, the National insurance corporation and other public enterprises and undertakings, especially the Cooperative Movement and including MUTA and TANU itself.

Work

The Arusha Declaration mentions people as one of the resources possessed by Tanzania. In fact, the document stipulates the necessity for a 'work ethic' - people ought to work harder and longer hours, the construction of socialist society cannot come about without the efforts of everyone working to their full capacity.¹⁸ There should be no idlers or parasites as these are forms of exploitation, and as such are antithetical to the construction of socialism. In the statements on work there is a strong suggestion of not simply the dignity of work in social construction, but the obligation each worker has to his fellows. Work is a component in national construction, a resource that must be cultivated and made more productive. It is constantly treated, however, as a means for social construction, rather than as an end in itself.

Consciousness

Above all socialism in Tanzania refers to socialist consciousness. In all of the documents there is an underlying urgency that

the masses not only become involved in the construction of socialist society but are aware of their role in this process. There is the implicit conviction that people must fully understand their purpose and function. To this extent 'socialism' is not just an ideological label - it is a tool for political and economic mobilisation. Hence, the need for another of the four resources mentioned in the Arusha Declaration, good leadership - the country must have people who themselves understand the principles of Ujamaa, but who are also able to explain it to others.

At the outset it was indicated that the Arusha Declaration would be considered in the light of the associative and dissociative measures it contained for the disengagement of Tanzania from imperialism on the one hand, and for the construction of socialism on the other. The foregoing is essentially a description of these measures as they were conceptualised in the Arusha Declaration and as they were translated into some of the key policy documents. I also intimated that there would be an attempt to show how these measures were not meant to be applied as if a blueprint for socialist transformation was being followed, but rather, the process of disengagement would be viewed as parts of a dialectical progression from one phase (the peripheral economy) to another (socialist society). What is alluded to here is the working out of a strategy which has as its driving force the creativity of the Tanzanian masses released as each measure is applied to the society itself. This creativity is not spontaneous, nor is it necessarily correctly applied the moment it is released - there are numerous constraints operating which obstruct the process of transition to socialism. In

Tanzania the continuing existence of remnants of the old order are among the principal obstacles, although misunderstanding of and over-zealous reaction to the Arusha directives are also partly responsible. The remainder of the present discussion is partly an effort to detail some of the ways in which these constraints inhibit the development strategy in operation.

Before going on to describe the post-Arusha period a note ought to be made of the role of the State in Tanzania as an under-developed country that is attempting to build socialism. The State in Tanzania refers to various entities: to the national assembly, the parastatal institutions which largely control the public sector of the economy, the state administrative apparatus at national, regional, and local levels, the TANU party, and, of course, to the president himself. The roles of the various elements that together comprise the state are extremely diverse - but one thing is clear - the State, taken as a collective of the various institutions is the dominant initiating force in Tanzanian society.

According to Marxism-Leninism, the phases of transition to communist society would witness the gradual 'withering away' of the state. In some socialist societies, notably the Soviet Union, the omnipresence of the state seems to have been the direct outcome of measures designed to transform Soviet society. The Chinese road to socialism, as we have already seen, was threatened, in the 1960's by heavy centralisation and excessive bureaucratisation, the mobilisation of the masses was the only weapon to combat this entropic force.

In recent Tanzanian history the State has been the dynamic agent in bringing about social change. Nyerere has been the dominant ideological force, TANU the dominant organisational force, and the parastatals and various ministries have largely presided over the extensive changes that have taken place in the industrial and service sectors of the economy. Finally, the regional and local-level arms of the state have brought the forces of change to the village level. The State has, therefore, been an initiating and educational force - as well as being integrally involved in the development system itself through the state corporate bodies.

But there are dangers in the continuing preeminence of the State as the 'engine' of development - these are more difficult to isolate, and even more difficult to overcome once the process has commenced. In Tanzania the whole purpose of development, as the President is fond of saying, is people. This means that people themselves must assume more and more of the responsibilities (as well as reaping more and more of the results) of planning and working out the development strategy. In the opinion of one analyst of the second Five-Year Plan:

The logical step, therefore, would be to move the engine of society away from government to other more flexible institutions in the country. As far as Tanzania is concerned these certainly include the new villages.¹⁹

This should, it would seem, be a logical progression from the immediate post-Arusha period when State activity in the economy was at its height. The new opportunities that were released by these initiatives should have been grasped fully so that the people could understand more actively their own role in the transformation process.

This implies greater emphasis on 'transformative' planning which aims at self-transformation of the society by creating new institutional relationships and concrete action programs.²⁰

In capitalist society the State is totally integrated with 'private' enterprise capitalism, providing welfare services of all kinds for workers displaced by the system, providing research, planning, and manpower training for capitalist industry and, to a large extent, supervising the maintenance and development of the economic infrastructure. It is, indeed, common for capitalists to bemoan the influence or 'intrusion' of the State in the 'free enterprise' system. This is usually either politically motivated, or it arises out of a utopian misunderstanding of the functioning of capitalism itself - where the 'free market' is actually thought to exist.

In Tanzania the disquiet that has recently been expressed at the relationship between the State and capitalism is more forcefully expressed by socialists who perceive the dangers in allowing international capitalism to penetrate into economic life. Thus Shivji²¹ in his remarkably perceptive analysis of Tanzania as a neo-colony, shows how the parastatal bodies, in partnership with global corporations have become the vehicle for the latter to force a stranglehold on the country. Tanzania's bureaucracy - the bureaucracy of a neo-colony rather than a socialist state - is 'objectively backed by the international bourgeoisie, thus:

The fundamental and antagonistic contradiction, let it be emphasized, is between imperialism and the people, which form dialectical opposites of the international capitalist system. However the international bourgeoisie administers its interests in individual

countries through various means.... Therefore, it is the petty-bourgeoisie of the neo-colony par excellence; or the national bourgeoisie of state capitalism; or the economic bureaucracy of bureaucratic capitalism - they serve, to a greater or lesser extent as on-the-scene agents of the international bourgeoisie.²²

Fortunately in Tanzania the economic bureaucracy does not yet have the upper hand, due to the continued pre-eminence of the socialist political leadership in the country. Nonetheless, Shivji warns, what is going on in Tanzania is a 'silent class struggle' with the workers and peasants on the one hand facing the economic and political bureaucracy whose interests are those of imperialism itself, on the other. The resolution of this contradiction must take place before socialism - in which the dominant class is the now-oppressed class - can be reached.

What Shivji has shown is that the tactic of nationalisation foreshadowed by the Arusha Declaration did not disengage Tanzania from imperialism. Nor did it eliminate the existence of a class antagonistic to the aims of socialism - in fact it strengthened its hand. Therefore, in the words of Othman; 'in a country like Tanzania, before any talk of socialism, complete decolonisation has to take place.²³ This means that in addition to disestablishing the organs of international capitalism within the country, the state itself must undergo a thorough transformation, since it too is very much a relic of the old order. It is obvious that elements of that order will persist after the new has been proclaimed, or, after the process of transition from neo-colony to socialism is initiated. However, in the case of Tanzania, since there was no revolution in which the case of Tanzania, since there was no revolution in which the base of the authority of the antagonistic classes was swept away from

underneath them, the old elements have not simply persisted in fragmentary isolation (as in China). They are still ascendant. To put this into the framework of our analysis, it seems that what has happened in Tanzania's development strategy is that the dissociative measures (nationalisation, reassessment of investment patterns, etc) were, correctly, directed at the elimination of imperialist influence, but they concentrated too heavily on the obvious agents of that influence. Hence nationalisation, for example, changed the legal status of the corporations appropriated, but left their rationale intact. Thus, they continued to function in precisely the same way as they had before - with minimal attention paid to worker control and effective 'socialisation'. The associative measures, the establishment of State corporations and enterprises and so forth in the place of neo-colonial institutions were also undertaken in a continuing neo-colonial framework, i.e., without due attention to the outgrowth of separate class interests from the bureaucracies themselves.

Othman believes that Tanzania is currently passing through the 'national democratic phase', and that this is a very necessary prerequisite for socialist construction:

National democracy is a state of transition from a semi-colonial, dependent situation, to a socialist order, and it addresses itself to the question of further development of the revolution, unity of all the national, patriotic, and revolutionary forces, and continually sees to it that the revolution develops toward the establishment of a socialist society. The task of this stage of development is to consummate the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution.²⁴

To make sure this logical conclusion is carried through, the socialist institutions in the country (TANU, NUTA, etc.,) must be

strengthened, revamped and reunited. The Ujamaa village movement as the economic base of the country must become the focal point of the work of these institutions - educating, providing service support, and assisting in the transformation of the technological base of the villages.

The Party itself made a decisive move in this direction with the publication of the Party Guidelines,²⁵ in which it was pointed that the country had inherited not simply the colonial governmental structure but also colonial working habits and leadership methods supported by an exploitative hierarchy. In a tone reminiscent of the Great Priletarian Cultural Revolution the guidelines castigate those leaders who are 'arrogant' extravagant, contemptuous and oppressive'.²⁶

'Presently', it goes on, 'there are some leaders who are less than vigilant champions of the rights and causes of the masses. "Similarly, the Party has the responsibility to fight the vindictiveness of some of its agents.... these actions....drive a wedge between the Party and the government on one side and the people on the other." "The time has come", the document announces, "to supervise the conduct and the bearing of the leaders".²⁷ But 'good leadership', the document points out, also means 'preparing the people' - the Party's role 'is to educate the people to transform their consciousness':

The truth is that we have not only inherited a colonial governmental structure but we have also adopted colonial working habits and leadership methods. For example, we have inherited in the government, industries, and other institutions the habit in which one man gives the orders and the rest simply obey them. If you do not involve people, the result

is to make them feel a national institution is not theirs, and consequently workers adopt the habits of hired employees. The Party has a duty to emphasize its leadership on this issue.²⁸

The document spells out a much more active and revolutionary role for the Party in checking the leadership and educating the people. To this extent it reveals a shift forward on the part of the Party - a radicalisation that reflects the growing revolutionary consciousness of the Party - or at least the more left-wing members of it.²⁹

Shivji describes the growing politicisation of the workers since the publication of the Mwongozo - "the workers", he says, "have begun to blow off the lid of ideological self false consciousness". This is reflected in their increasingly vigorous militancy and preparedness to 'down tools', and to take strike action, by-passing the 'workers councils' which had been set up, not in the interest of the workers themselves (although this was ostensibly the reason) but the interests of the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'. Still though, the workers are just emerging from what could be described as a 'trade union consciousness' - their 'revolutionary' action is still largely taken against work grievances. There have been some cases of worker take-overs which have sharpened the conflict between the two classes, and which Shivji recognises as a more advanced phase of the struggle. The next stage is the stage of open class war when the workers and poor peasants will fight 'not to replace one exploiter by another but to begin to replace the very system of exploitation'.³⁰

I have quite deliberately avoided drawing any conclusions about the Tanzanian political-economic strategy as it stands. It would seem that whilst the Arusha declaration and the post-Arusha

events in Tanzania are attempts to guide the society in the direction of 'socialism' the point is fast approaching where the promulgation and implementation of government 'policy' within the current political-economic framework will give way to a period of intense class struggle. This may be a phase in which the neo-colonial institutions that are still strong in Tanzania (the State, and even the Party and NUTA, but particularly the parastatals) become redundant and are replaced by institutions guided by the ideology not of the making of the bourgeoisie, but of the workers and poor peasants in alliance. As yet, the alliance, and hence, the phase, have not arrived.

Postscript to Part III

At the outset it should be cautioned that the following few pages are not intended as any sort of attempt to assess the political-economic strategies of the two countries concerned - either as strategies for 'socialism' or by any other criteria for assessment. Second it is not the present task to in any way assess the applicability of the Chinese political-economic strategy as a model for other underdeveloped countries. However, in relation to this point, there are some indications here and there of the suitability of the Chinese approach given certain objective conditions. Furthermore, since Tanzania has been a recipient of Chinese assistance on the strategically-important Tanzam railway, there must be some mention of the methods used in its construction. The point is to compare the development strategies in an endeavour to arrive at some generalisations about 'socialist' development strategies drawing on the two examples for illustration. I have already selected some criteria which seem to characterise 'socialist' development - but these have not been selected because they represent the framework of some 'ideal type' that socialist development strategies must conform to. Instead they are chosen because a random glance at any political-economic system that is not 'capitalist' (and, indeed, some which are will show up strong influences by such factors as the party, the state, etc.).

As indicated in the Introduction and in the Preamble to this section, one reason for these two countries being selected for comparison was their relative positions individually vis a vis imperialism. It was pointed out that this position will have a profound effect on the political-economic strategy of any country for reasons we have already gone into. Similarly, it was pointed out that the severance of dependency as a strategic move also imposed various conditions on the country taking the step - the most significant being that it must design a political-economic strategy that takes account of potential isolation - including its advantages and disadvantages. In the case of China, driving out the imperialists was one of the principal aims of the CCP, simultaneous with the liberation of the country. Apart from continued contact with the Soviet Union for a time, China, to all intents and purposes, remained largely isolated from the World for most of the period under discussion.

Tanzania, on the other hand, had no sustained liberation struggle that compared with that of China, and the aim of 'driving out the imperialists' was never as strong an element in the dissociative part of the strategy. Even in the Arusha Declaration Nyerere 'encouraged' investment by other countries in Tanzania - although he was more circumspect about 'aid'. Nevertheless, China's relationship with the Soviet Union is an important consideration when one looks at the two countries over the period. The 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' of the kind that Shivji talks about has no direct counterpart in China - since the country's contact with the 'international bourgeoisie' has been severed. At the same time though, China's links with the Soviet 'bureaucratic class' and her attempts to emulate the Soviet

development model in the first few years after liberation no doubt exacerbated the formation of the 'bureaucratic class' which came under attack in later years. The general conclusion that can be drawn from this is that sustained contact with an imperialist power encourages the formation of a 'class' whose base derives from that imperialist relationship. I realise that this conclusion is grossly oversimplified and does not discuss the specific circumstances nearly adequately, but I do believe it is, for the present at least, a valid generalisation.

Whatever the specific relationship between imperialism or social imperialism and the 'bureaucratic class', China's dealings with both (socialism and the bureaucrats) has been decisive and strategic. In fact the GPCR itself - the struggle between two lines - was launched to wrest increasing amounts of power from the hands of the 'capitalist roaders'. Tanzania's struggle, if Shivji's analysis is correct, is continuing: the publication of Mwongozo marks an important stage in the imminent struggle between the 'bureaucratic capitalist class' and the workers, the later strikes and takeovers are still further indications of the intensifying struggle. But whilst China experiences a Cultural Revolution involving all classes - peasants and workers included - Tanzania's working class has not yet allied itself with the peasantry to any significant degree - that is, in Sweezy's terms there is no 'sizeable element' yet that will play the role of the proletariat assigned the proletariat in classical Marxist theory in the Tanzanian revolution. It would seem from this that if the indications that the class struggle continues and, in fact progresses, in 'transitional' societies (and there is every

indication that it does) are correct then China and Tanzania are at different stages (of what may or may not be a single continuum). The former is experiencing a 'post-severence' struggle, whilst the latter is experiencing a struggle against a class whose base is international - the product, that is, of imperialism.

It is necessary to say something at this point about class struggle as revolutionary practice in China and Tanzania. In China's case class struggle is an integral part of 'continuing cultural revolution' as a development strategy. The constant emphasis on 'Struggle-criticism-transformation' is not a tactic designed simply to make cadres morally pure - it is designed to militate against the gradual entrenchment of a class whose outlook and values are antithetical to the essence of Maoism - the stress on self-reliance, production for needs instead of for accumulation, and so forth. In Tanzania, class struggle plays no such central role in the strategy - and this is largely due to two factors: the first is the stage of the transition that Tanzania appears to be at. The second is the ideology. We will leave the former since I think it is readily recognisable that many of the differences in the two countries can be accounted for in terms of the time that either society has had to develop transitional strategies.

In relation to ideology: Mao Tse-tung thought is a sophisticated political ideology that stresses class struggle as the engine of the Maoist political-economic development strategy. But the ideology in tanzania does not accord such a role to class struggle - the closest it has come has been to berate the leadership. In the early stages the ideology was even more fundamental, outlining

broad policies and spelling out commitments with scarcely any mention of class - although Nyerere was doubtless aware of the issues as his adoption of Dumont's thesis shows. There is no corresponding movement in Tanzania, for instance, to the Socialist Education Movement or to the GPCR, both of which advocated open class struggle to overcome contradictions and to transform the outlook of the bureaucrats and those with a 'bourgeoise outlook'.

Some of these differences can also be explained with reference to the party in each case. In Tanzania, the Party itself is in some ways a direct carryover from colonialism. It was mentioned earlier that TANU, having led the independence struggle for Tanzania, for a time looked as though it had nowhere further to go. Then, through several strategic moves initiated by the leadership it launched in a direction that culminated in the Arusha Declaration. Through these successive stages the composition of the Party altered: initially TANU had largely comprised Africans who were involved with the centre in one way or another, most were officials and members of the 'professional class'. After independence, and certainly after Arusha the class base of the Party widened and it began to look more like a mass party. However, both the Party and the ideology continued to reflect the interests of the ascendent class which was not necessarily that of the peasants and workers. This is not to say the peasants and workers, on one side, are in conflict with the Party on the other, but it is to say that TANU is not a 'proletarian' mass party of the kind, say the CCP has been for many years. What of the CCP? It is true that the leadership for many years, those men and women who are now passing on, was drawn from

the urban intellectual class. But both the ideology and the mode of organisation have been, since the 1930's, 'proletarian', though again in the 'substitute' sense. They have been "revolutionary" in that the masses have stood resolutely behind the party drawn together by years of struggle, and that the ideology has been fashioned according to the Maoist formula 'from the masses to the masses'.

But can TANU become a revolutionary party? Mwongozo is one indication, at least, that it may but the class struggle involving the workers and the bureaucrats confronting one another could also polarise the ranks of the party. Inasmuch as the CCP acquired its mass base in a period of protracted struggle against the imperialists and the Kuomintang, the objective conditions in Tanzania at the present time at least, count out the likelihood of TANU becoming a revolutionary mass party in the same way. On the other hand, if the class struggle does sharpen and if the phase of sharpening brings with it an alliance of workers and peasants (i.e., of all the oppressed elements), and finally, if the wing of the Party that is responsible for Mwongozo continues to exercise the kind of influence that produced the Guidelines, then there is no reason why TANU cannot turn into a revolutionary force that would accord it a similar role to that of the CCP.

The State

The experiences in the cases of both China and Tanzania confirm that in the early stages of transition (and of 'dissociation') the centralised state apparatus plays a dominant role in the political-economic strategy. The immense importance of central planning and particularly of administering five-year development plans are an

illustration of this. But it could be also tentatively speculated that this may even sharpen the contradictions between the leadership and the masses, and between the 'centre' and the countryside (manifest in the rural-urban contradiction intensifying). Evidence for this in the case of Tanzania is not as readily available as it is for China where in the first two plans where industry was nominated the leading sector successive contradictions arose which led to apparent antagonism between countryside and centre.

In addition, the tentative generalisation could be also made that after a period of 'centre' - inspired initiative the state transforms itself in such a way as to shift the focal point of decision-making, organisation, and even some planning, to the local level. This has clearly happened in China since 1966 and Nyerere expects it will happen as the Ujamaa collectives develop and the village assembly becomes stronger vis a vis the regional authorities. Thus, the whole concept of 'the state' alters somewhat as more activity is initiated and planned at the local level. What then, is the role of the centre? It is too early to say unequivocally in either case, but it seems the 'national' institutions (the Peoples Congress and the Party Congress and Central Committee in China, the Parliament and the Party Headquarters in Tanzania) will, more and more, play a supervisory role, coordinating national development through such means as internally reallocating national resources so that the distribution of wealth is more even.

An important difference between the Chinese and Tanzanian state apparatuses is the role of the parastatals. China has parastatals (the National Export company, the Peoples' Bank, etc.)

and some of the ministries coordinate planning and policy in much the same way as do parastatals; but they do not seem to have the same influence or prominence as do the parastatals in Tanzania. This is brought about, to a large extent, by the difference in scale of the Chinese economy compared with the Tanzanian economy. In the former large strides have been made, and can be made toward total national self-sufficiency. In Tanzania, this is not and, to all intents and purposes, cannot be the case. Hence, the parastatals, dealing as they do with aspects of Tanzanian political economy which are crucial to the country's survival, play a far more significant role. Unless 'self-sufficiency' of Tanzania can be brought closer to reality (perhaps by some series of collective agreements with other African countries - of the kind that the Tanzam railway can be regarded as a prototype) the parastatals will continue to play the role they do - though not necessarily the way they do. The point about the parastatals in Tanzania is that they provide environments in which the bureaucratic bourgeoisie can exercise influence. Thus, in their present form, they can be regarded as institutions which intensify the complexity of the process of transition to socialism.

The important point about the state for our purposes, however, is its role in the transformation mentioned earlier; in which the political-economic strategy is discussed, authorised, explained and acted upon more and more at a local level. Impetus for this comes directly from the state. Increased power to commune revolutionary committees, factory committees and production brigades, neighbourhood committees, village assemblies and so forth means that localisation of the educational strategy is also made more feasible; though we

shall talk in comparative terms later showing how this is working in either case.

Self Reliance

Finally, something ought to be said about self-reliance in each case. Taking the obvious contrast of economic scale as given, the goals of self-reliance in China and Tanzania are fairly similar: both countries have chosen to develop self-reliance in response to an appreciation of the deleterious effects of dependency, and both have felt the effects (although in different ways) of the sheer need to cultivate self-reliance in the face of non-availability of cash and of certain goods and services. Both countries are relying on their educational strategies to enhance the possibilities of self-reliance also.

Again putting aside the question of relative scale, the important differences in the approaches of each country to self-reliance relate to technology and 'aid'. To dispense with the latter first: Tanzania is the recipient of extensive amounts of aid - including aid from the Chinese (for example the \$300m interest-free loan for the Tanzam railway). But most of this aid comes from Europe, a sizeable sum from the Eastern European socialist countries including the Soviet Union. As far as I know there have been no large-scale studies to date to examine the effects of this aid on the goal of self-reliance. Nevertheless, if the experience of China is any indication there will be some spillover effects which amount to a kind of dependency - and 'technological dependency' is bound to be a characteristic of it. Since severing economic ties with

the USSR in 1961, the Chinese have not received 'aid', and hence their goal of self-reliance has been, to some extent unfettered.

A short note should be inserted on the effects of Chinese aid to Tanzania and the likelihood of its creating dependency. Whilst it cannot be said with certainty that the aid will not cause some sort of dependency relationship to develop (for example, are the locomotive parts to be manufactured in Tanzania or Zambia) it is less likely to develop than in an aid agreement of the kind that we have been talking about throughout. The reason for this is, I believe, the mode of labour and capital organisation that the Chinese are exporting - their methods are labour intensive, and they do not have an entrenched hierarchy of supervisors and workers - the whole approach is one in which 'experts' are workers the same as the rest. And, the spirit of Chinese technological design is imbued with the same attitude to self-reliance that the Tanzanian leadership wishes to stress in Tanzania.

In relation to technological self-reliance, the Chinese seem to have achieved more in this direction than perhaps anyone else. Especially at the local level where parochial problems are worked out as far as possible utilising the local resources creatively. This has also been the case in Tanzania - as the 'self-help' schemes indicate. However, China has made great strides in self-reliance in industry where a multitude of innovations and inventions of all kinds have been produced. If a country can achieve technological self-reliance in research as well as in production, then its chances of working out a political-economic strategy according to its own self-determined specifications (based on, in the case of China, the needs of the people) are enhanced considerably.

The purpose of this section has been to outline the political-economic strategies that China and Tanzania are following and compare them in order to provide a context in which the educational strategies can be outlined and compared. The ultimate purpose is to discover something of the nature of the interaction of the political-economic and educational strategies so that something can be said about education for 'socialism' in more general terms, in much the same way as I have attempted in the last few pages to draw some generalisations about 'socialist' development strategies.

Footnotes to Chapter VI

¹ Julius K. Nyerere, "The Tanzanian Economy," in Ujamaa - Essays on Socialism, ed. J.K. Nyerere, (Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1968).

² Aart Van Der Laar, "Arusha, Before and After," East Africa Journal 5:11, (November, 1968): 16.

³ Nyerere, "The Tanzanian Economy," p. 118.

⁴ Nyerere, Essays on Socialism p. 27.

⁵ Ibid., p. 96.

⁶ Ibid., p. 151.

⁷ Ibid., p. 98

⁸ Ibid., p. 139-140.

⁹ Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, 6:2 (1968): 166-167.

¹⁰ John Hatch, Tanzania: A Profile, (New York, Praegar, 1972), p. 135.

¹¹ Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism: A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1965-1967, (Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 67.

¹² Idem, Essays on Socialism, pp. 146-150.

¹³ Idem, Freedom and Socialism, p. 235.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 240-241.

¹⁵Van de Laar, "Arusha, Before and After," p. 28.

¹⁶Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 264.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 244-245.

¹⁹Goran Hyden, "Analysis of Tanzania's Second Development Plan," East Africa Journal, (October, 1969), p. 16.

²⁰Ibid., p. 17.

²¹Issa G. Shivji, "Tanzania, the Silent Class Struggle," in Socialism in Tanzania, 2 vols., ed., John Saul and Lionel Cliffe (Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1972), vol. 2.

²²Ibid., p. 319.

²³Haroub Othman, "The Tanzanian State: Who Controls its, Whose Interests Does it Serve?," Monthly Review, 26:7 (December, 1974), p. 52.

²⁴Ibid., p. 53.

²⁵Tanzania: Party Guidelines (Mwongozo wa Tanu), (Richmond, Canada, LSM Information Centre, 1973).

²⁶Ibid., p. 5.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 5-6.

²⁸Ibid., p. 5.

²⁹Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, p. 125.

³⁰Ibid., p. 145.

PART IV

EDUCATION AND THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM

Preamble

Chapter VII: The Chinese Educational Strategy

Chapter VIII: The Strategy of Education for
Self-Reliance

Postscript: Comparisons and Conclusions

PART IV

EDUCATION AND THE TRANSITION OF SOCIALISM

Preamble

In this final section we describe the education strategies that China and Tanzania have been pursuing in the transition to 'socialism', and we go on in the Postscript to make some comparative statements and to attempt to draw some conclusions about the role of education in strategies of transition to socialist society. Chapters VII and VIII follow on directly from the earlier chapters which describe the background to the educational strategies. But they also follow on from the previous Part (Part III) in that they describe education as an integral part of the 'transitional' strategies generally. Whilst the Postscript is meant to serve as a conclusion, the reader will also be able to draw conclusions and trace connections in his or her reading of the two parts.

In the following two chapters the methods of presenting the descriptive material is peculiar to each case study. In the China chapter the Post-1949 strategy is traced chronologically, at least until 1966 where the chronological description gives way to a general description of changes in education that took place during and after the GPCR. As is explained in the text, the chronological description

is used in order to emphasize that the contemporary education strategy can only be understood with reference to the immediate historical context within which it operates. In the case of Tanzania, the period of transition has been far shorter, so a chronological description would be less informative. Thus I have described the contents of the Arusha Declaration documents on education and attempted to elucidate their meaning in terms of a 'transitional' education strategy. Then I have gone on to describe some of the applications of 'Education for Self-Reliance' in Tanzania to illustrate further what it means as a learning strategy. To make this analysis of ESR clearer I have relied on some of the concepts used by Hans Bosse in his excellent article: "Socio-Cultural Factors of Underdevelopment. Overcoming Underdevelopment as a Learning Process."¹ I believe that though the approaches in the respective chapters differ, they are not incompatible as the criteria for comparability I am using do not favour one approach over the other - that is, they do not make the Chinese strategy described chronologically, appear more or less comprehensible than ESR described the way it is.

Just as there is no comprehensive body of theory on political-economic strategies for transition to socialism, there is certainly no thoroughgoing description of appropriate educational strategies. As Anna Louise Strong said in her speech at the Red Guard Headquarters in 1966 "nobody yet knows what socialist education is"² - meaning, since 'socialist' society does not yet exist, 'socialist' education is, as yet, unknown. Thus, the following should not be probed with such questions as: "But is this 'socialist'?" Education

in both societies is directed toward bringing socialism about - both Nyerere and Mao Tse-tung are adamant that their countries are not yet 'socialist'.

However, it is dogmatic, to pretend that the experiences of the Soviet Union and other 'socialist' countries are totally irrelevant to a discussion of this kind. To be certain the USSR has doubtless encountered problems at all sorts of points which are similar to those encountered by Tanzania, for instance. The solution to these various problems will, though, rest less on a body of dogma than on the interpretation of the objective conditions which confront the people. It is here that the differences occur between the two countries under study, as the Postscript points out. What is common to educational strategies in 'transitional' societies is, inter alia, widespread use of some variation on polytechnical education that emphasized practicability. Historically this emphasis grows out of Marx's statements in the Manifesto, the Critique of the Gotha Program, and other places to the effect that 'socialist' education is somehow combined with productive labour. The Soviet Union's response to this, and to the concrete conditions of the Soviet economy, was to develop a system of polytechnical education inspired by the research and organization of Lenin's wife Krupskaya. But the Soviet Union's educational strategy continues to function alongside Soviet industry in much the same way as does the educational apparatus in most capitalist societies. This was not always anticipated - in the early days of the revolution, a Soviet education official called Shul'gin even talked about the 'withering away of the school' in the transition to socialism. Unfortunately, while the Soviet economy developed

spectacularly as did the spread of educational opportunity, neither the state, nor the school have withered away, and the Soviet Union's education contains little that is exclusively 'socialist'.

But this does not mean that educational strategies should be simply 'different' to determine whether they are 'socialist' or not. Even Chinese education, which has experienced far greater innovation than that of the Soviet Union, still has much in common with education as it is practised in the capitalist world. The important differences lie in the manner in which education interacts with economic and political activities, and in the assumptions about human equality that each embodies.

What should be looked for then in the following two chapters, is the way in which the educational strategies operate within the parameters determined by the political-economic strategy, and the way the educational strategies themselves influence those parameters. In both cases, education is used as a means of familiarising people with the ideology, thus giving them a rationale for their political and economic existence. Education also plays a direct role in the political-economic strategies by involving students in the process of production, and therefore, making them active participants in the transition to socialism.

CHAPTER VII

THE CHINESE EDUCATIONAL STRATEGY

The educational strategy pursued by China in the Post-1949 period, at least in the first ten or so years, was influenced by two characteristics. First, in accordance with the political-economic strategy that nominated industry as the 'leading sector' special attention was given the training of scientific and technical personnel. In this, particular attention was paid to the educational experiences of the Soviet Union. The second influence on education was, of course, the educational strategy articulated by Mao Tse-tung and the leaders of the CCP in the earlier years in Kiangsi and the Shen-Kan-Ning Border areas. In 1940, in the treatise On New Democracy Mao had written that education on the New China would be national, scientific, and popular - that is, it would be anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, and anti-elitist. These broad principles had guided the development of education on the Border Areas and the success of it was that it had produced tens of thousands of cadres for revolutionary work, 'raising the political consciousness of millions of people.... accumulated rich experiences in its own field, and stood in shining contrast to the old decadent education in the Kumintang areas.'³

As the educational superstructure of China took shape in the ensuing years, conflict arose as the two influences became more and more mutually contradictory. Yet, in the early years, at least, they were regarded as thoroughly compatible; thus Liv Shih wrote:

...with the educational path mapped out by Mao Tse-tung, with more than twenty years experience in education in the revolutionary bases, and with the Soviet Union's advanced educational experiences, we are going forward with great strides.⁴

In any case, the early years saw the development of a reformed education system that made sweeping changes in aims and organisation. Education was opened up to China's peasants and workers for the first time in China's history. Changes that took place included the coordination and channelling of all kinds of education so that they would all lead eventually to a college education; the ideological remolding of teachers so that they understood the new goals of education and the educational practices of the Soviet Union; changes in higher education which was formerly 'divorced from practice'; and finally, the living conditions of teachers and students were improved and their political status raised.⁵ These early reforms show a concern with the political nature of education. As the description of the unfolding educational strategy proceeds it will be seen that the CCP, and especially Mao himself, attached great importance to education as an instrument of politicisation and conversely, of course, if education were left or placed in the hands of educational bureaucrats and experts alone it could be a powerful weapon against the aims and ideals of the Communist leadership.

In terms of content, the Common program laid down the general guidelines on ideology and raising the 'general cultural level of

the people. There were two basic tasks before educationists: to give basic education to the masses of Chinese people to whom it had never been available; and the need to provide education that conformed to the political outlook that would contribute to the successful implementation of the political-economic strategy itself. These two demands were, initially, perceived to be different - it was not until later that they became two parts of the same thing.

The appearance on a fairly wide scale in the early 1950's of spare-time education was one of the few departures from what was otherwise a conventional program of educational reform in the early years. During the cheng-feng movement, which stressed political education for workers and peasants, and during the numerous literacy campaigns of the pre-1949 period, reading and discussion among the peasants and working people had been encouraged by the CCP. Later, in 1950, the Directives on Developing Spare-time Education for Workers and Staff Members addressed themselves to the need to give workers (spare-time education was concentrated in factories and mines) a rudimentary political education which was to be the basis of spare-time education to follow. But, in addition to political education, literacy, technical subjects and general 'cultural' subjects were also to be taught. Political education was designed, as in the cheng-feng period, to acquaint workers with their position in the class struggle, and to provide them with a fundamental understanding of Marxism which would enable them to participate in decision-making and discussion of issues of political as well as economic (related to their work) importance. Cultural and technical education apart from literacy was concerned to generally upgrade the workers'

knowledge and technical expertise. The technical education offered was, at least in the initial stages, of the 'popular' type, consisting of master-apprentice contracts, or mutual study with a master, as well as lectures and forums with engineers, specialists or Soviet experts.⁶

Mass literacy was one of the most pressing challenges to the government in 1949 - estimates of the illiteracy rate varied but it was thought to be somewhere in the vicinity of 85-90% - a remarkably high figure. Under the 1950 Directives literacy was to be closely linked with political education (the approach favoured by Mao in earlier times).⁷ Basic political education preceded literacy training 'to explain why literacy was important'. The content of textbooks used in literacy classes, it was stressed, must be of immediate interest to the learners - this way matters of political interest were incorporated.⁸ In the countryside literacy was related to the work and immediate day-by-day concerns of the workers - this is an early exemplar of the literacy method later developed by the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire.

Spare-time education was controlled by the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) cadres in factories and mines through local spare-time education committees. The union cadres themselves always organised political education whilst general education was undertaken by teachers assigned to the plants' spare-time schools by the local education departments.⁹ The principle of 'those who are capable....' applied, especially in literacy education, but also in technical instruction where all technical personnel were urged to 'take up the glorious task of training technical workers for the country and volunteer to be teachers.'¹⁰

People were exhorted to teach their comrades for the honour of the country, but generally spare-time education was financed from the cultural and educational fund which the plant or enterprise contributed to the union, supplemented by grants from local education departments.¹¹

Time spent in spare-time education varied with the workplace in which it took place, and with the political and economic climate of the time. According to the Directives, primary (general) education and technical classes should take place 'at least twice per week' while higher level (general) classes and political education classes were to meet more frequently and for at least ninety minutes.¹² Politically advanced workers were encouraged to devote more time to ideological study, 'searching into the more complex tenets of Marxist-Leninist theory'.¹³

During the GLF political study was intensified and time devoted to reading and discussion extended. This was in keeping with the Maoist idea that politics must come first. In the same period, it has been reported, general education was reduced proportionately.¹⁴

Given the original goals of spare-time education set by the directives, this type of schooling contributed significantly over the years up to and beyond the GPCR to raising the level of general and technical knowledge of Chinese workers. But its greatest contribution was, in the early years at least, to the supply of trained personnel for new enterprises and expansions, the manpower supply for which could not have been met by the conventional school system.¹⁵ Vital too is the fact that these skilled workers, because of the manner and content of their education, were both 'red' (i.e., they

had the correct ideology) and 'expert' (they possessed necessary skills) - qualities which graduates from other streams of education did not always possess.¹⁶

Part-Work Part-Study (PWPS) Schools

The first radical departure in school organisation and approach from what has already been described as a fairly conventional program of educational reform, was the introduction of Part-Work Part-Study schools. The political-economic context which gave rise to these schools was the Great Leap Forward which, as has already been mentioned, was the turning point in China's post-1949 development strategy where localisation and self-reliance became the lynchpin of the policy of 'walking on two legs'. Among the contradictions at which the GLF was aimed was that between mental and manual labour. Mao's educational ideal, as demonstrated in the Yen'an period was the overcoming of this contradiction through the realisation of some form of polytechnical education.¹⁷

In 1958, the year of the GLF, LuTing-yi published a document outlining the basis of the strategy of education combined with labour, at the same time declaring that the chief mistake in our educational work has been the divorce of education from productive labour'.¹⁸

The aim of communist education is 'to produce the allround human being, and the only method of doing this is 'to educate them to serve working class politics and combine education with productive labour'.¹⁹

As for educational forms, factories and farms were to establish their own schools, and schools were to set up their own factories and

farms.* Lu declared that the principles of running the schools by applying the mass line were to be: a) in either of part-work, part-study schools or spare-time education the education may be fee paid-for, or free, but as production grows further and working hours can be shortened, the present spare time schools will become similar to PWPS Schools. When production develops and accumulation rises, fee paying schools will become free; b) to combine the spreading of education widely with raising of educational levels, schooling will become popularised - this means the curriculum and methods will suit the greater number of people to whom schooling becomes available. The principle of 'those who are capable can teach' will apply; c) Local authorities can take more responsibility for planning, with aid where necessary, from the central government. d) Educational administration and pedagogy should be opened up with wide popular participation in and criticism of decision making in education.²⁰

Underlying educational undertaking in China at the time of the GLF was a challenge to the idea that the educated should lead the masses - this is the central point of the 'red' versus 'expert' debate that emerged strongly at this time. The 'cultural revolution' that accompanied the GLF was designed to correct the ideology of bourgeois elements and to strengthen socialist and communist consciousness. That is, the educational revolution was to be carried out 'on the basis of the ideological revolution'.²¹ In that way the

*It is necessary to clarify the distinction between spare-time education and Part-Work Part-Study schools: the latter are actual schools in which the students are (generally) of 'school age', where there is a particular site for schooling etc.; the former is education that goes on (usually) in the work place.

educational strategy was to be intimately connected to the political-economic strategy which was, as we have seen, based on the conscious participation of workers and peasants in the huge production undertakings in the communes. This interconnection represents a reaffirmation of the Yen-an principle of 'transformation', in which everyone, through practice (participation in productive activity) and theory (learning) could transcend their class limitations and become active and conscious participants in revolution.

The practice of 'part-work, part-study' in schooling became incorporated into the educational apparatus with the appearance of 'Agricultural Middle Schools' in 1958. Education of country youth, especially at post-primary levels had become more of a problem as the number of graduates of the expanding primary system grew. These graduates were not deemed mature enough to handle full-time work, and moreover the demand for further education was high. From the point of view of the economy of the countryside, trained agricultural workers who could operate and maintain machinery, and whose approach to agriculture was 'scientific' were needed.²² The schools that were established were at the junior-middle level, incorporating levels seven, eight, and nine. There were some later attempts to extend them to the senior middle school (ten through twelve levels).²³

The schools were locally administered, and by the end of 1958 there was an average of one for each of China's approximately 26,000 communes. The cost of running the schools was expected to be met by the schools themselves which were expected to become self-sufficient after initial assistance from the commune in the form of machinery, land, and other agricultural inputs. Initially they were housed in temporary or disused buildings such as temples and pagodas or barns.

The production activities which the schools engaged in were either agricultural or industrial enterprises: the former including livestock raising, orchards and tree nurseries in addition to farms; the latter involving a variety of handicraft workshops or packaging or assembly plants.²⁴ The production activities were incorporated into the overall plan of the commune - this emphasised the fact that they were expected to be actually producing and were not merely organised for novelty.

In the early years the time spent by the pupils, whose ages ranged from thirteen to sixteen, was evenly divided between labour and classroom activities. Most schools used the split day, though some used alternate days for study and work.²⁵

Later, however, the organisation of school, and work time was altered in the Agricultural Middle Schools so that a modified form of PWPS became the pattern. Under the new system which came into operation after 1960, schools operated on a split-year basis with classes in the slack periods and labour in the busy season. The money students earned in regular peasant labour during the work period contributed to fee payment in the five or six months of schooling. During the work period teachers travelled through assigned areas and conducted classes with students who were expected to continue self-study and to participate in small group study sessions in their spare time.²⁶ The modified system did mean, though, that the integration of learning with labour (theory with practice) was disrupted to the extent that what was done in one part of a day or week could not immediately be made applicable to another within the respective environments (workplace and classroom).

To compensate for this attempts were made to give the school curriculum even more practical orientation.²⁷

A second PWPS institution to appear at around the same time as the agricultural middle school is the Labor University. These universities (Communist Labor University and Industrial University - both located in Kiangsi where the AMS's had begun and flourished) were closely supervised by the communist Party, and administrators and teachers at the various sites of the multi-campus institutions were frequently drawn from local party organs. The universities provided two to four year programs which had heavy technological orientations.

Admission requirements included labouring experience, but completion of secondary schooling was not stipulated. In fact there were no hard and fast academic requirements at all - in this way the universities' doors were open to workers, peasants and demobilised servicemen. The labouring activities of students and teachers were carried out in the factories and mines to which the campusus were attached. Often labour took the form of constructing buildings needed for the university itself. These universities were not universities in the traditional sense, but their establishment marked the beginnings of the realisation of a long-term aim of the leadership - to break down the isolation of the university and educational institutions generally, from the community at large.²⁸

As the Socialist Education Movement, described in an earlier chapter, got underway, Part-Work, Part-Study as an underlying principle in Chinese education extended to other educational forms. The intention of socialist education, according to Chou En-lai, was

to have 'intellectuals who are at the same time manual workers, and manual workers who are also intellectuals'.²⁹ The extension of PWPS followed a conference on PWPS Education for Urban areas, held in Peking in 1964, and a directive issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party the same year which recommended that 'part-work, part-study education should be gradually introduced throughout the education system'. The following year witnessed the emergence of schools of various types: work-study secondary specialised schools, work-study classes of higher learning, work-study schools and classes equivalent to junior-middle schooling, schools which catered to the needs of both town and country and where students did both factory and farm work, and schools which were oriented towards the countryside and recruited their students from the cities on the understanding that upon graduation they would go to work in the countryside. Varied in organisational forms, some of these schools were run by factories or enterprises either individually or jointly; some had regular links with factories; some were factory-school-in-ones; some had their own small factories or farms, and some arranged for students to do whatever work was available.³⁰

All this illustrates one important point - that the educational strategy that was emerging in China prior to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was clearly based on PWPS as a guiding framework for education generally. It was a framework whose theoretical genesis could be traced to Marx's own statements to the effect that education should be combined with productive labour.³¹ The models of application for it were both the Soviet Union's educational experience with various forms of polytechnical education, and education in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Areas in the pre-1949 period.

In demonstrating the above point we have, so far, focussed on particular educational reforms in China's first ten or fifteen years, which took place outside the regular school system. Even the Agricultural Middle Schools were established where previously there were no schools. But what of regular systemic education? And what of the effects of education combined with productive labour on regular schooling?

The Regular School System

Over the corresponding period numerous reforms in full-day (regular) schools took place - the impetus for these reforms came from the Part-Work, Part-Study Directives in 1958. It is, however, difficult to say how widespread the reforms were, or how widespread was the adoption of PWPS in the regular schools. Certainly, as the documents indicate, the intention was for education to be combined with productive labour at all levels of education. In his summary of educational achievements for 1958 Education Minister Yang Hsiu-feng left no doubt that full-day schools should provide for participation in productive labour.

As for schools adopting the full-day system, education should be their primary assignment, and the time required for engaging in productive labour by their students properly arranged in conformity with the ages other specific features of students.³²

But what is more interesting about this statement is that it points to what was probably was a widely held misunderstanding about the purpose of combining education and productive labour. Based on the theory Mao Tse-tung developed in Yen-an - in which the source of knowledge itself was practice (including labour), the principal of PWPS should mean that learning and labour are combined in the schools'

daily routine. Yang makes a distinction between 'education' - 'the schools', 'primary assignment', and labour - thus separating the two. This confusion was one of the sources of conflict between two fairly divergent educational outlooks that came to head in the mid-1960's.

The conflicting viewpoints about the place of labour in education, together with the opinion held by some leaders (and doubtless by cadres and educationists at many levels) that China needed to develop schools whose particular attention was on training of top-level personnel, provided ground on which major struggles were to develop relating to the whole question of the role of education in socialist society. In reference to the latter viewpoint, the opinion was expressed by Chou En-lai himself in 1958: in a general discussion on the importance of combining education with productive labour he said: "We must devote more energy to perfecting a number of 'key' schools, so as to train specialised personnel of high quality for the state and bring about a rapid rise in our country's scientific and cultural level".³³ Similarly Yang in the speech quoted above declared: "We must raise the work quality of a selected group of these (full-day) schools to a particularly high level so as to enable them to become the backbone of our educational undertakings".³⁴ Whilst it is unarguable that for some specific tasks China needed people with particular skills in various parts of industry and the economy generally, needs that probably still have not been fully met, the idea of singling out special students and special schools for particular treatment is completely antithetical to the Maoist mass line in education - not because the mass line is populist but because it assesses the equal contribution of each human being according to

his means, and opposes the cultivation of 'specialists' and 'experts' who tend to become a class unto themselves and divorced from the masses.

The presence and force of these contradictions among Chinese educators and political leaders has led to the speculation that what was evolving in China during the period 1949-66 was a 'double tracked' education system. Whilst little actual research has been done to draw any firm conclusions there is substantial evidence, some of which I have already referred to, to support the opinion that there were the beginnings, at least, of 'a new kind of mass education at a lower level.... not intended to lead necessarily into the formal ladder towards the universities.... (The Liu Shao-chi group was).... in favour of a kind of second grade education along these lines, and they were concerned with pushing half-work schools ...the Maoists, on the otherhand, claim that they were in favour of these part work schools as part of a more general system, allowing the students from them to join the main stream.*³⁵

As for the selected schools, the opponents of Mao Tse-tung's educational line who were later accused of following a two-line system, were attempting to set up a series of 'little treasure pagodas' (hsiao pao-t'a) which would receive special assistance with staffing and financing from the state. They were to offer access to **especially** talented children to shape them for good careers. As is usually the case with selective educational under-

*As we shall see below, it became less a matter of 'letting the students join the main stream' than making PWPS the guiding framework of the mainstream of educational activity - that is, pressing for the universalisation of the PWPS principle.³⁶

takings in which special privileges are conferred on students, the population from which these schools (in so far as they already, effectively, existed) drew pupils contained a disproportionate number of urban, high-level cadres.³⁷

It seems that many aspects of the functioning of regular schools were sources of dissatisfaction to the Maoists in the pre-GPCR period. Schools had become 'dominated by bourgeois teachers and ideology' and there was concern that they were nurturing a generation of people to whom the victory of the revolution meant something different, even something less, than it meant for their parents. Nevertheless, as the GPCR developed it soon became obvious that many of the young people did, in fact, understand the Maoist 'mass line' in political-economic and educational strategies, and they did regard the need to revolutionise China's education as completely congruous with 'Cultural Revolution' as a development strategy.

In 1964 Mao himself is reported to have made some critical remarks about education. These remarks are worth examining, not simply because they come from Mao, but because they indicate some of the more obvious shortcomings that appeared to have become characteristic of Chinese education. They do, also, show Mao's profound disquiet with the manner in which China's young was being educated. These remarks vividly illustrate the seriousness with which Mao regarded the need for educational change; whilst, at the same time, they show that he had neither lost his innovative spirit in his approach, to educational problems, nor his elemental mistrust of bookishness and cloistered learning. His general complaints were that 'though the line and orientation in education were correct, the

methods are wrong and must be changed'; 'there is too much studying going on, and this is exceedingly harmful'; there were 'too many subjects' and the burden was 'too heavy'. 'Education', Mao said, 'ruins talent and ruins youth, altogether there were 'too many classes and too many books'.³⁸

We shouldn't read too many books. We should read Marxist books, but not too many of them either. It ought to be enough to read a dozen or so. If we read too many we can move towards our opposites, becomes bookworms, dogmatists, revisionists.³⁹

Mao's skepticism about people who 'read too many books' is not simple philistinism, it is very closely related to his awareness of the tendency, which was especially strong in China's Confucian tradition, for educated people to assume airs and demand privileges over their uneducated compatriots - as the phrase 'we can move toward our opposites' clearly demonstrates.

To overcome these serious ills in the practice of education, Mao recommended first that 'the period of schooling should be shortened somewhat'. The history of Chinese education in the post-1949 period is marked by numerous periodic experiments with time and duration of schooling: the PWPS schools, for instance, varied from two to three years duration at various times. Among the earliest systemic reforms are reduction in duration at the elementary level where in 1951 the period was shortened from six to five years. In 1953 the government reverts to the old system of six years with four and junior and two ar senior elementary level.⁴¹ There are, of course, sound economic reasons for reducing the number of years of schooling - it takes pressure off the system as fewer amentities and teachers are required. Yet, in a system where a child commences

Schooling at ages five or six, there is the problem of what to do with him or her at age ten or eleven or twelve when the period of formal education is over and there is very limited access to secondary education of any kind.

The content of schooling also came under attack from Mao in his talk at the Spring Festival. He proposed that 'the syllabus should be chopped in half' so that the children 'have time for recreation, swimming, playing ball, and reading freely outside their course work'.⁴² This proposal reflects not just Mao's disenchantment with bookish education, but his long held concern at the all round development of children through physical education and recreational activities. In an educational environment where 'scholastic' values and behaviour are held in high esteem (which was, doubtless, the case in many parts of Chinese society at this time, as it was in the past) these proposals are, if not radical, a challenge to some deep-seated notions of what education was all about. Mao was also concerned that people should be flexible in their outlook, and not simply confine their learning to what is learned in school. This same concern was expressed by Julius Nyerere in 1967, as we shall see in the following chapter.

'Our present method of conducting examinations', complained Mao, was 'a method for dealing with the enemy, not a method for dealing with people'. To counteract this, 'the questions should be published in advance', and students should be 'allowed to study and answer them with the aid of books'; 'students should be allowed to whisper in one another's ears, and change places if they want to'.⁴³ This call for a 'livelier' approach to evaluation and assessment was

not simply a refreshing afterthought to the remarks condemning examinations, but a statement of actue insight into the problem points of systemic education. It is interesting to recall that students and teachers in other parts of the globe were calling for the same restructured approach to assessment techniques not too many years after Mao's Spring Festival comments - and many of these calls came from within education systems that were far more comprehensive and encompassing than that of China at that time.

Finally, Mao reiterated a theme that had been a hallmark of his educational thinking for most of his life - the conviction that learning is acquired through work, through practice in the real world. Students and teachers should 'go down' - that is go and work with the peasants in the countryside and become hardened to rural life, and at the same time learn from the people - education must be linked to the class struggle and to production. The class struggle Mao said to his nephew Mao Yuan-hsin in 1964, 'is your most important subject, and it is a compulsory subject'.⁴⁴

These remarks from the outline of a general critique of educational practice in China on the eve of the GPCR. Despite Mao's stated opinion that 'the line and orientation' of education were 'correct', it is evident from his later remarks that they were not - as Mao would have realised only too clearly that to talk of changing the duration, content, and 'place' of schooling (be sending students down to the country) whilst expecting to retain the 'line' and 'orientation' is contradictory - one can only expect he was making a political statement in admitting the correctness of the latter. Many of the inadequacies Mao pointed to were later taken up by

student Red Guard groups in schools, colleges, and universities as the GPCR swept through the education system. Similarly, many of the recommendations for reform became the basis for altering the structure, form and content of education in the Post-GPCR period. The Cultural Revolution was in every sense an educational revolution - and was at least as far reaching in its shakeup of the education system as it was on other sectors of Chinese society. Yet the changes it wrought in many aspects of the day-to-day running of educational institutions were minimal - its greatest significance for education lies in the fact that it refurnished the political-educational outlooks of many teachers, administrators and students who had previously expected education to produce 'experts', taking little account of their 'redness'.

Following the method of description followed in the chapters on China's political-economic strategy, the straight 'chronology' of the educational strategy will give way, at this point, to a discussion which attempts to elucidate the meaning of the GPCR in educational terms, and the meaning of some of the actual changes in educational practice which it stimulated. It is well known that educational institutions were frequently the scenes of revolutionary activity during the years of the GPCR, and that the revolution involved students, professors, teachers, administrators at all levels, educational bureaucrats and peasants and workers as parents and students themselves. They all engaged, at one level or another, in a struggle that was, in large part, designed to completely overturn the educational status quo in China. Excellent and highly readable accounts (which are, literally, blow-by-blow accounts) of the

Cultural Revolution in two of China's most prestigious educational institutions are provided by Victor Nee and Don Layman in The Cultural Revolution at Peking University, and by William Hinton in Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University.⁴⁵ The latter will be referred to below.

The chrononogical account of educational policies and practices outlined above is sufficient to indicate some broad features of and some problems within the educational strategy China pursued in the period between 1949 and the outbreak of the GPCR. These features are summarised as:

a) Systemic education had undergone changes that were designed to make education more universally available, particularly to grant access to education to adults and children who were peasants and workers.

b) In systemic education also, experiments had been carried out in establishing new types of schools (e.g., Agricultural Middle Schools where regular middle schools were not available); in curriculum (new courses such as political education were added, whilst the content of old courses was revamped); in administration centralised control was being modified by moves toward greater local participation and involvement in schooling; in various periods when reform of intellectuals was urged (for example during the Socialist Education Movement) new proposals for the education of teachers arose.

c) Two important new educational forms had developed: Spare-time Education, and Part-Work, Part-Study schools.

d) Part-Work, Part-Study had become an educational 'philosophy' which was supposed to determine many aspects of education in all kinds of educational institutions.

e) The educational strategy had encountered, or developed some negative features also, the most significant of these was the evolution of 'two tracks' in education, where different parts of the educational infrastructure were separated from others (i.e., systemic education from PWPS and spare time education). Within systemic education "key schools" threatened to become separate educational institutions, qualitatively, from the rest of the schools.

f) Other problems with education included: children from poor and lower middle peasant families were often barred from the greater part of the educational ladder by inaccessability of schools, entrance examinations that favoured wealthier students, age limits, and the 'marks system' which required certain 'standards' of achievement from pupils before they were permitted promotion to higher levels (failure to reach given standards often meant repetition of grades, which poor children could not afford); the cost of education, which varied from place to place, was often out of the reach of some families; content and methods often stressed bookishness, formalism, and cramming; local conditions were often not taken into account: teaching was divorced from the real struggle - class struggle, a struggle for production and scientific experiment.⁴⁶

From the earliest days the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was, in every way, a revolution in education. Even before the events of 1966 which led to the open struggle itself, the rhetoric in the press is directed at 'academics' and 'authorities', emphasizing the depth with which the ills in Chinese society both penetrated the education system, and were a product of it. The education questions confronted during the GPCR itself were elemental, question

such as: "Who 'knows'?", "What is it to 'know'?", "What knowledge is important?", "What is the relationship between 'knowing' and 'doing'?", or, between "skill" and political consciousness, between understanding and commitment? These questions formed the deeper core of others to which the Chinese masses directed their attention in an endeavour to work out a 'socialist' education strategy: "Who receives schooling?", "What kinds of schools?", "What kinds of knowledge do schools purvey, and should they purvey?", "Who decides?", and many more questions of this very basic kind. It has often been argued that whilst these questions may have arisen during the GPCR, its effects on educational practice have not been far reaching.

(Belgium) Our task is less to take issue with this opinion than to examine the direction the Chinese educational strategy took in an attempt to discover something of the nature of the relationship between the educational strategy and the political-economic strategy.

Events and Effects: During the GPCR itself

A. Personnel

A document published in 1967⁴⁷ traces chronologically the development of the two conflicting educational lines in education policy. From as early as the 1949-53 reforms, the document alleges, the struggle between two classes, two 'roads', and two 'command quarters' on the educational front was going on. Connected from the very start with the old education system, and with transplanting Soviet 'revisionist' educational practices and ideas were Lu Ting-i Yang Hsiu-feng, and Ma Hsu-lun - China's educational 'establishment' whose directives and speeches have been quoted throughout the earlier

section of this chapter, and whose contribution to the development of the educational strategy in the 1949-1966 period was inestimable. All of these figures were purged during the 1966-69 period, and removed from positions of influence in education for "resisting Mao Tse-tung's educational line". But for the most part, the charges against these individuals were related to their alleged predilection for an educational system that was almost a mirror image of that of the USSR, and was 'two tracked' - with one track for the elites and one for the masses. This wholesale scouring of the upper echelons of the educational policy-making apparatus in China was accompanied to situate the control of education more locally - more will be said about this below.

But the educational establishment was by no means the only bastion to be torn down during the years of Cultural Revolution, thousands of teachers were criticised for 'bourgeois ideology; paraded in the streets in dunce caps, commanded to make 'self-criticism' (often by their own students), removed from their posts, and frequently sent down to the country. Mao and the Party had repeatedly complained that the problem of transforming education was a problem of the teachers,⁴⁸ thus, included in the 'Draft program for Middle Schools in the Chinese Countryside' promulgated in 1969 were the following provisions for the improvement and reeducation of teachers:

a) They should be reeducated and remolded to 'consciously purify their ranks'; class enemies should be cleaned out; teachers should come from the ranks of poor and lower-middle peasants and demobilised soldiers; their appointment should be discussed and

endorsed by poor and lower-middle peasants, the production brigades and the revolutionary committees of the commune.

b) Active students of Mao Tse-tung thought who are poor and lower-middle peasants and militiamen should be part-time teachers.

c) Teachers should be constantly reeducating themselves by participating in production and in revolution.

d) Teachers should be paid on the work-point system.⁴⁹ In other words, teachers had to participate in 'struggle-criticism-transformation' in order that they may understand correct ideology. Teachers are regarded as politicising agents, and their influence in promoting the aims of the Chinese revolution cannot be underestimated. So that they may carry out this role properly they are constantly encouraged to participate in revolution, to understand the class struggle, to attend spare-time courses and symposia as part of an extensive in-service training program.⁵⁰

Students

During the Cultural Revolution, youth organisations which had previously existed were replaced by new groups (the Pioneers by the Little Red Soldiers, the Communist Youth League by the Red Guards). The goal of the education of youth became the 'four goods': youth was to be trained to be good at ideological work, good in military training, good in arranging everyday life, and good in working style.⁵¹ There was considerable emphasis on the education of young people during the GPCR, youth was 'the heir to the revolution', and there was concern lest it should lose sight of the aims and goals of the revolution. This was, of course, no radical departure from debates about education as they had come and passed in the seventeen

year period prior to 1966, but during this time, as we have seen, particular emphasis was on 'rectification' of workers and peasants and on the education generally of these groups so they would understand the aims of the revolution. China's youth was, however, projected to the forefront of the Chinese revolution during the early Cultural Revolution years: in 1957 Mao had said of China's youth:

The world is yours as well as ours, but in the last analysis it is yours. You young people, full of vigour and vitality, are in the full bloom of life like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is placed in you. The world belongs to you. China's future belongs to you.⁵²

There is nothing extraordinary about this exhortation to youth until it is recalled that it is delivered in a culture where age, not youth, is revered, and where if the future is not so much deemed to belong to the old, the young were certainly obliged to wait obediently until their time comes.

In 1966 when Mao became 'supreme commander' of the Red Guards he officially endorsed his support for the young of China 'taking command'. The Red Guard movement began at Tsinghua University and soon detachments were formed in schools, colleges and universities throughout China. Whilst the activities of Red Guards during the GPCR were took them off the campuses into factories and communes and neighbourhoods to 'revolutionise the masses' tearing down the 'four olds' - 'old ideas, old culture, old customs, old habits', much of their energy was directed toward revolutionising the education system also, by leading criticisms of teaching methods, curricula, and administration. At a meeting with a group of Red Guards at a rally in Peking, Anna Louise Strong received rousing applause for her own exhortation to reconstruct education:

You are beginning to work out a new system of education. The world has never had a really good system of education. Always the dead hand of the past has used education to try to dominate the future through youth. The divorce of theory and practice has never been overcome. As for socialist education, it has not yet existed and nobody yet knows what it is. It is for you to work out in the coming months. For the chance is opened by the Cultural Revolution now.⁵³

B. Educational Institutions

During the high years of the Revolution 1966-69 most educational activity within schools, colleges and universities came to a standstill while students and teachers 'made revolution'. Some institutions merely suspended their regular activities to discuss political and educational issues, others were forced to close because they were battlegrounds for the GPCR itself.⁵⁴ In 1966 the Central Committee of the CCP announced the decision to transform the existing entrance examination and to postpone enrollment for half a year - this meant that university education was severely disrupted - in fact the disruptions and closures lasted for longer than half a year.⁵⁵ But demands to reconstruct education were often more forthright than this measure - students called for the complete reorganisation of whole courses and faculties, and the discussions which these calls sparked off effectively ground formal lectures to a halt.⁵⁶

In 1966 Work Teams moved into educational institutions, at Tsinghua the role and composition of the various work teams ebbed and flowed as the pitched battle on the campus grew more intense, then abated. Hinton describes the activities of the first work team at Tsinghua sent by none other than Liu Shao-ch'i:

Team leader Yeh lin announced a two-pronged program. On the one hand all department and university-level cadres were suspended and ordered to report in groups for study. On the other hand, all were called upon to return to their classrooms for a major campaign of self-and-mutual criticism. Yeh then read out a series of regulations concerning student activity. He forbade any contact among the students of different classes, different departments and different campuses. To insure the latter he ordered the campus gates locked: no-one could go out or come in without special permission. He also forbade the posting of statements without prior approval from the team.⁵⁷

This approach to the tasks undertaken by work teams was fairly typical wherever teams were sent in - it meant that effective control of the institution passed into the hands of the team. This began the great transformation in educational administration that the Cultural Revolution was responsible for. It culminated in the permanent presence of 'three-in-one' (comprising poor and lower-middle peasants, cadres, and revolutionary students and teachers) combination bodies that acquired effective control of schools: the Party Committee (the highest regulatory body), the Revolutionary Committee and the Propaganda Team.⁵⁸

Official Pronouncements

The number of significant pronouncements on education questions published during the period 1966-69 is impossible to estimate - and likewise, their impact is impossible to assess. Yet standing out are two or three documents which have probably influenced the development of the educational strategy more than any others. The first of these is the CCP Central Committee Decision on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (the '16 Points') which was adopted on 8th August 1966. Point 10 of the 16 Points relates to education. It calls for the

transformation of the old system, and changes in the old principles and methods of teaching; the phenomenon of schools being dominated by 'bourgeois intellectuals must be completely changed. Education must be made 'serve proletarian politics' and education and production must be combined so as to enable those receiving education to 'develop morally, intellectually, and physically and to become labourers with socialist consciousness and culture'. The period of schooling should be shortened, courses should be fewer and better. Teaching material should be thoroughly transformed - 'in some cases beginning with simplifying complicated material'. Students should 'learn industrial work, farming and military affairs, and take part in the struggles of the Cultural Revolution'.⁵⁹

Whilst it is short, the brief is comprehensive - combining the elements of the critique of Chinese education outlined above with some proposals for reform. The fact that these points are contained in a CC directive lends weight to their significance as determinants in redirecting the educational strategy. Whilst it is true that the points encompass practically every aspect of social, political and economic life in China, taken as a whole they provide guidelines for the construction of a political-economic framework within which revolutionary changes in education could take place. The schools reopened in 1967 were guided by these instructions in regard to reductions in time, reduction in the number of teachers, and combining education with productive labour.⁶⁰

A second important document related to education to appear in the Cultural Revolution years was the Draft Programme for Primary and Middle Schools in the Chinese Countryside. This document, more than

any other, indicates the change in approach, at least, to education, that was stimulated by the Cultural Revolution generally. Under seven headings it discussed changes in leadership, ideology, length of schooling, teachers and teaching, and PWPS. It recommends, among other things, the establishment of 'three-in-one' revolutionary committees to 'manage' middle schools, the politicisation of the curriculum, and participation by peasants and cadres in teaching and learning.⁶¹ Through implementation of proposals in this document schools were to become integrated with labour not only by the inclusion of productive labour on the curriculum, but by shifting the responsibility for administration into the hands of production brigades, commune brigades as well as party cadres and teachers and students.

The role of the school as an agent of political socialisation as seen in this document, is a direct response to the call by Mao in 1966 to 'put revolutionary politics in command'. This is especially reflected in the changes in curriculum that the Draft Programme fore-shadows: it is proposed that five course in the middle schools should include: Education in Mao Tse-tung thought, (including modern history of China, Contemporary Chinese History, and the history of the struggle between two lines within the Party, 'revolutionary literature and art', military training (including the study of Chairman Mao's concepts on peoples war and preparedness against war) and productive labour.⁶²

The third important document on education to come out during the GPCR is Mao Tse-tung's "May 7th" directive which was, in fact, a short letter written to Lin Piao on May 7th 1966 and published a year

later. It will be dealt with below in detail in a discussion of the May 7th Cadre Schools.

Educational Changes and the Cultural Revolution

The reforms stimulated by these directives and by the GPCR itself are far too numerous to list in detail - but some ought to be mentioned in order to throw clearer light on the educational strategy China has pursued in the Post-GPCR period. It is important to remember that the potential in these reforms is only realisable in the educational context which the foregoing has described. This means that the reforms that the GPCR stimulated were, in fact, already features of pre-1966 education, the difference lies mainly in the scope of their implementation. They are measures which have been, to some extent, part of the Maoist educational strategy.

Learning and Productive Labour

The feature of schooling in China that has, perhaps, captured most the imagination of visitors in the last few years is Part-Work, Part-Study as it is now widespread at least at the levels of primary and secondary education.⁶³ Through a variety of means schools combine learning with productive labour. The students 'thus do something useful for society and create wealth for the state'.⁶⁴ But there is also a political end to be served by extending PWPS throughout the system: 'combined with political indoctrination productive labour is supposed to produce a correct proletarian outlook, productive labour is conceived of as a means of 'curing the elitist ailment' and fostering the ideal of "serving the people".⁶⁵ 'Some schools organise manual labour in a very enlightened way, both to help the students in

mastering skills and knowledge, and to give them social experience and political consciousness by participating in collective tasks together with ordinary workers. Finally, PWPS is has a useful economic function: productive labour is the means by which many poor villages can afford some education for their children at all. The economic factor can also be a disincentive - especially in urban areas where there are simply insufficient factory places to accomodate all the children for even part of the time.⁶⁶

As before the GPCR, PWPS is applied in a variety of ways according to different needs and different material conditions. Some schools establish close links with nearby factories, peoples communes and army units, and the children leave the schools campus to go to work, or, where permitted, the work is brought to the school. Other schools have opened their own factories and farms, and they invite armymen, workers and peasants to come in as part-time teachers.⁶⁷ Tsinghua University does both: it operates a truck factory and an electronics assembly plant, and it maintains contact with the factories outside so students can work in them.⁶⁸ In any case, what is learned in the classroom (the 'theoretical' part of education) is closely allied to the productive activity.

Localisation

Another major reform in education influenced by the Cultural Revolution is the localisation of control, administration, financing, and general operation of schools - particularly primary and middle schools. This had been going on, as we have seen, in the period following the CLF but events such as the purge of the central

educational leadership spurred on the process. It is in line with the aims of reducing centralised control and curbing the power of bureaucracy. It is also very much in keeping with the aims of self-reliance.⁶⁹

Greater localisation of control and operation has two important advantages: it allows educational institutions to be designed and run according to local needs and conditions - classes are arranged, for instance, to suit the characteristics of life in farming and pastoral areas to make attendance convenient.⁷⁰ Second, local control means that the burden of financing education falls on the production brigade (which run the primary schools) and the communes which are responsible for rural secondary education.⁷¹

But localisation refers to a relationship between the State as a central planning institution, and the local community. The latter are not abandoned to work out their own financial arrangements and educational delivery systems - where necessary state aid derived from taxing wealthy areas supplements the educational budgets of poorer areas. Furthermore, 'inasmuch as the "three-in-one" revolutionary committee functions under the guidance of the resident Party committee in the schools the control of the education program still rests in the Party-State' - that is, it is a mistake to assume that the min-pan schools are 'private' schools - they still have determining links with the state institutions.⁷²

The government provides supervision over the broad plans and outlines of education so that the general spirit and objectives of education, which is, as we have seen, a topic of wide scale 'national' discussion, are followed by local communities.⁷³

Localisation has meant experimentation and innovation with forms, teaching materials and teaching methods. For example, there are 'mobile schools' with travelling teachers who make the rounds of remote villages composed only of a few families. There are also 'horseback schools' in which the teachers move from pasture to pasture with the herdsmen and their families.⁷⁴ More commonly, where the economic activity is more dependent upon seasonal factors, some schools have periods of closure during the busy times. In the same spirit rural schools insist that they compile their teaching materials themselves according to local needs.⁷⁵ By providing education with greater practical applicability to the immediate environment it is hoped that the peasant will understand the relevance of education to the improvement of their own situation.⁷⁶

Organising Education

"In the administrative reorganisation of schools, no effort has been spared to do away with any independent staff specialising in educational management, and to reduce as far as possible the number of full-time teachers".⁷⁷ The 'three-in-one' combination bodies that are now in permanent control of schools are part of an overall administrative structure that seeks to ensure control by worker-peasant groups whilst at the same time militating against the concentration of organisational and decision-making power in the hands of a layer of educational bureaucrats. Responses to this widely recognised aim include a wide variety of organisational structures which 'break through a rigid concept of division of work and put forward a new praxis for the management of state affairs'.⁷⁸ In

addition to Party participation in educational administration, people from neighbourhood, factory and commune groups form the corpus of administrative groups along with teachers and students. In many cases the real day-to-day running of the institution is carried out by these people where once it was the task of full-time administrators.

Expansion

One of the aims of education in China since liberation, as we have seen, has been expansion of educational facilities so that education becomes universally available. To this end there has been an immense variety of educational forms experimented with in attempts to meet demands for literacy, technical education, political education, and 'general, cultural' education. This has often been interpreted as a series of endeavours to make China one huge educational entity. It is wrong, though, to interpret denunciations of educational practice during the Cultural Revolution as simply symptomatic of demands for 'more' education (as many observers from capitalist countries have done) - I think this has been fairly clearly pointed out already. Nevertheless, there have been serious attempts to expand educational availability since the GPCR - most regions have been attempting to achieve universal primary education within four to six years, and most have claimed successes of 90 to 95 percent of all school age children.⁷⁹ An article in China Reconstructs in 1974 claimed that 'the number of university, middle and primary school students is more than one fifth of the total population ...around 90 per cent of all school-age children are in school'.⁸⁰

These achievements reflect mainly the proliferation of educational facilities in small villages and hamlets so that children

from poor and lower-middle peasant families now have the opportunity to receive some education and can now go to school without leaving the villages or brigades.⁸¹ This is partly the result of the reallocation of finances - with internal reallocation of funds from tertiary to lower levels of education and by having funds that would have been allocated by the state to wealthy regions' education budgets redirected as these regions develop greater self-sufficiency in their educational financing.

Teaching Methods, Materials, Curricula

As mentioned already, the school as a politicising agent is an important feature of Chinese education. "Priority is given to the study of revolutionary theory so that both teachers and students will have the aim of teaching and study - wholehearted service to the revolutionary cause and to the people - deeply embedded in their minds".⁷⁷ The study of Mao Tse-tung Thought comes first and the texts often form the basis of classroom activities: for instance 'in some places characters are learned from the Quotations; language courses are taught on the basis of the Three Well-Known Essays',⁸³ Elsewhere geography is taught along with the international class struggle in a chemistry class on the use of fire extinguishers, 'students are asked to consider what to do in the event of fires caused in a war started by the imperialists'.⁸⁴ At Tsinghua University students 'spend 15 per cent of their time studying Marxism-Leninism'.⁸⁵ Other changes in the curriculum include dropping 'useless' subjects - one of the recurring criticisms of the pre-GPCR education was the proliferation of subjects courses - now there are only five or six sources in both primary and secondary schools.

Teaching materials have undergone changes too since the 1960's. Old textbooks are found to be replete with bourgeois ideas and are no longer usable. There had been extensive compiling of new materials - this has partly been a response to localisation where materials are designed and compiled, with collective effort, and in response to local needs, by peasants, workers, and students and teachers. Materials are drawn from actual problems of farming and industry and the common diseases of the locality to ensure that the knowledge gained is applicable in practice.⁸⁶ One third grade is reported to have initiated a projects to compile books based on the writings of Mao Tse-tung for leisure reading because of the absence of appropriate material.⁸⁷

As for teaching technique, this is a constant problem in Chinese education, as in many education systems. Teaching is frequently by the lecture-rota method with the students reciting or repeating what the teacher has said. Nevertheless, there are signs that this is becoming less and less the case as improved teaching techniques become more widely appreciated. Teaching 'by enlightenment' is considered to be revolutionary pedagogy as opposed to teaching by 'infusion'.⁸⁸ Collective teaching (team teaching and variations on it) is practised particularly where teachers and students have worked co-operatively on preparation of teaching materials. An exciting innovation has been the various moves to 'de-mystify' teaching and teachers by utilising the skills and knowledge of local workers and peasants - traditionally one of the pedagogue's strongest means of sustaining his unquestioned authority has been his exclusive possession of book knowledge. Where the kind

of knowledge that is 'correct' is often not 'book knowledge', this ruse has been denied the teacher.⁸⁹

Other Innovations and Changes

Whilst this list is by no means exhaustive, there are some other educational changes stimulated by the GPCR that deserve mention. As has always been the case in Chinese revolutionary education, learning and teaching does not stop at the school door. Strenuous efforts are made to promote extra-mural activities in family education and through Mao Tse-tung study groups in neighbourhoods for parents and pre-school age children.⁹⁰ "Workers, peasants, office workers, army men, state clerks and people in city neighbourhoods are raising their educational level or studying revolutionary theory in all kinds of spare-time or on-the-job study programs including short-term study classes and political night schools".⁹¹ These extra-mural activities are part and parcel of the 'open door' policy in education in which the school and the broader community are closely linked.

As if a promise were being fulfilled, examinations, long the bane of educationists in China, are regarded far more critically today. The old examination system has been abolished along with the 'limited age' principle to facilitate access, particularly to higher education by poor peasants' children.⁹² "Open book" examinations are far more common and examination candidates are notified the questions beforehand, during examinations, students may refer to books and discuss the questions among one another.⁹³

This section began with the caution that it would not be an attempt to describe comprehensively all the innovations and alterations to China's educational strategy that have been stimulated by

the GPCR - in fact, there are probably many more changes which are still developing that have been missed altogether. What the brief list does, though, is to indicate by illustration, the basic direction in which Chinese education has been heading since 'cultural revolution' has been the political-economic strategy within which education operates. The illustrations show clearly that post-GPCR education is an affirmation of the triumph of the Maoist educational line.

Before concluding, however, there is one other important kind of educational institution that deserves special mention for a number of reasons, not the least among which is that it is interesting to compare the May 7th Cadre Schools with Kivukoni College in Tanzania, as they are both training institutions for political cadres.

The "May 7" Cadre Schools

The proliferation of May 7 Cadre Schools (M7CS) since the opening of the first school on a farm in Heilungkiang province in May 1968 illustrates much that is remarkable about the role of education in the Maoist development strategy. The inspiration for setting up the first schools and all of the subsequent schools came, it is claimed, from Mao's May 7th Directive published on that date in 1966. In it Mao recommended that the PLA should 'be a great school' in which army men 'learned politics military affairs and agriculture', they should also 'engage in agricultural production and run small factories, and do mass work'. They should study and participate in class struggle. The workers and peasants too 'should take part in production, study military affairs, politics and culture, and criticize

the bourgeoisie'. Where conditions permit, Mao said, workers in service trades, the Party, government and commerce should do the same, as should the students.⁹⁴

The Liu-ho school (the first M7CS) took up this statement as a guideline in running a school whose purpose was the 'reeducation of cadres during the stage of the socialist revolutions'.⁹⁵ The stage was one in which the principal theme was the need for cadres to acquaint or reacquaint themselves with the masses - the question of 'how to carry forward the cadres' revolutionisation and revolutionise government institutions. In the October following Mao's directive, he issued another 'latest instruction' which officially linked cadre training with the new emphasis on cadre labour in the countryside.⁹⁶ Two years later Peking Review was able to report that 'in the single month of October (1968) new (schools) appeared almost every day'.⁹⁷

At the schools cadres practise the 'five togethers' - 'to eat, live, labour, study, and criticize the bourgeoisie together'.⁹⁸ The object of students taking part in industrial or agricultural productive labour is not only to create material wealth for the country, but mainly to improve their ideology and to transform their subjective world as they transform their objective world'.⁹⁹ This is a direct application of the learning theory Mao had articulated since 'On Contradiction' in 1937 - the idea being that work with the peasants produces correct ideas and strengthens communist consciousness. The May & Cadre School is a 'revolutionary furnace' and the 'May 7th Road' is an essential road for all intellectuals and revolutionaries who want to make themselves worthy of service to the proletarian cause.¹⁰⁰

Participants in the schools, who attend for periods up to two years, but generally for one year or so, include leading cadres and 'cadres doing general work',¹⁰¹ - the former including cadres on revolutionary committees at provincial and regional levels, chairmen of revolutionary committees of communes and members of revolutionary committees of institutions of higher education.¹⁰²

They include incumbent cadres 'on rotation', as well as those who are not at work, 'new cadres who are intended for promotion; teachers, medical personnel, and technicians in various units. They are cadres who are 'good' and 'comparatively good' and as also cadres who have committed serious mistakes and have shown signs of repentance and improvement.¹⁰³ There has been considerable debate on the whole rationale behind attendance at the M7CS's with some people taking the 'poisonous line of Liu Shao-Ch'i' that labour should be used as punishment, and this is the function of the schools. But, officials of the Office for Sending Cadres to Do Manual Labour point out that the task of M7CS's is: 'to train all of our cadres to be new products of communism who are willing to be assigned to high or low positions, able to function either as officials or common people, capable of doing either industrial or farming work, and good at both military and literary pursuits'.¹⁰⁴

There are no hard and fast rules on organisation of M7CS's, the pattern of organisation differs according to material conditions. But variations as also depend on the responses to such questions as: How much study and how much work? and what is the relationship between the two? Should there be a fixed pattern of staying behind at the cadre school or going down to settle in with the brigades, or a

combination of the two?¹⁰⁵ Often students are in two groups, one staying behind at the school, one going down to the brigades, and every couple of weeks the school revolutionary committee sends members in to check on students in the brigades. At the end of each rotation, time is set apart for discussion and study and summarising experiences.¹⁰⁶

Some schools practise 'inviting in' and 'going out' - the former referring to the having the peasants come in and be stationed at the school as a 'Poor Peasant Propaganda Team', serving as 'sand in cement'. 'Going out' means sending students out group by group to settle with production teams.¹⁰⁷

Production activities in which cadres engage also very according to circumstances. Initially many schools were established on barren lands where there were neither buildings nor trees - this meant that most of the time was spent constructing accommodation facilities - often starting with extraordinarily little in the way of building materials. In similar cases the participants were faced with barren, arid land or swampland, and they set about to make it productive - often with remarkable success. Emphasis is on frugality, hard work, and especially self-reliance - thus cadres are toughened at the same time as their initiative is encouraged when confronted by adverse conditions or problems that perhaps threaten their survival. In addition to these activities, cadres work on farms and in factories, either within or outside the school, or outside alongside peasants and workers. This sharpens their understanding of the class struggle whilst involving them in production at a level with which they have often had little or no experience. Other activities organised at the schools include militia training and cultural and sports activities.¹⁰⁸

Finally, at every stage and every level, and associated with every activity at the M7CS is study. The object of study is to revolutionise the cadres' ideology and change their 'spiritual outlook'.¹⁰⁹ Students study the works of Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. They read the Manifesto, The State and Revolution, On Contradiction, and study the Quotations. 'They pay special attention to linking theory with practice and often organise group discussions and criticism meetings and participate in 'struggle-criticism--ransformation'.¹¹⁰

The May 7th Cadre Schools grew out of a long tradition of educational practices that have time from time to time been used to 'rectify' the outlook and ideology of cadres. They embody the flexibility of organisation that has been a characteristic of spare-time education and political education since Yen-an, and they have been concerned to avoid dogmatism, as has been an educational imperative since Kang t'a. As in the cheng feng movement and in the Socialist Education Movement they have focussed intensely on the cadres' political outlook and on his or her capacity to make revolution and transform himself and the world. They represent the single most impressive response to the spirit of the Maoist education strategy, and their aim is concurrent with it - to produce the communist human.

Footnotes to Preamble to Part IV and Chapter VII

¹Hans Bosse, "Socio-Cultural Factors of Underdevelopment. Overcoming Underdevelopment as a Learning Process", Journal of Peace Research. 12:4:315-329.

²Asia Research Centre, The Great Cultural Revolution in China, (Rutland and Tokyo, Charles E. Tuttle, 1968).

³Liu Shih, "Two years of Advance in People's Education, in Chinese Communist Education, ed., Stewart E. Fraser, (New York, John D. Wiley), 1965), p. 113.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ma Hsu-Iun, "Successes in People's Education", In Fraser, Chinese Communist Education, p. 133-135.

⁶Paul Harper, Spare-Time Education for Workers in Communist China, (Washington D.C., U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1964), p. 9.

⁷Ibid., p. 3.

⁸Ronald R. Price, Education in Communist China, (New York, Praeger, 1970).

⁹Harper, Spare-Time Education, p. 18.

¹⁰Price, Education in Communist China, p. 194.

¹¹Ibid., p. 193.

¹²Ibid., p. 194.

¹³Harper, Spare-Time Education, p. 5.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 26.

¹⁷ John N. Hawkins, Mao Tse-tung and Education, (Hamden, Linnet Books, 1974), p. 110.

¹⁸ Lu Ting-Yi, "Education Must Be Combined with Productive Labour", (1958) in Fraser, Chinese Communist Education, p. 294.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 293.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 297-298.

²¹ Yang Hsiu-feng, "Educational Work Achievements in 1958 and Arrangements for 1959", (1959), in Fraser, Chinese Communist Education, p. 302.

²² R.D. Barendsen, The Educational Revolution in China, (Washington, D.C., United States Office of Education, 1973), pp. 3-4.

²³ Ibid., p. 19-20.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 14-15.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 10.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 31.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 34.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 43-44.

²⁹ Chou En-lai, "Report on the Work of the Government to the First Session of the Third National People's Congress" (1964), in Asia Research Centre, The Great Cultural Revolution, p. 39.

³⁰ "Part-Work, Part-Study System Shows its Advantages", Peking Review, 51:1965, in Asia Research Centre, The Great Cultural Revolution, p. 31.

³¹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969), p. 105.

³² Yang, "Educational Work Achievements", p. 305.

³³Chou En-lai, "Our Tasks on the Cultural and Educational Fronts", in Fraser, Chinese Communist Education, p. 311.

³⁴Yang, "Educational Work Achievements", p. 305.

³⁵Centre d'etude du Sud-est Asiatique et de L'Extreme Orient, Fourth Working Session: Education in Communist China, 2 vols. (Brussels, mimeograph, 1969), p. 45.

³⁶Rudiger Machetzki, "China's Education Since the Cultural Revolution", The Political Quarterly, 45:1 (1974), 58.

³⁷Ibid., p. 59.

³⁸Mao Tse-tung, "Remarks at the Spring Festival", in Schram, Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, pp. 201-209.

³⁹Ibid., p. 209.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 202-208.

⁴¹Centre d'etude etc., Education in Communist China, pp. 40-41.

⁴²Ibid., p. 203.

⁴³Ibid., p. 205.

⁴⁴Mao Tse-tung, "Talks With Mao Yuan-hsin", in Schram, Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, p. 246.

⁴⁵Victor Nee and Don Layman, "The Cultural Revolution at Peking University", Monthly Review, 21:3 (July-August 1969); William Hinton, Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University, (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1972).

⁴⁶Marianne Bastid, "Economic Necessity and Political Ideals in Educational Reform during the Cultural Revolution", The China Quarterly 42:16-45, pp. 17-21.

⁴⁷Peter J. Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China: Documents and Commentary, (White Plains, New York, International Arts and Sciences, 1973).

⁴⁸"Draft programme for middle schools in the Chinese countryside", in The Maoist Educational Revolution, Ch'en Hsi-en, (New York, Praeger, 1974), p. 247.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 247-249.

⁵⁰Ch'en Hsi-en, The Maoist Educational Revolution, pp. 131-132.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 74.

⁵²Mao Tse-tung, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung, (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1966), p. 288.

⁵³"Anna Louise Strong Addresses the Red Guards", in Asia Research Centre, ed., The Great Cultural Revolution, p. 541.

⁵⁴Hinton, Hundred Day War, Passim.

⁵⁵Belgium 100.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 102.

⁵⁷Hinton, Hundred Day War, p. 45.

⁵⁸Ch'en, Maoist Educational Revolution, pp. 45, 92-94.

⁵⁹"Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", in Asia Research Centre, ed., The Great Cultural Revolution, p. 402.

⁶⁰Ch'en, Maoist Educational Revolution, p. 42.

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 246-251.

⁶²Ibid., p. 249.

⁶³Machetzki, "China's Education", p. 66.

⁶⁴Yung Hung, "Education in China Today", China Reconstructs 24:5, (May, 1975), :4.

⁶⁵Machetzki, "China's Education", p. 66.

⁶⁶Ibid., see also Bastid "Economic Necessity and Political Ideals", p. 41.

⁶⁷Yung Hung, "Education in China Today", p. 4.

⁶⁸China: Science Walks on Two Legs: A Report from Science For the People, (New York, Avon Books, 1974), p. 83.

⁶⁹Ch'en, Maoist Educational Revolution, p. 54.

⁷⁰Yung Hung, "Education in China Today", p. 2.

⁷¹Machetzki, "China's Education", p. 69.

⁷²Ch'en, "Maoist Educational Revolution", p. 45-46.

⁷³Ibid., p. 11.

⁷⁴Yung Hung, "Education in China Today", pp. 2-3.

⁷⁵Bastid, "Economic Necessity and Political Ideals", p. 41.

⁷⁶Machetzki, "China's Education", p. 66.

⁷⁷Bastid, "Economic Necessity and Political Ideals", p. 37.

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Machetzki, "China's Education", p. 67.

⁸⁰Yung Hung, "Education in China Today", p. 2.

⁸¹Machetzki, "China's Education", p. 67; see also Bastid, "Economic Necessity and Political Ideals", p. 39.

⁸²Yung Hung, "Education in China Today", p. 3.

⁸³Bastid, "Economic Necessity and Political Ideals", p. 40.

⁸⁴Ch'en, Maoist Educational Revolution, p. 67.

⁸⁵Science Walks on Two Legs, p. 182.

⁸⁶Ch'en, Maoist Educational Revolution, p. 55.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 68.

⁸⁸Bastid, "Economic Necessity and Political Ideals", p. 41.

⁸⁹For a discussion of "old" teaching techniques and practices see price, Education in Communist China, pp. 221-230.

⁹⁰Bastid, "Economic Necessity and Political Ideals", p. 42.

⁹¹Yung Hung, "Education in China Today", p. 3.

⁹²Machetzki, "China's Education", p. 92.

⁹³Yung Hung, "Education in China Today", p. 5.

⁹⁴Ch'en, "Maoist Educational Revolution", pp. 233-234.

⁹⁵"Persist in using the "May 7 Directive" as the Fundamental Guidline for Running Schools", Chinese Education, 8:8, (1975)

⁹⁶Ch'en, Maoist Educational Revolution, p. 113.

⁹⁷Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China, p. 85.

⁹⁸"Students of the Cadre School should "go out" group by group", Chinese Education, 9(1), (1976).

⁹⁹Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China, p. 85.

¹⁰⁰Ch'en, Maoist Educational Revolution, p. 115.

¹⁰¹"Persist in using the May 7 Directive", p. 8.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁰³Ibid., pp. 8-10.

¹⁰⁴"The Task of the "May 7" Cadre School is to help Cadres renew their study", Chinese Education, 9(1), (1976).

¹⁰⁵"Combine staying behind at Cadre Schools with settling down in brigades and temper the Cadres in an all-round way", Chinese Education, 9(1), (1976).

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 48.

¹⁰⁷"Students of the Cadre School", p. 49.

¹⁰⁸Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China, p. 85.

¹⁰⁹"The Task of the "May 7" Cadre School", p. 11.

¹¹⁰Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China, p. 85.

CHAPTER VIII

THE STRATEGY OF EDUCATION FOR SELF-RELIANCE

A little over one month after the Arusha Declaration was published, President Nyerere issued the first of his 'post-Arusha' documents on education, called "Education for Self-Reliance". In it he outlined the basic strategy which ought to be applied concomitantly with the development moves (the political-economic strategy) fore-shadowed by the Declaration itself. That is, education was viewed as complementary to the development strategy - referred to by Nyerere in the paper by stressing the rural orientation of the economic future: 'it is therefore the villages that must be made into places where people live a good life'.¹ Education for this future must, he reported, foster the social goals of living together and working together for the common good, and inculcate a sense of commitment to the total community. Furthermore, it must prepare the young people to make useful contributions to agriculture in the village, to be good farmers and to apply their knowledge intelligently.²

The theory of the genesis of underdevelopment upon which the strategy is based takes account of the distorting features of colonial education in Tanzania. Colonial education was motivated by the desire to inculcate the values of the colonial society, and to train Africans as junior officials for the colonial state. It emphasized subservience and white collar skills, and promoted the

individual instincts of capitalism. To this extent it induced attitudes of human inequality and encouraged the dominance of some individuals over others. The knowledge it disseminate was not knowledge that grew out of the objective culture of Tanzania, but that of the metropole. Finally, education was institutionalised along racial lines until Uhuru when the independence movement won an important battle against institutionalised racism.

In the process of dissociating from colonialism and international capitalism begun by the independence movement and precipitated by the Arusha Declaration, the groundwork was laid for an educational strategy that was a collective learning strategy in the sense that it stresses the urgency of educating the many rather than giving a lot of education to the few. To make this worthwhile education, "education" the document says, "should be changed from a strategy which makes a virtue of distortions and inequalities in Tanzanian social and economic life by concentrating on preparing for higher levels" to one in which what is learned will be directly related to the 'life-historical collectives'. That is, the education given in the primary schools (the basic level) must be, Nyerere urged, a complete education in itself. This was to require dissociative steps: the downgrading on importance of examinations (an attack on the selective and allocative functions of education); revision of the curriculum so that it reflects the lives of the majority of the students, rather than teaching what an engineer, economist, administrator, or a teacher needs to know.³ This is an attack on the socialisation function of education - an attempt to transform it so that it conflicts less with the other functions.

The strategy itself takes the community as its spatial basis - 'community- in this case, referring to the village collective. It takes the idea of self-reliance as its rationale. The school ought to be integrated into the community in the profoundest sense - with farmers and teachers teaching and learning from children who are themselves farmers. Each school should aim at self-reliance through establishing a school shamba or through some other economic activity. The activities of the whole school should be woven around the economic activity selected - the curriculum should be directed towards the improvement of techniques and of produce so that in science classes, for example, the properties of fertilizers would be explained. The important point about these aspects of the strategy is that they are directed to the enlightenment of the people to the fact that the school and the improvements it represents are integral to the development of the community itself - the people, in other words, should learn that it is their destinies they are shaping.

One of the purposes of integrating economic activities with schooling is to inculcate a sense of the dignity of labor. For many years in Tanzania, as has already been discussed, education has had the effect of separating the educated from the laboring community from which they come. This has been the result of the educated person spending so much of his or her time apart from the community. And of the intellectual arrogance instilled into them throughout an education system that made a fetish of book learning whilst despising the work of the peasant. By confronting the fact that most of those students who come from villages will stay there, or return there after their basic education, Education for Self-Reliance (ESR)

sets about to overcome this contradiction by a thorough reassessment of the nature and usefulness of labor in the schools. It is hoped that learning combined with labor produces a collective learning strategy that is both productive and even innovative in what it proposes for both agriculture and education.

The economic activity of the school should, as far as possible, contribute to the upkeep of the school itself. That is, by growing crops for consumption by students and teachers and school will contribute to the community's well-being. Selling cash crops for profit may be a source of revenue with which to finance a school project, to purchase equipment, to make a cash contribution to a community project, or even to expand the productive capacity of the economic activity itself. Through these means the school should contribute to its own self-reliance whilst, at the same time, displaying by example, the benefits of self-reliance to the pupils and to the community at large.

The complementarity of the learning strategy to the political - economic strategy in post-Arusha Tanzania was designed to operate in a particular way. The educational strategy is not simply an ideological adjunct to the substructural transformation which the Arusha Declaration initiated, although this is part of its function. The task begun in 1967 was the transformation of Tanzania's political - economic base from a situation in which the relationship between periphery and centre was exploitative and which produced distorted development, to one in which the distinctions between centre and periphery were to be overcome through emphasizing development of the agricultural sector with the aim of self-reliance. The

difficulty of this task was intensified by the complexity of Tanzania's underdevelopment where 'the combination of traditionally undeveloped and now, more developed moments of production, as well as life in the society, within their work, within immediate reproduction, and political relations was not achieved yet.⁴ The peasants were therefore, confronted with a plan essentially from outside. The aim of the learning strategy was to help them understand the implications and complications of the political-economic strategy which the Arusha Declaration represented, and especially, to help them develop in Ujamaa village transformation. By constructing an educational strategy which incorporated productive activity with learning, the government sought not simply to teach self-reliance, but to have it demonstrated as well. Thus, as the schools themselves should begin to show some return and to rely less on external support (government grants, etc.). The communities should have the opportunity to see the possibilities of self-reliance. This way the learning strategy is synchronised with the political-economic strategy.

Working out the Educational Strategy: Some Applications.

In this section I plan to discuss the implementation of the Tanzanian educational strategy by examining three areas of educational activity:

- Ujamaa village schools
- Adult education
- political training for TANU cadres at Kivukoni college.

These three are chosen for a variety of reasons. In the first place, they represent a broad range of educational activity. Second, they are all innovative moves - the former two being direct outcomes

of the political-economic and educational policies announced in 1967, and the latter being in the spirit of the Arusha Declaration in a very meaningful way (despite the fact that the foundation of Kivukoni predates the Arusha Declaration by several years). Third, the Ujamaa village schools are, quite obviously, the focal point of the self-reliant strategy in education. Finally, Tanzania's adult education program offers a view of the manner in which life-long learning is being practised in a society which is in transition from neo-colonialism to socialism.

Education for Self-Reliance in the Countryside

Choosing agriculture as the dominant sector for development in Tanzania meant, among other things, that the face of the countryside was going to have to change if rural production were to generate sufficient surplus to finance further investment. The chief agent by which this change was to be encouraged was the educational institutions in the countryside. Before discussing the manner in which education is strategic to this basic change, it is necessary to quickly list those elements of life in the periphery which are in conflict with the basic objectives of ESR and which the latter seeks to overcome. Nyerere himself recognised most of them in the ESR document, and some are already mentioned above - including intellectual arrogance as a product of education, and the separation of children from their economic livelihoods. Others include the 'bookish' nature of education generally - curricula are more academic than vocational since the end result of each stage in the education system is progression to the next step, and also because the function of education in relation to employment, as perceived by parents, teachers

and students alike, is to open the way to employment in the white-collar sector.

The basic contradiction is, however, brought about directly by capitalism in the Periphery. The relationship between centre and periphery is exploitative, as has already been pointed out, with the centre 'developing' through the application of the surplus produced in the periphery. The development strategy initiated by the Arusha Declaration is, of course, an attempt to overcome this contradiction. To this extent, the educational strategy may only be understood in the general context of the political strategy itself. Thus, education is part of the process of radically restructuring the periphery so that the exploitative relationship is terminated, and so that the national economy can develop on the basis of rural production.

There is available a few studies of applications of the ESR policy. What follows is a discussion of some of these with attempts to throw light on the problems encountered in the implementation of the strategy, and to account for these in terms of our general framework.

An experiment with ESR in Litowa,⁵ a TANU youth league settlement in the Ruvumu region, is based on farming, wool processing and a community nursing service. An important feature of the Litowa project is the manner in which the school is integrated with the community, 'the children live and work in the community. They regularly work on communal lands. The parents come and help with the school lands. Children and parents together build roads and bridges, repair and build houses'.⁶ On fifteen acres of the school farm, beans, groundnuts and soybeans are grown, on another eight

acres fruit trees and cassave have been planted. Additional projects planned for Litowa include poultry breeding, keeping rabbits, building a fish pond and keeping pigs. All these projects are intended to produce for surplus, the commodities are to be sold locally or consumed by the school children.

Reporting on the experiment, a teacher at the school stipulated several conditions that ought to be borne in mind in the effective organisation of ESR. First, the economic activity selected must aim to produce economic gain as experience indicates that students will be far more willing to do the hard and sometimes dirty work necessary if the venture is to be a paying one. Second, the activities must be related to the pupils lives - this is a central theme of ESR itself as explained by Nyerere. The object of this educational strategy is to associate what is learned with the objective conditions in which the students find themselves so that their understanding of their own surroundings is deeper and so that they can begin to undertake improvements in the village economic activity and in its political life. Third, the economic activities must not be organised as clubs in the old school system - this way they acquire an 'extra curricular' connotation that is antithetical to the idea that education for self-reliance is basic and fundamental to the learning process and is, indeed the very rationale of education itself. Fourth, and related to the first point, the activity must be real and sizeable so that the students have a sense of actually engaging in productive activity. Establishing experimental school plots is simply not

adequate. Finally, the activity selected must have as a criterion the age and abilities of the children themselves, otherwise the whole project runs the risk of either being completely taken over by teachers or of stagnating through lack of active pupil participation.⁷

In addition to the economic activities at Litowa, the school is organised in such a way that the pupils participate in some fairly fundamental decision making. The organs which operate are an Executive Committee which looks after much of the day to day running of the school as a social institution; a Working Committee which oversees all practical activities in which the pupils are involved; and Ujamaa Assembly - a sort of general assembly attended by all pupils where issues and problems are discussed. Last, there is a discussion Group of 'selected intelligent children' who meet together to discuss matters of educational interest.⁸

The teachers in this situation are regarded more as 'facilitators' - helping the pupils where necessary and giving advice on all matters. In addition, the curriculum itself provides for the study of socialism and certain documents and texts critical to the understanding of ESR.

On the basis of Toroka's short report, the Litowa experiment appears to be a progressive attempt to apply the principles of ESR. In a highly formalised educational environment such as that in colonial and neo-colonial Tanzania any innovations were treated with mistrust by the pupils and parents. Teachers also, viewed their positions with considerable attachment to rigid school patterns of organisation and behavior. Thus, any school which manages to initiate a process

whereby these hangovers from the past are attacked confronts a difficult task. It would seem that the Litowa experiment owes much of its success to its association with the TANU Youth League as a progressive body in the community.

For all that, one has some misgivings about the 'Discussion Group' - both its composition and rationale. The basis of selection may be in conflict with the egalitarianism embodied in the spirit of ESR and the idea of "selected intelligent children" discussing 'matters of educational importance' leaves one wondering for whom these matters are of interest if the bulk of students cannot be involved in discussing them. This kind of organisational sub-group could contain overtones of elitism.

An ESR project undertaken at Kwamsisi and studied by Kilimhana⁹ is noteworthy for a number of reasons. The purpose of this project as Kilimhana has described them are:

(1) the development of a curriculum that will provide the youth with ideas, skills, and predispositions oriented essentially toward the improvement of the traditional sector of the economy along the principles of socialism and self-reliance.

(2) the experimentation of a school-village integration strategy which it is hoped will facilitate an effective realisation of the set educational goals summarized in (1).¹⁰

These aims are to be implemented through curriculum reform, intensive in-service training of teachers to orient them to the principles underlying ESR; and through exploiting school-community links. It is interesting to note that the limitations to the success of the Kwamsisi experiment are imposed by both the community and the school - the former because it is very poor and

has no cash crops, the latter because of numerous factors related inter alia to: teaching methods and the existence of the primary school Leaving Examination. This is a limitation in that it tends to stress the cognitive aspect of education at the expense of others¹¹ - thus putting it in conflict with the practical orientation of ESR. If these limitations were to be tackled as problems confronting the whole community, rather than as isolated problems affecting the school and the community separately, the result could be a transformation of the very idea of education in the community.

I propose to turn now to a more general look at some of the features of the implementation of ESR in Tanzania referring to a couple of studies carried out by the Institute of Education at the University of Dar es Salaam.

In a survey of education for self-reliance and rural development based on studies of schools in villages in two districts, Besha¹² concluded that the basic problems of implementation stemmed from misunderstanding about the fundamental underlying principle of ESR:

the self-reliance activities are undertaken 'mechanically'. There is little attempt to teach the pupils the skills (even very elementary) required in carrying them out. In other words, self-reliance activities are practicals done without the accompanying learning/teaching that should go with them - they are divorced from the academics (some call it theory work or classroom work).¹³

The overall result of this problem is that self-reliance activities do not fulfill the more basic purposes of the policy which is 'to help the students to learn and practice attitudes and skills which will be of use to them, and to the society in the

future'. At the core of this problem is the fact that reducing the cost of education to the public has been made the central purpose in the implementation ESR activities, inadequate incorporation of ESR into the school curriculum, and in general: 'there is a quite defined separation of self reliance activities from all the subjects at school'.¹⁵

It would be a mistake, however, to draw a general conclusion from these studies about the success or failure of ESR. It would seem that the implementation of ESR, if carried out carefully, can lead to greater successes, that is, 'the kind of project undertaken, the way it is chosen, administered and carried through are all absolutely vital if the spirit of the policy is to be fulfilled'. It seems also, that the manner in which the self-reliance activities are integrated into the curriculum is also important - special weight ought to be given to the activities in the curriculum.¹⁶ Where this is not the case (for instance where work on the school shamba is allocated as punishment) problems begin to mount.

Summing up some of the difficulties encountered in implementing ESR, Mwingira emphasized the roles of the teachers who must understand that ESR is not simply a return to school farming of the kind often practised in the colonial era. They must also be made aware of the 'new political and sociological significance of what they do in the schools'.¹⁷

What these studies and comments indicate is that the educational ideology articulated in 'Education for Self-Reliance' is, in many respects, incompatible with the educational institutions of Tanzania which continue, to a large extent, to manifest characteristics of the colonial and neo-colonial periods. These characteristics

include, in the words of A.A. Lema: 'the curse of the white collar job' and the 'disproportionately great value which many Tanzanians continue to place in book knowledge'.¹⁸ It is basically true, nevertheless, as Nyerere has recognised, that the path to socialism through ESR is a long one - not all the teacher's have had retraining and re-orientation and not all the essential curricular changes have been made.¹⁹

The solution to these conflicts is not, as Foster would argue, to utilize educational resources to encourage the production initiatives of individual farmers.²⁰ But rather, to explore alternative institutions for education, including non-formal education, mass literacy campaigns (of the type conducted in Uba in the early days of the revolution) and to emphasize the integration of school and work, rather than imply their separateness by simply appending ESR activities to the curricula. Nyerere has said in reference to the last point:

A school should not become either a factory or a shamba. But working in a school factory or shamba should become a normal part of the process of learning and living. This is what we have not yet grasped we do not accept in practice that school pupils have to live, as well as learn, and that learning and living are parts of a single process. We are still trying to grasp 'working' onto 'learning' as if the former is on 'extra' being added to education just for the good of our souls. Living, learnings, and working cannot be separated.

Adult Education

In his 1969 New Year's Eve Speech to the people, President Nyerere declared 1970 'Adult Education Year'. This strategic move was designed to generally step up the mobilisation function of Tanzanian education. Its stated objectives were:

- (i) to shake people out of their resignation and to encourage people to learn more about how they can affect improvements in their lives.
- (ii) to provide people with the skills required to improve their lives.
- (iii) to enable everyone to learn the meaning of self-reliance and socialism.²²

The means by which this strategy was to be implemented were numerous - utilizing mass communications media, running courses of all kinds, expanding literacy campaigns, and generally mobilising any resources the nation may possess. The emphases in adult education were to be on learning for change and learning by doing. In addition, 1970 was to be the year for the construction and organisation of the infrastructure for a national program of life-long education.²³

One year after his New Years Eve speech, Nyerere again dedicated 1972 to adult education, stressing the need to extend the national literacy campaign so that illiteracy would be eradicated in six districts.²⁴

Adult education had been a fairly prominent feature of the educational picture in Tanzania for some time, throughout both the colonial and neo-colonial periods, and in the post-Arusha period generally. The institute of Adult Education had been established at the University College in 1964, and both TANU and the Cooperative Movement were among the large number of institutions providing educational to people outside formal schooling. The First Five Year Plan laid emphasis on the need to educate adults 'so that they may willingly accept changes which are necessary in bringing about economic and social improvement'.²⁵ Since 1967 there had been a

burgeoning infrastructure of Adult Education Associations in Tanzania infrastructure of Adult Education Associations in Tanzania with the aim of coordinating the provision of adult education at village and district levels.²⁶

Although it is nowhere openly stated, adult education in a country with 60% of the population under eighteen years of age and where primary education is only available to 52% of the school-age population, is really a positive laternative education - especially since provisions for secondary education are so restricted. It is doubtless in this light that adult education was favoured by the political leadership. Nevertheless, the transformation of the educational infrastructure that would be required to universalise adult education would take a long period of time. Moreover, getting people to accept alternative routes to learning where the established ones are regarded as so vital would also be difficult. Meanwhile, it is true that much adult education that is going on in Tanzania is directed toward the 'sensibilisation of the masses' and their enlightenment - filling gaps in literacy and basic knowledge.

Illiteracy and Literacy Campaigns

The biannual conference of TANU in September 1971 passed the resolution that the entire nation must work toward the total disappearance of illiteracy by 1975.²⁷ This was obviously stimulated by Nyerere's plea for a 'special effort' in the six districts in which he hoped everone would be able to read and write by December 1971.²⁸

UNESCO had already launched a functional literacy campaign in Mwanza near Lake Victoria in 1968. This campaign was a product of the conviction that learning and economic development are logically linked. It was based around the work of the people and their everyday lives. Therefore, the primers used in the campaign were about agriculture and agricultural products - particularly those related to the districts in which the campaign was being carried out. Other primers developed particularly for women participants used themes of better health, home and child care. The campaign also made use of demonstration plots for every literacy class so that the learning may be more thoroughly integrated with working. However, to follow the same pattern in a national campaign may present insurmountable difficulties relating to the use of these resources.²⁹

Any country that embarks on a national literacy campaign ought to do so with care since the cost of implementing the strategy may outweigh the benefits. The question that ought to be asked is: "Literacy for what?" There is danger in ignoring the objective economic conditions of the masses to the extent that other vital elements of the learning strategy are subordinated to the quest for national literacy. On the other hand, as Nyerere points out, ignorant people are liable to repression and exploitation, and the national literacy campaign is regarded as a defense strategy against this. Furthermore, mass alfabetization, because of the nature of the educational task itself, can avoid the kinds of conflicts that are encountered in other types of educational strategies such as the wider availability of schooling, as has been shown above.

Mass literacy campaigns can fulfill a number of associative functions in the development of a self-reliant society. The experience of learning to read can, as Paulo Freire has so forcefully pointed out transform the ignorant and oppressed peasant or urban-slum dweller into an agent of revolutionary change. This emerges from a critical awareness of the conditions of oppression - 'critical' in the sense that the sources of oppression are understood, and are objects of political praxis. To this extent, the literacy campaign may be a strategy that grows out of the shared political experience of the masses. In Tanzania, where there has been a political revolution and where the conditions for social revolution are being activated, literacy may be a powerful tool in transforming the countryside economically and politically.

The achievement of literacy is not in itself material social change, although mass literacy may be the forerunner of social change movements, or even of revolutions that follow 'mass awakening'. Mass literacy is often one promise of revolution, it is often an important part of the rhetoric of the revolution itself. The fulfilment of the promise of the revolution may take the form of a mass 'alfabetization' campaign, as in Cuba in 1961, and become a cohesive force in which the shared experiences of the masses are united in a historical movement. In this way a mass literacy campaign may become an achievement of the revolution - one of the symbols of the people moving forward. But the literacy campaign must be followed up with moves for actual social change where the material expectations of the masses are met. Unless this happens the net result of mass literacy may be simply more articulate

discontentment of the masses provoking reaction from the political leadership. In Tanzania, the leadership, made up of some progressive intellectuals, seems to be aware of the potential conflict, and literacy is not regarded as an end in itself. It is, writes Nyerere, 'just a tool, a means by which we can learn more, more easily'.³⁰

In addition to the literacy program other components of Tanzania's adult education strategy are:

Rural Training Centres: a network of over thirty-five of these centres operates throughout the countryside. They are mainly concerned with the dissemination of knowledge and information about Ujamaa. They transmit ideology and teach agricultural and rural technical skills to village leaders.

Cooperative Education: the cooperative movement, as mentioned earlier, has been involved in adult education for a long time. The Cooperative Education Centre produces correspondence course, radio programs and courses and seminars for people such as Cooperative education secretaries who work in the cooperative movement. The Cooperative Movement also runs the Cooperative College at Moshi which provides residential and correspondence courses for Cooperative Movement members and committeemen.

Agricultural Extension: the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives is responsible for the upgrading of farmers skills and knowledge. However, the ratio of extension officers to farmers is low, making the task of agricultural education difficult.

These are among a variety of adult education activities in Tanzania. They have been presented in a little detail in an endeavour to demonstrate the manner of cooperation of a collective

learning strategy that is, in many ways, a departure from the educational norm. It may be wondered what is the basis of this claim since adult education is a commonplace educational activity all over the world. The answer to this relates to the manner in which adult education in Tanzania is designed to operate against the formation of an educational 'status quo' which may support class formations that actively subvert the processes of self-reliance and the transition to socialism. As long as adult education is designed to complement the political-economic strategy initiated by the state, it will play an associative role in these processes. For example, political education of the masses (such as education in the principles of Ujamaa undertaken by the Rural Training Centres) is directed toward the production of political consciousness that is regarded as essential to the successful implementation of Ujamaa principles at village level. This is a direct demonstration of the manner in which the educational strategy is designed to synchronise with the political-economic strategy.

Because adult education programs tend to be less concerned with certification, 'formal' qualifications, and other institutionalised impediment characteristic of the regular school system, and because such programs tend to less to be integrated into the 'lock-step' progression of the formal education system, they also more successfully avoid the conflicts that are inevitably part of the formal system. In other words, the conflict between the allocative function and the socialisation function (or learning function) often encountered in formal education is less likely to arise where the object of the learning strategy is the dissemination of skills and

knowledge relevant to the actual 'life histories' of the participants (i.e., to their work and their community participation) rather than the attainment of a certificate as an end in itself.

Nonetheless, adult education can reproduce its own structures and in doing so become a 'nighttime version' of the formal system in the respects just mentioned. This is especially likely where adult education performs a compensatory function - that is providing second opportunities to school dropouts. But, handled correctly, an adult education program that becomes extensively formalised - even if it issues certificates - need not necessarily operate against the aims of the collective learning strategy generally - particularly where the liberation of the participants is an objective. The success of the adult education strategy in Tanzania depends on the extent to which the aims of the political-economic strategy and the educational strategy remain concomitant.

The Education of Cadres: Kivukoni College

In the Arusha Declaration Nyerere named 'good leadership' as one of the prerequisites for development. In contrast to other revolutions in other parts of the world during the present century, Tanzania's leadership is a civilian leadership rather than being composed of military leaders. This has inevitable implications for the training of political leaders. At the national level, the leadership seems sufficiently aware of the road on which to lead the country in the transition to socialism. At the lower levels, inexperience and lack of general education can lead to misunderstanding about the aims and manner of implementation of the

development strategy. At the lower levels conflict can be the product of over-zealous application of policy directives. Thus, reliance on leadership as a basic resource requires that leaders must be educated to a level of awareness that ensures the correct application of policy.

From 1956 onward TANU sent leaders abroad for education - to Liberia, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia, or Great Britain,³¹ but the number was too small to significantly upgrade the general level of political leaders at all levels. Hence in 1958 the Party executive decided, in the face of open hostility to the idea from the colonial government, to open an educational institution of its own. It set up the Tanganyika Education Trust Fund to raise money for the institution - from there, the grass roots connection that Kivukoni has, began. Raising funds was the task of a small committee organised by an expatriate Ms. J.E. Wicken whose description of the early beginnings of the drive to raise money is a vivid illustration of the grass roots origins of the College:

At each district headquarters of TANU the local TANU secretary had organised voluntary collectors ...In Lake Province, the period of the collections was shortly after the harvest but in (other areas) there was very often a real shortage of cash. Thus it was that in a very small village outside Iringa on elderly women came up to the table where the collection was made saying: "Sinha fedha; naweza Kakupa yai?"; "I have no money, can I give you an egg?" This was the beginning. On that occasion the egg was accepted and auctioned there and then - it raised 5/- from a non-African farmer who had stopped to see what was going on! But from then on, after the cash collection, we would ask the people to give us whatever they could spare. This way we received tins of nuts, bags of maize, beans, chickens, eggs, etc.³²

The Fund purchased an old hotel accross the harbour from Dar Es Salaam and opened with 39 students and four staff in 1961.³³ The students are not selected for academic qualifications - there are no minimum qualifications laid down, but selection is made from mature men and women in leadership positions in the Party. More than a third of the students are civil servants and rural teachers, others are TANU regional, district, and branch chairmen and secretaries, community development workers, and rural leaders of voluntary organisations of all kinds.³⁴

The college runs numerous short courses, but the basic courses are one nine-month, and a three-month residential course. The College operates a shamba where cassava, pineapples, coconut and pawpaws are grown, and cattle and chickens are raised. In this way the college practices 'Ujamaa' and it invests in its own self-reliance, the activities are undertaken by the students and staff. The atmosphere of cooperation and self-reliance is also promoted by everyone participating in cleaning and dishwashing.³⁵

Courses at Kivukoni are all oriented toward Ujamaa. It provides the central theme of courses in politics, history, economics and sociology. Careful attention is paid in all these courses to Tanzania's ideology, and the implications of the course contents for social, political, and economic development. 'Students are provided not only with information on these subjects but they are taught how to learn, how to extract and condense education from books, how to reason and how to present ideas in a speech or discussion.'³⁶ Teaching is done as far as possible in small tutorial groups as it is believed close contact between staff and students will produce

who can read, write, and think about the problems of development better.³⁷

Kivukoni was modelled, in the initial stages at least, on Ruskin College, Oxford - an adult education institution catering for officials of the Labour Party, especially those who had not completed regular secondary education.³⁸ But unlike Ruskin, which is not a college for political education and training in the sense that a particular world view forms the basis of the course offerings, Kivukoni is very intent on constructing education in which Tanzanian socialism is the central theme. That is, it is intended to instruct the leaders in the practical and theoretical aspects of socialism. This has not always worked though - some graduates return to the countryside willing to implement the right policies as long as they emanated from above.

To ensure that the cadres are capable of being effective leaders in the transformation of the countryside, what is necessary are cadres who can make a creative theoretical and practical contribution based on an understanding of socialism in the Tanzanian context.³⁹ As long as regional and local level cadres are capable of simply executing orders efficiently the process of Ujamaa will be impeded by ineffective communication between the masses and the socialist leadership. This could mean that the effectiveness of Kivukoni as an instrument in socialist education could be mitigated.

It is too early yet to draw any hard and fast conclusions about the implementations of 'education for self-reliance' in Tanzania. It is clear, though, that where the educational strategy is closely related to the processes initiated by the application of

the political-economic strategy, the 'transition to socialism' is more likely to approach what Nyerere had in mind in the Arusha Declaration period when the strategies were designed. Operating against this are a host of factors - not the least among which is the fact that colonial and neo-colonial institutions remain the principal vehicles for transmitting the collective learning strategy. For historical reasons there are likely to be conflicts between the socialisation/learning function of these institutions (i.e., the 'content' as determined by the ideology, and the directives from the Party and leadership) and the selective/allocative functions (as determined by such traditions as the association of schooling with 'white collar' prestige, etc.). Nevertheless, as I have indicated, the learning strategy is applied through other educational institutions which are 'outside' the regular schooling system - as long as some sort of flexibility in interpretation exists, then the spirit of 'Education for Self-Reliance' may be realizable.

POSTSCRIPT

COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Localisation

It was remarked in the Postscript to Part III that one of the common features of the transition in both China and Tanzania is localisation of the planning and implementation of the political-economic strategy. In this, we have observed, the state 'transforms itself' from a 'macro' institution coordinating applying and supervising policy at all levels to a collective of regional and village committees which initiate and implement policy in response to needs they themselves have perceived. Since education is a state apparatus, it is to be expected that a similar shift from 'national' to local organisation and control will take place - and it is in both countries. The impetus for this has not been exactly the same in both cases, however: the Tanzanian state has encouraged localisation and self-determination in schools largely because it has insufficient funds to endow all the schools with state aid. Whilst this is certainly the case also in China, it does appear that localisation is a product of the belief on the part of the leadership in the efficacy of local decision-making in the political process generally. That is, it is a response to the Maoists' belief in the 'infinite creativity' of the Chinese peasant.

But whatever the impetus, the fact that the educational strategy takes on a more local emphasis in funding, organisation and control is testimony to the close relationship between the application of the political-economic strategy and the educational strategy. It is recognised, in both cases, that the educational apparatus must first respond to local needs - since meeting the basic needs of the people is the first priority of the political-economic strategies. This is in contrast to two aspects of alternative approaches: in cases where the political-economic strategy is nationally determined and coordinated (i.e., where there are 'leading sectors' nominated by the centre, and where there is elaborate 'national' planning) the educational strategy is less a matter of meeting the aspirations and needs of individuals and local communities than of fulfilling 'manpower requirements'. This could happen in either capitalist underdevelopment or in 'transitional' societies (it was happening in China in the first ten years after liberation). In either situation, also, education, by virtue of its function as a supplier of manpower to the nominated sector, can contribute significantly to the 'rural-urban' drift by providing education what is in one way or another, more 'relevant' to the urban industrial worker.

Where the educational strategy is localised, on the other hand, the educational apparatus responds to local needs, and the education offered is more likely to fit the educated for work in the village, or somewhere in the rural community. Without further discussion, the point illustrates the mechanisms of the interaction

between the educational strategy and the political-economic strategy in 'transitional' societies. There are some differences in the manner in which localisation occurs in each case. For instance, in China, localisation extends to the selection of teachers from the community, brigade, or party organs - this is a product of the GPCR and is partly aimed at 'deprofessionalisation' and 'demystification' of the teaching profession. In Tanzania, teachers are **still**, by and large trained at the National Colleges of Education - and professionally trained teachers are still thereby distinct from other personnel working in the school (of course not all **teachers** are trained - many are secondary school graduates without teacher training at all). Whilst there are possible simple explanations for the difference (in terms of the availability of teacher training institutions, etc) it does seem to reflect a fundamental difference in the approach to education, and especially to the status and role of the teacher in each case. In China the 'red-expert' debate has produced serious questioning of academic credentials and formal training, and this, in turn is related to the class struggle (with 'authorities' and 'experts' being criticesed for 'bourgeois' ideology). In Tanzania, the same has not occurred - although the leadership has often complained that teachers are divorced from the masses. From this the general conclusion could be drawn that the extent of localisation in China and Tanzania differs - that is, the state as a 'macro' institution (training and supplying teachers) continues to play a dominant role in Tanzania, the role that has been challenged, and in some areas eliminated in China. This applies to some extent in

the design of curricula and materials also, although the extent is not determined in the text.

Education and Labour

Both strategies are based on the integration of education and productive labour. In China the basis of this is the principle of PWPS which is now fairly widespread throughout the education system; in Tanzania, the Ujamaa village schools are supposed to support a shamba, or engage in some kind of productive activity - this was spelled out clearly in 'Education for Self-Reliance'. In both cases combining study with work is designed to eliminate the contradiction between mental and manual labour and to instill the value of work into the minds of the young. It is a 'work ethic' as it were. But also, in both cases, it is very practically oriented on several counts: it means that the educational institution can be self supporting, and it can also mean that augment their contribution to the economic life of the community, and finally, the school can become a trying ground for innovations and new techniques in agriculture, husbandry or whatever the economic pursuit of the community. Both countries have experienced similar difficulties in having the idea of combining learning with productive labour accepted by different groups. Objections and resistance have come from teachers and educational policy makers. Furthermore parents are reported to have had difficulty accepting that school is for work as well as for study. The principal difficulty seems to be in having people understand and accept that education and labour are part and parcel of the same thing, that productive activity becomes the basis of educational activity generally, and it is not simply a

matter of schools setting aside a period or two for working in the school plot.

With these few comments the similarities between China's and Tanzania's strategies of combining education with productive labour are covered. It is necessary to point to some contrasting features. In doing this, care must be taken not to assume, the superiority of the Chinese experience, because most of the contrasts refer to measures that the Chinese have tried and that the Tanzanians have not.

The first point that is noticeable in contrasting the Chinese with the Tanzanian practice of combining education with productive labour is the profound difference in the 'theoretical' rationalisation for the approach. In China, Mao Tse-tung Thought as a world view is highly developed - we have seen this in relation to many other factors. But it is developed in depth as well as in breadth - there are Maoist essays on a vast range of 'philosophical' topics, including epistemology. In fact, the impetus for combining education with productive labour comes from the epistemological foundation of Mao Tse-tung Thought which has been so highly developed and which has spread throughout Chinese political and economic life in practice. The impetus for it in Tanzania is more the product of practical considerations like the desire for schools to be economically self-sufficient, and the desire for youth to learn skills applicable to rural life.

In "On Practice" which is widely read and discussed throughout China, and which is the seminal work on the Maoist epistemology, Mao points out that 'man's knowledge depends mainly upon his activity

in material production'. He goes on to outline his scheme of the process of cognition in terms of an exploration 'of the relationship between knowledge and practice, between knowing and doing'. I am not suggesting that this aspect of Tanzanian educational practice, because of the absence of a clearly-articulated philosophical basis, lacks theoretical justification. I am merely pointing out that the relationship between epistemology and educational practice in China is far more clearly spelled out, and, moreover, seems far more thoroughly probed than is the case in Tanzania. In China, education and productive labour are combined because the latter is the essence of learning - practice is the basis of knowledge.

Second, the combination of education and productive labour has a greater variety of applications in China than in Tanzania. This is partly accounted for because by the infinitely greater range of educational 'situations' in the former - there are more people pursuing a greater diversity of economic and social activities. This aside, the Chinese appear to have explored the applicability of PWPS more extensively - the explanation for this lies partly in the fact that in China education is based less on the school: many factories for instance, run their own schools. The impetus for educational innovation comes from all across the social spectrum. In Tanzania, on the other hand, education is more likely to be regarded as the preserve of the school rather than of other social, economic or political institutions - although, as we will see in our discussions on forms, this is not absolutely the case. This points to a difference in the principle of combining education with productive labour - in China, the principle is as often 'productive labour

combined with education' rather than the other way around. It is more thoroughgoing.

Finally, within the 'formal' education 'system' (it is less useful to talk of Chinese education as 'systemic' because of the regional diversity of educational institutions and practices) the principle of combining education with labour is applied more widely in China. For example, PWPS is as much a part of higher education as it is of regular primary school education. Whilst institutions of higher education in Tanzania (for example the National Colleges of Education) do practise 'self-reliance' it is much less a characteristic of them than similar institutions in China. The contrast between say, Tsinghua University and the University of Dar es Salaam in this respect would be marked.

There are other points of contrast that have already been mentioned in other contexts. For example, PWPS in Chinese education provides the rationale for employing workers and peasants as teachers - this is not practised to the same extent in Tanzania. Second, the practice of sending teachers and university professors down to work in fields and factories has no real parallel in Tanzania - Nyerere's action of sending university students down from the university to get a taste of country life would be regarded as seriously out of step with the Chinese practice since it was conceived of as punishment. The Chinese have been careful not to treat 'sending down' as punitive. Finally, and more will be said about this below, productive labour is more fundamentally allied to the purpose of the M7CS than to Kivukoni. This can be explained, of course, with

reference to a range of differences in aims and objectives between the two institutions.

Ideology and Educational Practice

The relationship between the 'official' ideologies and educational practice has been in the foreground of our discussion throughout, but it is necessary to isolate a few points of difference between the two countries. It is necessary also to keep the distinction clear between two distinct usages of the term 'ideology' - it is used in a general, and in a specific (applied) sense. For example, Mao Tse-tung thought is the 'official' ideology in China - this is using the term in the 'specific' or applied a sense. But 'ideology' is also used to refer to the superstructure - to politics, social relations, etc. Thus, in the following discussion we refer to education as ideology (i.e., as part of the superstructure) and to the 'ideological' content of education.

Educational institutions are the vehicle for the official ideologies of both countries in numerous ways. A simple example is the 'work ethic' that is very much a part of both ideologies. It is stressed through the practice of combining education and productive labour, and it is 'taught' in the curriculum. The curriculum and the activities related to learning in educational institutions are not the sole vehicles the school has to impart the ideology. The day-to-day management and organisation of the school is also part of the process.

We have seen how Mao Tse-tung Thought is incorporated into the curriculum in Chinese schools and universities - by basing all kinds of activities around Maoist principles and by reading and

studying various documents and essays from Mao's selected works and other important sources. The works of Nyerere are also used in educational activities in Tanzanian schools and educational institutions generally. For example there are adult education courses set up to 'explain Ujamaa', and in the village schools the principles of Ujamaa are incorporated into the syllabus in a variety of ways. To this extent the ideologies are used in both cases to influence the thinking of students along particular lines. It does appear in the case of China, though, that this aspect of curriculum is more comprehensive in the schools. It is also, probably, more effective since it is buttressed by a range of additional media publicising the ideology. But the crucial difference is the way Mao Tse-tung Thought underlies all education, explains its rationale. The principles of Ujamaa do not, yet anyway, occupy the same basic place in the forefront of Tanzanian education.

As the impetus behind PWPS in Chinese education is the Maoist epistemology, curriculum is also affected. Among the questions Mao addresses himself to in the 'philosophical essays' is the nature of human knowledge, and the curricula in Chinese schools are based on the answer Mao gives to this question. This has no parallel in Tanzanian education, though Nyerere does address himself to the question of what knowledge should be taught in schools, he does not construct an epistemology that has become the basis of school knowledge itself.

In looking at the role of education in societies in 'transition' we are in fact examining the role of the child ideological apparatus in the transformation of political and economic life. In

both societies it is obvious that the political leaders place considerable emphasis on the educational apparatus in this transformation.

It is clear too that to the extent that the political-economic strategies in Tanzania and China are working, education is playing a decisive role. However, there is a crucial difference that has already been alluded to more than once: In China class struggle is the basis of revolutionary practice and educational activity is closely related to the struggle (in Mao's words to Mao Yuan 'it is the most important subject'). In Tanzania, on the other hand, education is not linked so definitely to the class struggle - in fact, the educational apparatus all but ignores it. This is not to suggest that the educational strategy is fruitless - it may well give rise to sharper political awareness among students and hence become an integral part of class struggle. But this remains a phase in the future.

Forms

What Lenin said of political forms in the transition from capitalism to communism can be equally applied to educational forms in the transition to socialism:

The transition from capitalism to communism certainly cannot but yield a tremendous abundance and variety of political forms.⁴⁰

The 'socialist' revolutions in China and Tanzania have given rise to a remarkable variety of educational forms although the 'regular' school in some form or another is still the basis of the educational strategies. Since the rise of mass schooling has been concomitant with the rise of capitalism it is tempting to regard

the school as essentially a capitalist institution. It is also tempting to think that the transition will, in Shul'gin's, words witness 'the withering away of the school'. Like the capitalist state, (which Lenin insisted must be smashed if the revolution were to be successful) the school also, it would follow should be similarly destroyed, given its role in bourgeois society. But it would be absurdly dogmatic to take this as given before any thought were given to both the inherent value of schooling, and alternative educational structures. In the strategies under discussion it seems that due consideration has been given both these - although to varying degrees, and with varying successes.

In many respects the Ujamaa village schools and village (brigade) primary schools and junior middle schools in China play a similar social role to schools anywhere - and they operate in much the same way: the majority of attendants are children, there are specific hours of attendance, most teaching is done by a regular teaching staff, and so on. But it immediately becomes clear that even these features of schooling have become modified in Tanzanian and Chinese schools. The 'form' of the school has been changed as the educational strategy has been applied. For instance, sending out children to work in neighbourhood factories shifts the locale of education from the four walls, as does farming the school shamba.

As far as completely new forms are concerned, these usually emerge where students are, for reasons of age or perhaps isolation, out of the 'regular' school system. For example, the variety of technical training institutions in China (of which the school at the

Shanghai Machine Tool Plant is a prototype) and the 'Labour Universities' attract students who are peasants, workers, or army-men: similarly, Rural Training Centres in Tanzania are for workers and peasants. Spare-time education in China gives rise to a variety of educational forms -- even if they are simply discussion groups.

But the most interesting new form that has become part of the educational strategies in the two countries is the cadre training institution: the M7CS and Kivukoni College. Though the latter was established well before Arusha it is very much part of the ESR strategy. These institutions are comparable because they are both designed to improve the work of cadres among the people; to make them effective leaders. At both institutions the emphasis is on the study of 'theoretical' works which form the basis of the rationales behind the political-economic strategies so that there will be cadres who can be relied upon to interpret and apply policy correctly and resolutely. But cadres also learn how to relate to the people with whom they work -- how to function sympathetically, yet efficiently as leaders. To this end they are taught such organisational skills as how to run a seminar, or lead a discussion group, how to prepare and deliver a speech, and how to draw out ideas and points from an argument. In these features, in their relationship with the parties, the institutions function similarly.

Yet there are differences between the two institutions which deserve attention. The first is the obvious difference in emphasis on labour, class struggle, and experiencing correct ideology. The M7CS are based on productive labour, cadres spend most of their three,

six, or twelve-month periods engaged in productive labour alongside the workers and peasants, and the schools actually construct buildings, clear land, and produce goods. That is, the M7CS thrusts the cadre into the workplace, whereas Kivukoni takes him or her out of it, and the labour that is engaged in at the college is undertaken almost as an 'extracurricular' activity - it is not central to the students' purpose in being there.

The role of study in the respective programs is also different. Kivukoni students do not study works of 'classical' Marxism - Leninism (TANU itself is not a Marxist-Leninist party) although they do learn about the notion of 'socialism', and part of their purpose is to gain a more thorough understanding of what 'socialism' is through a study of the Ujamaa documents. At the M7CS, cadres read Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Mao, and discuss the works in their brigades. This too is to gain a critical understanding of 'socialism' - but it is tempered with discussion of the class struggle, etc., which does not happen at Kivukoni to any comparable extent.

At Kivukoni students are taught in seminars, lectures, or there are discussions - there are curricula and syllabi, and the college runs in much the same way as any 'middle level' college. At the M7CS this is not usually the case, mainly because of the place of labour in the day-to-day activities of the institution. Lectures are given, but by workers and peasants, some of whom come in to work and live in the school. Educationally, the method of learning at the M7CS is more 'by enlightenment' with less emphasis on lectures by experts than on discussions which the individual

cadre contributes to as he needs, or is asked by the group. The process of 'struggle-criticism-transformation' sums up the pedagogy of the M7CS.

At this point it may seem unfair to be comparing the two institutions as their differences seem irreconcilable, but these contrasts show up much of what is different generally in the educational strategies of China and Tanzania. Yet both institutions were set up with the express purpose of training political leaders to be active in the transition to socialism.

We have seen how the educational strategies are applied in both China and Tanzania, and we have compared them. We have summarily concluded that their differences are due to differences in their approach to the transition to socialism: China stresses class struggle, Tanzania does not utilise the ideology to the same extent or in the same way as China; the transformation of regular schools into institutions that combine learning and productive labour is preceeding at different rates and in different ways in each case. In China the relationship between the educational strategy and the political-economic strategy appears more 'sensitive' in that the school is being transformed, learning is being transformed, and both of these are contributing to the continuing transformation of the political-economic existence of the masses. In Tanzania, the school is not yet so interwoven with the political-economic strategy. Yet that is the conclusion - that the educational apparatus interacts with the political-economic base, explaining, refining, and enacting the strategy to its conclusion.

Footnotes to Chapter VIII and
Postscript to Part IV

¹Julius K. Nyerere, "Education for Self-Reliance", in Julius K. Nyerere, ed., Freedom and Socialism, A Selection of Writings and Speeches, 1965-1967. (Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1970) p. 273.

²Ibid., p. 294.

³Ibid., p. 282.

⁴Hans Bosse, "Socio-Cultural Factors of Underdevelopment. Overcoming Underdevelopment as a Learning Process", Journal of Peace Research, 12:4 (1975): 323.

⁵S. Toroka, "Education for Self-Reliance: The Litowa Experiment", in Socialism in Tanzania, 2 vols., ed., John Saul and Lionel Cliffe (Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1972), 2:264-270.

⁶Ibid., p. 266.

⁷Ibid., p. 264.

⁸Ibid., pp. 268-270.

⁹Samuel N.M. Kilimhana, "An Evaluation of the Kwamsisi Experimental Project in Tanzania", (Master of Education Thesis, University of Alberta, 1975).

¹⁰Ibid., p. 79.

¹¹Ibid., p. 146.

¹²M.R. Basha, "Education for Self-Reliance and Rural Development". Institute of Education, 1973 (mimeographed).

¹³Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁶Anza A. Lema, "Education for Self-Reliance". Institute of Education, Dar es Salaam, n.d. (Mimeographed), p. 14.

¹⁷A.C. Mwingira, "Education for Self-Reliance: The Problems of Implementation", in Education in Africa, ed., Richard Jolly (Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1969), p. 49.

¹⁸Lema, "Education for Self-Reliance", p. 27.

¹⁹Julius K. Nyerere, "Tanzania Ten Years After Independence", The African Review, 2:1 (1972): 46.

²⁰Phillip J. Foster, "Education for Self-Reliance", in Jolly, Education in Africa, p. 76.

²¹Nyerere, "Ten Years After", p. 46.

²²Idem, Freedom and Development: A Selection of Writings and Speeches 1968-1973, (Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 137-138.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Idem. "Adult Education in Tanzania", Mbioni 6:7 (1972):1-11.

²⁵Quoted in Mbioni 5:5 and 6 (1969):19.

²⁶Ibid., p. 56.

²⁷Budd L. Hall, "Literacy and Development: The Freire Approach", Mbioni 6:10 (1972):18.

²⁸Nyerere, "Adult Education in Tanzania", p. 8.

²⁹Hall, "Literacy and Development", pp. 54-55.

³⁰Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p. 139.

³¹J.E. Wicken, "The Beginnings of Kivukoni College", Mbioni 5:8 (1969):3.

³²Ibid., pp. 7-8.

³³Ibid., p. 10.

³⁴J. Cunningham, "Kivukoni College Post-Arusha Declaration Period", Mbioni 4:7 (January, 1968):15.

³⁵Ibid., p. 19-20.

³⁶Ibid., p. 36.

³⁷Ibid., p. 17.

³⁸Belle Harris, "An Ideological Institute for Tanzania?", in Tanzania: Revolution by Education, ed., Idrian N. Resnick (Arusha, Longmans of Tanzania, 1968), p. 154.

³⁹Ibid., p. 156.

⁴⁰V.I. Lenin, The State and Revolution, (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1973), p. 41.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

EDUCATION, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCY

- Almond, G.A., and Coleman, J.S., eds. The Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1964.
- Amin, Samir. "Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model." Review of African Political Economy 1 (August-November, 1974): 9-26.
- Altbach, Philip, G. "Education and Neo-colonialism." Teachers College Record 72:4, (May, 1971): 543-558.
- _____. "Literary Colonialism: Books in the Third World." Harvard Educational Review 45:2, (May, 1975): 22-236.
- Baran, Paul, A. The Longer View. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968.
- _____. The Political Economy of Growth. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962.
- Baran, Paul, A., and Hobsbawm, Eric, J. "The Stages of Economic Growth". Review of The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifest, by Walt Whitman Rostow. Kyklos 14: 1961.
- Barnet, Richard J., and Muller, Ronald, E. Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974.
- Bernstein, Henry. "Modernisation Theory and the Sociological Study of Development." Journal of Development Studies 7:2, (1971) 141-160.
- Bettelheim, Charles. The Transition to Socialist Economy. Sussex: Harvester Press, 1975.
- Bettelheim, Charles, and Sweezy, Paul M. On The Transition to Socialism. New York and London: Montly Review Press, 1971.

- Blaug, Mark. Education and the Unemployment Problem in the Developing Countries. Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1973.
- Blaug, Mark, ed. Economics of Education, 2 vols. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1968.
- Brembeck, C.S., and Hansen, J.W. Education and The Development of Nations. New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1966.
- Carnoy, Martin. Education as Cultural Imperialism. New York: David McKay, 1974.
- Coombs, P.H. The World Education Crisis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Curle, Adam. Education for Liberation. New York: Halstead Press, 1974.
- _____. Educational Strategy for Developing Countries. London: Travistock, 1963.
- Eisenstadt, S.N. Modernisation: Protest and Change. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966.
- Fishlow, A. "Empty Economic Stages?" The Economic Journal 75 (March 1965):
- Frank, Andre Gunder. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969.
- _____. "Human Capital and Economic Growth". Economic Growth and Cultural Change 8:2 (1960).
- _____. Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution? New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969.
- Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: The Seabury Press, 1970.
- Gintis, Herb, and Bowles, Samuel. Schooling in Capitalist America. New York: Basic Books, 1976.
- Hagen, Everett. On the Theory of Social Change. Homewood Lu: The Dorsey Press, 1962.
- Harbison, F.H. and Myers, C.A. "Strategies of Human Resource Development." In Economics of Education, Vol. 1. Edited by Mark Blaug. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968.
- Huberman, Leo, and Sweezy, Paul M. Introduction to Socialism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968.

Inkeles, Alec, and Smith, David H. Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.

Lenin, VI. The State and Revolution. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1973.

Lewis, W.A. "Education and Economic Development". Social and Economic Studies 10:2 (June, 1961):113-127.

McClelland, David D. The Achieving Society. Princeton, N.J. D. Van Nostrand and Co., 1961.

Mazrui, Ali A. "The African University as a Multinational Corporation." Harvard Educational Review 45:2 (May, 1975): 191-210.

Meier, Gerald, ed. Leading Issues in Development Economics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.

Pye, Lucien W. "The Politics of South East Asia". In The Politics of the Developing Areas, pp. 65-149. Edited by G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964.

Rodney, Walter. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. London: Bogle -l'Ouverture Publications.

Rostow, Walt Whitman. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.

Schultz, T.W. "Capital Formation by Education". Journal of Political Economy 68:6 (1960): 571-583.

_____. "Investment in Human Capital". In Economics of Education Vol. 1. pp. 13-33. Edited by Mark Blaug. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968.

_____. "Reflections on Investment in Man." Journal of Political Economy 70:5 (October, 1962):1-8.

Sweezy, Paul M. Socialism. New York: McGraw Hill, 1949.

CHINA: EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT

- Asia Research Centre, ed. The Great Cultural Revolution in China. Rutland and Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1968.
- Barendsen, F.D. The Educational Revolution in China. Washington: United States Office of Education, 1973.
- Bastid, M. "Economic Necessity and Political Ideals in Educational Reform During the Cultural Revolution". The China Quarterly 42:16-45.
- Baum, Richard, and Teiwes, Frederick C. Ssu-Ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962-1966. Berkeley: Centre for Chinese Studies, 1968.
- Bettelheim, Charles. Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organisation in China. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974.
- Biggerstaff, K. The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China. Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1961.
- Bowie, Robert, and Fairbank, J.K., eds. Communist China 1955-1959: Policy Documents with Analysis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.
- Brandt, Conrad; Schwartz, Benjamin; and Fairbank, J.K., eds. A Documentary History of Chinese Communism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952.
- Centre d'etude du Sud-Est Asiatique et de l'Extreme Orient. Fourth Working Session. "Education in Communist China." Brussels, 1969. (mimeographed)
- Ch'en Hsi-en. The Maoist Educational Revolution. New York: Praeger, 1974.
- Cheng Shih. A Glance at China's Economy. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1974.
- "China In Transition." The Political Quarterly. (Title Issue) 45:1 (January - March, 1974).
- China: Science Walks on Two Legs. A Report from Science for the People. New York: Avon Books, 1974.

Chou En-lai. "Our Tasks on the Cultural And Educational Fronts."
In Chinese Communist Education, pp. 308-315. Edited by
Stewart E. Fraser. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965.

_____. "Report on the Work of the Government to the First
Session of the Third National People's Congress on December
21-22, 1964." In The Great Cultural Revolution in China.
Edited by Asia Research Centre. Rutland and Tokyo:
Charles E. Tuttle and Co., 1968.

_____. Report on the Proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan
for the Development of the National Economy. Peking,
Foreign Languages Press, 1956.

Chu Yu-kuang. Some Problems of a National Education System in
China. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1933.

Cohen, Arthur A. The Communism of Mao Tse-tung. Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Cole, Christine. "Education and the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution". Master of Arts Thesis, The University of
Alberta, 1970.

Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. China! Inside the People's
Republic. New York: Bantam Books, 1972.

Culture and Education in New China. Peking: Foreign Languages
Press, 1951.

De Bary, W. Theodore; Chan Wing-tsit; and Tan, Chester, eds.
Sources of Chinese Tradition. 2 Vols. New York and London:
Columbia University Press, 1960.

Dirlik, Arif. "National Development and Social Revolution in Early
Chinese Thought". The China Quarterly 58 (April - June, 1974)
286-309.

Dittmer, Lowell. Liu Shao-Ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.

Eckstein, Alexander. China's Economic Development. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1975.

Fan, H.K. ed. The Chinese Cultural Revolution: Selected Documents.
New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1968.

First Five-Year Plan for Development of the National Economy of the
People's Republic of China in 1953-1957. Peking: Foreign
Languages Press, 1956.

- Fraser, Stewart E., ed. Chinese Communist Education. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965.
- Freyn, Hubert. Chinese Education in the War. Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1940.
- Friedman, Edward, and Selden, Mark. America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian American Relations. New York: Pantheon, 1969.
- Fundamental Education in China. Nanking: Ministry of Education, 1947.
- Gorley, John G. "Capitalist and Maoist Economic Development". In America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian American Relations, pp. 324-356. Edited by Edward Friedman and Mark Selden. New York: Pantheon, 1969.
- _____. "The Formation of Mao's Economic Strategy, 1927-1949." Monthly Review 23:3; pp. 58-132.
- Harper, Paul. Spare-Time Education for Workers in Communist China. Washington: United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1964.
- Hawkins, John N. "Family Planning and Health Care Delivery in the People's Republic of China: Implications for Educational Alternatives". Comparative Education Review 20:2 (June, 1976) 151-164.
- _____. Mao Tse-tung and Education. Hamden: Linnet Books, 1974.
- Hinton, William. Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village. New York: Vintage Books, 1966.
- _____. Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University. New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1972.
- _____. Turning Point in China: An Essay on the Cultural Revolution. New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1972.
- Holubnychy, Usevold. "Mao Tse-tung's Materialistic Dialectics". The China Quarterly 19 (July - September, 1964):3-37.
- "How to Run 'May 7' Cadre Schools Well". Chinese Education (Title Issue).
- Hsiung, James Chieh. Ideology and Practice: The Evaluation of Chinese Communism. New York: Praeger, 1970.
- Hsu, Immanuel Chung-yeieh. The Impact of Industrialisation on Higher Education in China. Berkeley: Centre for Chinese Studies, 1966.

Hu, C.T. Aspects of Chinese Education. New York: Teachers College Press, 1969.

_____. Chinese Education Under Communism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962.

Karnow, Stanley. Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution. New York: The Viking Press, 1972.

King, Frank H.H. A Concise Economic History of Modern China. New York: Praeger, 1968.

Liang Nien. "A Significant Development in China's Education Revolution". Peking Review 2 (1966).

Lifton, Robert J. Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. New York: Random House, 1968.

Lindbeck, John M., ed. China: Management of a Revolutionary Society. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1977.

Lindsay, Michael. Notes on Educational Problems in Communist China, 1941-1947. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950.

Liu Shih. "Two Years of Advance in People's Education". In Chinese Communist Education, pp. 111-115. Edited by Stewart E. Fraser. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965.

Liu, William T., ed. Chinese Society Under Communism: A Reader. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967.

Lu Ting-yi. "Education Must be Combined With Productive Labour." In Chinese Communist Education, pp. 283-300. Edited by Stewart E. Fraser. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965.

Ma Hsu-lun. "Successes of People's Education". In Chinese Communist Education, pp. 131-135. Edited by Stewart E. Fraser. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965.

Mac Nair, Harley Farnsworth, ed. Modern Chinese History: Selected Readings. Shanghai: The Commercial Press Ltd., 1933.

Mc Farquar, Roderick. Origins of the Cultural Revolution: Contradictions among the People 1956-1957. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.

Machetzki, Rudiger. "China's Education Since the Cultural Revolution". The Political Quarterly 45 (1974):1:58-74.

- Mao Tse-tung. China's New Democracy. Introduction by Earl Browder. New York: n.p., 1945.
- _____. Quotations from Mao Tse-tung. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966.
- _____. Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1971.
- Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. The Communist Manifesto. Introduction by A.J.P. Taylor. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967.
- Mauger, Peter. Education in China. London: Anglo-Chinese Educational Institute, 1974.
- Meisner, Maurice. "Leninism and Maoism: Some Populist Perspectives on Marxism-Leninism in China." China Quarterly 45 (January - March, 1971):3-17.
- Mu Fu-sheng. The Wilting of the Hundred Flowers. New York: Praeger, 1962.
- Munro, Donald J. "Man, State, School: China's Developmental Experience" Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 31. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973.
- Muszynski, A. "Yenan Principles in Chinese Education." Master of Arts Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1973.
- Myrdal, Jan. Report from a Chinese Villages. New York: Vintage Books, 1965.
- Nee, Victor, and Peck, James, eds. China's Uninterrupted Revolution from 1840 to the Present. New York: Pantheon Books, 1975.
- Nee, Victor, and Layman, Don. "The Cultural Revolution at Peking University". Monthly Review 21:3 (August, 1969).
- New China Advances to Socialism: A Selection of Speeches Delivered at the Third Session of the First National People's Congress. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956.
- Paauw, Douglas S. "The Kuomintang and Economic Stagnation, 1928-1937". In Modern China. Edited by A. Feuerwerker. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
- Pa Chin. Family. New York: Anchor Books, 1972.
- Payne, Robert. Mao Tse-tung, Ruler of Red China. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1950.

- Podoul, Gilbert. "China 1974: Problems, Not Models". New Left Review 89 (January - February, 1975):73-82.
- Price, Don. C. Russia and the Roots of the Chinese Revolution, 1896-1911. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.
- Price, Ronald F. Education in Communist China. New York: Praeger, 1970.
- Proposals of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China for the Second Five-Year Plan for Development of the National Economy 1958-1962. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956.
- Purcell, Victor, W.W.S. Problems of Chinese Education. London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1936.
- Report of the Preparatory Committee of the Regional Study Conference on Fundamental Education. Nanking: Ministry of Education, 1947.
- Ridley, C.P.; Goodwin, P.H.B.; and Doolin, D.J. The Making of a Model Citizen in Communist China. Stanford: The Hoover Institution Press, 1971.
- Robinson, Joan. The Cultural Revolution in China Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1970.
- Schram, Stuart, ed. Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters: 1956-1971. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974.
- _____. ed. The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969.
- Selden, Mark. The Yen-an Way in Revolutionary China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.
- Seybolt, Peter, J., ed. Revolutionary Education in China: Documents and Commentary. White Plains: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1973.
- _____. "The Yen-an Revolution in Mass Education". The China Quarterly: 641-669.
- Snow, Edgar. Red Star Over China. New York: Grove Press, 1961.
- Solomon, Richard H. Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.
- Teng Ssu-Yu, and Fairbank, J.K., eds. China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey 1839-1923. New York: Alberneum Press, 1967.

- Tsang Chiu-Sam. Society, Schools and Progress in China. New York: Pergammon, 1968.
- van der Sprenkel, Otto B., Guillian, Robert; and Lindsay, Michael, eds. New China: Three Views. London: Turnstile Press, 1950.
- Wang Sing-tai. Changes in Chinese Communist Education. Taipei: Asian People's Anti-Communist League, 1972.
- Wang, Y.C. "Intellectuals and Society in China". Comparative Studies in Society and History 3 (1961): 395-426.
- Wheelwright, E.L. and McFarlane, Bruce. The Chinese Road to Socialism. New York and London, Monthly Review Press, 1970.

TANZANIA: EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT

- Ake, C. "Tanzania, The Progress of a Decade." The African Review 2:1 (1972): 55-64.
- Arrighi, Giovanni, and Saul, John. "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa." Journal of Modern African Studies 6:2 (1968): 141-169.
- Besha, M.R. "Education for Self-Reliance and Rural Development". Dar es Salaam: Institute of Education, 1973. (mimeographed)
- Burke, Fred G. "Tanganyika: The Search for Ujamaa". In African Socialism, pp. 194-221. Edited by W.H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg Jr. London and Nairobi: Stanford University Press, 1964.
- de la Rue, Andre. "Ujamaa on the Move." The New African. (October, 1967): 6-10.
- Cameron, J., and Dodd, W.A. Society, Schools and Progress in Tanzania. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1970.
- Dolan, L.F. "Transition from Colonialism to Self-Reliance in Tanzanian Education." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1970.
- Dumont, Rene. False Start in Africa. Translated by Phyllis Nauts Ott. 2nd revised edition. New York: Praeger, 1969.
- _____. Utopia or Else. Translated by Vivienne Menkes. London: Andre Deutsch. , 1974.
- Dumont, Rene, and Mazoyer, Marcel. Socialisms and Development. Translated by Rupert Cunningham. New York: Praeger, 1973.
- Eliufoo, S.N. "The Aims and Purposes of Tanzanian Education since Independence". In Tanzania in Revolution by Education. pp. 33-48. Edited by Idrian L. Resnick. Arusha: Longmans of Tanzania, 1968.
- Ewing, A.F. "Self Reliance in Africa." Journal of Modern African Studies 6:3 (1968): 361-372.
- Foster, Phillip. "Education for Self-Reliance: A Critical Evaluation." In Education in Africa: Research and Action. Edited by Richard Jolly. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1969.

- Friedland, W.H., and Rosberg, Carl A., Jr. eds. African Socialism. London and Nairobi: Stanford University Press, 1964.
- Chai, Dharam P. "Reflecting on Tanzania's Plan". East Africa Journal, (June, 1964): 17-24.
- Hall, Budd L. "Literacy and Development: The Freire Approach," Mbioni 6:10 (1972).
- Harris, Belle. "An Ideological Institute for Tanzania?" In Tanzania Revolution by Education, pp. 153-162. Edited by Idrian L. Resnick. Arusha: Longmans of Tanzania, 1968.
- Hatch, John. Tanzania: A Profile. New York: Praeger, 1972.
- Helleiner, G.K. "Tanzania's Second Plan: Socialism and Self-Reliance." East Africa Journal 5:12 (December, 1968): 41-50.
- Hyden, Goran. "Analysis of Tanzania's Second Development Plan." East Africa Journal 6:10 (October, 1969).
- Ingle, C.R. From Village to State in Tanzania. Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1972.
- Jolly, Richard. Education in Africa: Research and Action. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1969.
- Kilimhana, Samuel N.M. "An Evaluation of the Kwansisi Experimental Project in Tanzania." Master of Education Thesis, The University of Alberta, 1975.
- Lema, Anza A. "Education for Self-Reliance." Dar es Salaam: Institute of Education, n.d. (mimeographed).
- Mapolu, Henry. "The Organisation and Participation of Workers in Tanzania." African Review 2:3 (1972): 381-416.
- Mohidden, Ahmed. "Nyerere and Fanon on African Development and Leadership." Pan-African Journal 6:2 (1973): 163-182.
- _____. "Reflections on Socialist Tanzania". East Africa Journal 9:11, (November, 1972): 26-37.
- Mulei, Christopher. "The Predicament of the Left in Tanzania." East Africa Journal 9:8, (August, 1972): 29-34.
- Mwapachu, J.V. "Operation Planned Villages in Rural Tanzania: A Revolutionary Strategy for Development." Mbioni 7:11 (November, 1975): 5-39.

- Mwingira, A.C. "Education for Self-Reliance: The Problems of Implementation." In Education in Africa: Research and Action, pp. 65-80. Edited by Richard Jolly. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1969.
- Nkoana, Matthew. "Mwilamu Speaks." Review of Freedom and Unity: 1952-1965 by Julius K. Nyerere. The New African. (October, 1967), p. 26.
- Mazrui, Ali, A. On Heroes and Uhuru Worship. London: Longmans, 1967.
- Nyerere, Julius K. "Adult Education in Tanzania." Mbioni 6:7 (1972): 3-11.
- _____. "Education, A Tool for Liberation and Development of Man." Mbioni 7:7 (1975): 14-23.
- _____. Freedom and Development: A Selection of Writings and Speeches 1968-1973. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- _____. Freedom and Socialism: A Selection of Writings and Speeches 1965-1967. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press.
- _____. Freedom and Unity: 1952-1965. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- _____. "Tanzania Ten Years After Independence." The African Review 2:1 (1972): 1-54.
- _____. Ujamaa - Essays on Socialism. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- O'Connor, Edmund. "Contrasts in Educational Development in Kenya and Tanzania." African Affairs 73:290 (January, 1974): 67-84.
- Okoye, Mokwuyo. "Socialism for Africa." Africa 42 (February, 1975): 42-43.
- Onooha, Bede. The Elements of African Socialism. London: Andre Deutsch, 1965.
- Othman, Haroub. "The Tanzanian State: Who Controls It, whose Interests Does it Serve?" Monthly Review 26:7 (December, 1974): 46-57.
- Pratt, C. "Nyerere on the Transition to Socialism in Tanzania." The African Review 5:1 (1975): 63-76.

- Prewitt, Kenneth. Education and Political Values - An East African Case Study. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1971.
- Resnick, Idrian L, ed. Tanzania: Revolution by Education. Arusha: Longmans of Tanzania, 1968.
- Rodney, Walter. "Tanzanian Ujamaa and Scientific Socialism." The African Review 1:4 (April, 1972): 61-76.
- Rweyemamu, A.F. "Managing Planned Development: Tanzania's Experience." Journal of Modern African Studies 4:1 (1966): 1-16.
- Rweyemamu, A.F., and Mwansasu, B.V. Planning in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam: East African Literature Bureau, 1974.
- Saul, J.S., and Cliffe, Lionel R. "The District Development Front in Tanzania." The African Review 2:1 (1972): 65-104.
- Saul, J.S., and Cliffe, Lionel R. Socialism in Tanzania. 2 vols. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972.
- Scanlon, D.G., ed. Traditions in African Education. New York: Columbia Teacher's College Press, 1964.
- Shivji, Issa G. Class Struggles in Tanzania. London: Heinemann, 1976.
- _____. "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle." In Socialism In Tanzania, vol. 2, pp. 304-330. Edited by John Saul and Lionel R. Cliffe. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972.
- Svedsen, Knud E. "Socialist Problems After the Arusha Declaration." East Africa Journal 2:2 (May, 1967): 9-15.
- Szentes, Thomas. "Underdevelopment and Socialism". Eastern Africa Economic Review 2:2 (December, 1970): 1-13.
- "Tanzania Development Plan." Africa Digest 17:1 (February, 1970): 9.
- Tanzania: Party Guidelines [Mwongozo wa Tanu]. Translated by Development Studies Department, University of Dar es Salaam. Richmond, British Columbia: L.S.M. Information Centre, 1973.
- Tordoff, W. Government and Politics in Tanzania. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1967.
- Tordoff, W., and Mazrui, Ali A. "The Left and Super-Left in Tanzania." Journal of Modern African Studies 10:3 (1972): 427-445.

Toroka, S. "Education for Self-Reliance: The Litowa Experiment."
In Socialism in Tanzania, vol. 2, pp. 264-270. Edited by
John Saul and Lionel R. Cliffe, Nairobi: East Africa
Publishing House, 1972.

Van der Laar, Aurt. "Arusha: Before and After." East Africa
Journal 5:11 (November, 1968): 13-26.

B30199